Consciousness Explained

1. Consciousness is not a unified stream, but multiple drafts of content

There is no single, definitive "stream of consciousness," because there is no central Headquarters, no Cartesian Theater where "it all comes together" for the perusal of a Central Meaner.

Multiple Drafts Model. Instead of a single stream of consciousness, our brain processes information in parallel through multiple specialized circuits. These circuits create various "drafts" of content, which are constantly edited and revised. Some drafts persist and influence behavior, while others fade away quickly.

• Key aspects of the Multiple Drafts Model:
  • Parallel processing of information
  • Constant editing and revision of content
  • No central "audience" or "meaner"
  • Drafts compete for influence on behavior and memory

This model explains phenomena like the color phi experiment, where subjects report seeing a moving spot change color before the second stimulus is presented. Rather than "backwards referral in time," this is simply the brain's best interpretation based on available information.

2. The brain doesn't have a central "Cartesian Theater" for consciousness

There is no one place in the brain through which all these causal trains must pass in order to deposit their content "in consciousness."

Distributed Processing. The idea of a central place in the brain where consciousness happens - a "Cartesian Theater" - is deeply flawed. Instead, consciousness emerges from the distributed processing of information across various brain regions.

• Problems with the Cartesian Theater concept:
  • No neuroanatomical evidence for a central consciousness area
  • Timing issues (e.g., the "Cartesian bottleneck")
  • Inability to explain complex phenomena like blindsight

The brain's architecture is more like a "pandemonium" of competing specialists, each contributing to our conscious experience without a central coordinator. This distributed model better explains the flexibility and complexity of human consciousness.

3. Language shapes our thoughts and inner experiences

Looking at ourselves from the computer viewpoint, we cannot avoid seeing that natural language is our most important "programming language."

Linguistic Scaffolding. Language is not just a tool for communication; it fundamentally shapes our thoughts and inner experiences. It provides a structure for organizing our mental content and allows us to manipulate complex ideas.

• Ways language influences cognition:
  • Provides categories and concepts for thinking
  • Enables abstract reasoning and planning
  • Shapes our internal monologue and self-reflection
  • Allows for cultural transmission of ideas (memes)

The acquisition of language dramatically alters our cognitive landscape, creating new possibilities for thought and consciousness. This "linguistic scaffolding" is a crucial aspect of human consciousness that distinguishes us from other animals.

4. Qualia and phenomenal experiences are not as mysterious as they seem

If I couldn't talk to myself, I'd have no way of knowing what I was thinking.

Demystifying Qualia. The idea of ineffable, intrinsic qualities of experience (qualia) is often seen as a major challenge to materialist theories of consciousness. However, these supposedly mysterious qualities can be explained through the brain's information processing and our ability to reflect on our experiences.

• Reasons to be skeptical of qualia:
  • No clear evidence for their existence beyond our reports
  • Can be explained by complex information processing
  • Often conflated with the content of experiences

Rather than positing special "mental stuff," we can understand phenomenal experiences as the result of our brain's ability to process, categorize, and reflect on sensory information. The feeling of "what it's like" to have an experience emerges from this complex interplay of information processing and self-reflection.

5. The brain doesn't "fill in" missing information, it ignores gaps

The fundamental flaw in the idea of "filling in" is that it suggests that brain is providing something when in fact the brain is ignoring something.

Efficient Representation. Contrary to popular belief, the brain doesn't "fill in" missing information in phenomena like the blind spot or neon color spreading. Instead, it efficiently represents the world by ignoring gaps and generalizing from available information.

• Examples of efficient representation:
  • Blind spot: not filled in, simply ignored
  • Neon color spreading: labeling of regions, not pixel-by-pixel filling
  • Wallpaper illusion: generalization from limited samples

This approach is computationally efficient and explains why we don't notice many gaps in our perception. It also challenges the idea that consciousness involves creating a detailed internal replica of the world.

6. Consciousness evolves through three processes: genetic, phenotypic, and memetic

Human consciousness is itself a huge complex of memes (or more exactly, meme-effects in brains) that can best be understood as the operation of a "von Neumannesque" virtual machine implemented in the parallel architecture of a brain that was not designed for any such activities.

Evolutionary Layers. Human consciousness is the result of three evolutionary processes layered on top of each other:

1. Genetic evolution: Provides the basic neural architecture
2. Phenotypic plasticity: Allows for individual learning and adaptation
3. Memetic evolution: Cultural transmission of ideas and mental habits

This layered approach explains the complexity and flexibility of human consciousness. Memes, in particular, play a crucial role in shaping our conscious experiences and cognitive abilities, allowing for rapid cultural evolution beyond genetic constraints.

7. Our sense of self is a "user illusion" created by the brain

What I am suggesting is that there is nothing more to being in the background of experience than that.

Virtual Self. Our sense of a unified, conscious self is akin to a "user illusion" created by the brain. Just as a computer's user interface simplifies complex underlying processes, our sense of self provides a simplified model of our brain's distributed processes.

• Aspects of the "user illusion" of self:
  • Feeling of unity and continuity
  • Sense of agency and free will
  • Illusion of detailed perceptual awareness

This model explains why our conscious experience feels unified despite the distributed nature of brain processing. It also accounts for phenomena like confabulation, where we create post-hoc explanations for our actions.

8. Blindsight reveals the complexity of visual processing and consciousness

Blindsight involves (1) receipt of visual information that is (2) nevertheless unconscious.

Unconscious Processing. The phenomenon of blindsight, where people with certain types of brain damage can respond to visual stimuli they don't consciously see, reveals the complexity of visual processing and consciousness.

• Key insights from blindsight:
  • Visual processing can occur without conscious awareness
  • Consciousness is not necessary for some types of visual-guided behavior
  • Challenges simple models of visual consciousness

Blindsight suggests that consciousness is not a simple result of sensory processing, but involves additional processes of integration and access. It also raises questions about the relationship between conscious experience and unconscious information processing.

9. The timing and order of conscious experiences are not fixed or absolute

The fundamental principle that causes must precede effects applies to the multiple distributed processes that accomplish the editorial work of the brain.

Flexible Timing. The brain's distributed processing means that the timing and order of conscious experiences are not fixed or absolute. Instead, they are constructed based on the brain's best interpretation of available information.

• Implications of flexible timing:
  • Explains phenomena like the color phi effect
  • Challenges the idea of a fixed "stream of consciousness"
  • Suggests consciousness is more like editing than experiencing

This view resolves apparent paradoxes in the timing of conscious experiences and explains why our subjective sense of time can sometimes differ from objective measures.

10. Introspection is not a reliable way to understand consciousness

We must break the habit of positing ever-more-central observers.

Limits of Introspection. While introspection can provide valuable data about our conscious experiences, it is not a reliable method for understanding the underlying mechanