America Last

1. A Century of the American Right's Romance with Foreign Dictators

If anything, the opposite is true: these arguments represent an act of conservation, preserving in a kind of rhetorical alembic grievances and apprehensions that can be traced all the way back to World War I, when intellectuals on the Right displayed an unease with mass democracy that manifested itself in a hankering for authoritarian leaders abroad.

A persistent pattern. The book argues that a significant strain within the American Right has consistently shown admiration for foreign authoritarian leaders over the past century. This isn't a new phenomenon but a recurring pattern rooted in deep-seated grievances against American liberal democracy. It's a tradition of seeking models abroad that seem to offer a stronger, more ordered alternative to the perceived chaos and decadence of American society.

Beyond realism. This historical affinity for strongmen isn't primarily based on pragmatic foreign policy realism, as its proponents often claim. Instead, it stems from a sincere ideological kinship. These figures on the Right often believe that authoritarianism, in various forms, is inherently superior to democracy, particularly for societies they deem unfit for self-governance.

A search for utopia. Disappointed by what they see as America's failings—its liberalism, tolerance, and secularism—these conservatives have repeatedly looked overseas for a political paradise. From Kaiser Wilhelm's Germany to Viktor Orbán's Hungary, they've sought foreign models to emulate at home, often blaming America first for global conflicts or domestic problems.

2. Early Admiration: From Kaiser Wilhelm to Mussolini's Order

In America, however, “Kaiser Bill,” as he was known, enjoyed numerous admirers.

Courting the Kaiser. At the turn of the 20th century and during World War I, figures like journalist H. L. Mencken and propagandist George Sylvester Viereck openly admired Germany's Kaiser Wilhelm II. They saw him as a strong leader unfairly maligned by Western powers, viewing Britain as the true threat and Woodrow Wilson as a warmonger. Their pro-German stance went beyond neutrality, actively defending the Kaiser's authoritarian regime and German culture.

Mencken's disdain. Mencken, a prominent journalist, openly deplored the emergence of democratic Germany after WWI. He viewed American democracy with contempt, seeing it as mob rule, and believed an "intelligent Fascism" led by an incorruptible elite might be better for America. His writings laid groundwork for later right-wing attacks on liberal presidents and government.

Mussolini's appeal. In the 1920s, Italian dictator Benito Mussolini became a new object of admiration. Figures like diplomat Richard Washburn Child and intellectual Irving Babbitt lauded him for restoring order, cracking down on communists, and promoting traditional values. Mussolini's perceived dynamism and efficiency appealed to those on the Right who longed for decisive action against perceived threats to traditional society.

3. Eugenics, Nativism, and the Appeal of Authoritarian Efficiency

“Whoever will take the time to read and ponder Mr. Lothrop Stoddard’s book on The Rising Tide of Color,” Harding said, “must realize that our race problem here in the United States is a phase of a race issue that the whole world confronts.”

Racial anxieties. The early 20th century saw rising fears about immigration from Southern and Eastern Europe, often framed in racial terms by proponents of eugenics like Lothrop Stoddard and Madison Grant. They warned of "race suicide" and the dilution of the "Nordic" American stock, advocating for immigration restrictions and racial segregation.

Authoritarian solutions. These racial anxieties intertwined with admiration for authoritarian regimes. Figures like Stoddard saw Mussolini's Italy as a model for preserving racial purity and social order. The idea of a strong leader capable of imposing discipline and controlling "inferior races" resonated with those who feared the consequences of mass democracy and immigration.

Mainstreaming prejudice. Stoddard and Grant's ideas, though rooted in pseudoscientific racism, gained traction in mainstream American politics, influencing figures like Presidents Harding and Coolidge and contributing to the passage of discriminatory immigration laws in the 1920s. This period solidified a link between nativism, racial hierarchy, and a willingness to see foreign authoritarian states as models for domestic policy.

4. Post-WWII Revisionism: Downplaying Nazi Crimes, Hyping Communist Threat

In his judgment, “Both Hitler and Roosevelt—each in his own way—were masters of the art of manipulating the masses, and by a strange quirk of fate they died within a few weeks of each other.”

Revisionist history. After World War II, a segment of the Right, including figures like historian Harry Elmer Barnes and publisher Henry Regnery, promoted a revisionist view of the conflict. They argued that the war was unnecessary, that Roosevelt had provoked Japan, and that the real outcome was the rise of Soviet power, not the defeat of totalitarianism.

Soft on Nazism. This revisionism often involved downplaying or excusing Nazi atrocities while highlighting perceived Allied misdeeds, such as the bombing of German cities or the Nuremberg trials (dismissed as "victor's justice"). Figures like Freda Utley argued that Allied crimes rivaled or exceeded those of the Nazis, portraying Germany as a victim of Allied vengeance.

McCarthy's defense. Senator Joseph McCarthy, in his quest for political prominence, seized on issues like the Malmedy massacre trial to defend accused Nazis. He insinuated that the American interrogators were Jewish refugees seeking revenge, illustrating how anti-communism and anti-Semitism could converge with a willingness to whitewash the crimes of the Third Reich.

5. The Cold War Shift: Embracing Anti-Communist Strongmen

Implicitly sanctioning Mussolini’s power grab,” wrote the historian Ruth Ben-Ghiat, “the act started a century of US support for right-wing authoritarian leaders.”

New enemies, new friends. With the rise of the Soviet Union as the primary global adversary, the focus of the Right's admiration shifted from fascist dictators to anti-communist strongmen. Figures like Spain's Francisco Franco, despite his fascist past, were lauded as defenders of Western Christendom against godless communism.

The China Lobby. The fall of China to communism in 1949 fueled a new wave of anti-liberal fervor on the Right. The "China Lobby," including figures like Alfred Kohlberg and supported by media moguls like Henry Luce, championed Chiang Kai-shek as a heroic Christian leader and blamed the "pro-communist" State Department for his defeat.

McCarthyism's target. Joseph McCarthy capitalized on these anxieties, launching a campaign against perceived communist traitors within the U.S. government, particularly in the State Department. This era solidified the Right's narrative of a malevolent liberal elite undermining American security and betraying allies abroad.

6. The "Kirkpatrick Doctrine" Justifies Authoritarian Allies

Although there is no instance of a revolutionary ‘socialist’ or Communist society being democratized, right-wing autocracies do sometimes evolve into democracies—given time, propitious economic, social, and political circumstances, talented leaders, and a strong indigenous demand for representative government.

Intellectual justification. During the Reagan administration, academic Jeane J. Kirkpatrick provided a widely influential argument for supporting right-wing authoritarian regimes. Her essay "Dictatorships and Double Standards" distinguished between "authoritarian" governments (seen as potentially reformable and compatible with American interests) and "totalitarian" communist regimes (seen as immutable and inherently hostile).

Pragmatism or preference? This doctrine offered a seemingly pragmatic rationale for aligning with dictators like Pinochet in Chile or various military juntas in Latin America, arguing they were necessary bulwarks against communism. However, critics argued it often served as a convenient excuse for supporting brutal regimes that shared the Right's disdain for liberalism and democratic movements.

Defending the indefensible. Kirkpatrick and her allies actively defended the human rights records of these regimes and downplayed their abuses. This included defending the Argentine junta during the Falklands War and supporting figures like Jonas Savimbi in Angola, often portraying them as freedom fighters despite evidence of their brutality and lack of democratic credentials.

7. Post-Cold War "America First" and Sympathy for New Autocrats

What we need, is a new nationalism, a new patriotism, a new foreign policy,” he wrote, “that puts America first, and, not only first, but second and third as well.”

Return of isolationism. With the end of the Cold War, figures like Pat Buchanan revived the "America First" slogan and advocated for American withdrawal from global commitments like NATO and foreign aid. They argued that America should focus inward and that promoting democracy abroad was a misguided, Wilsonian crusade.

Anti-establishment fervor. Buchanan's campaigns in the 1990s channeled populist anger against the Republican establishment, global elites, and neoconservatives, whom he accused of dual loyalty and pushing America into unnecessary wars. His rhetoric often echoed earlier nativist and anti-Semitic tropes from the Old Right.

Sympathy for strongmen. Despite advocating non-intervention, Buchanan and his allies often expressed sympathy for authoritarian figures like Serbia's Slobodan Milošević or Russia's Vladimir Putin, viewing them as defenders of national identity against globalist forces. This revealed that their stance wasn't purely isolationist but involved a preference for certain types of illiberal regimes.

8. The Iraq War Backlash Fuels Anti-Establishment Sentiment

Over the next decade, however, the imperialist follies of a Republican, not a Democratic, administration would give Buchanan’s arguments real traction on the Right.

Neocon ascendancy and fall. Following 9/11, neoconservatives gained significant influence, advocating for regime change in the Middle East, particularly in Iraq. Figures like Max Boot openly championed a new era of American global leadership, sometimes invoking the language of enlightened imperialism.

War fatigue and disillusionment. The protracted and costly wars in Iraq and Afghanistan led to widespread disillusionment, particularly on the Right. Critics like Ron Paul and William F. Buckley Jr. condemned the wars as utopian crusades and a betrayal of traditional conservative principles, echoing earlier critiques of American interventionism.

Fertile ground for populism. The failure in Iraq provided fertile ground for anti-establishment sentiment. The neoconservatives, once ascendant, were blamed for the debacle, and their influence waned. This created an opening for a new wave of populist conservatives who were deeply skeptical of foreign intervention and the foreign policy establishment.

9. Today's Idols: Putin, Orbán, and the Culture Wars

In lavishing praise on Putin and other dictators, however, Trump wasn’t creating a new style of right-wing politics. Instead, he was building on a long-standing tradition.

Trump's embrace. Donald Trump openly admired strongmen like Vladimir Putin, praising his leadership and questioning traditional alliances like NATO. His rhetoric normalized expressing admiration for foreign authoritarians within the Republican party, building on the historical tradition identified in the book.

Orbán as a model. Hungary's Viktor Orbán has become a key figure of admiration for many American conservatives. His "illiberal democracy," crackdown on liberal institutions, and focus on "traditional values" and anti-immigration policies are seen as a blueprint for what the American Right wants to achieve domestically. Figures like Tucker Carlson and Ron DeSantis have actively promoted the "Hungarian Way."

Culture war focus. This contemporary admiration is often explicitly linked to cultural grievances, particularly opposition to "wokeness," LGBTQ+ rights, and perceived liberal dominance in institutions like universities and media. Putin and Orbán are seen as defenders of Christian and traditional values against a global liberal tide.

10. The Enduring Disdain for American Liberal Democracy

At bottom, they are advocating ethno-nationalism in the guise of a set of principles.

Rejecting the American ideal. The core thread connecting these historical instances of admiring foreign dictators is a fundamental dissatisfaction with American liberal democracy itself. Figures on the Right have consistently viewed it as weak, decadent, or susceptible to control by undesirable groups (immigrants, Jews, communists, liberals, the "deep state").

A different "Americanism". While claiming to defend "Americanism," these figures often advocate for policies and structures antithetical to the nation's founding ideals of universal rights and democratic governance. They draw distinctions between a "republic" (favored) and a "democracy" (feared), seeking to limit popular rule and impose a conservative, often ethno-nationalist, vision.

Putting America Last. By consistently looking abroad for models, downplaying the crimes of authoritarian regimes, and blaming America first for global problems, this strain of the Right, paradoxically, puts American ideals and independence last. Their romance with foreign strongmen reveals a deeper desire for a different kind of America, one less liberal and more aligned with the illiberal imagination they admire overseas.

Last updated: May 19, 2025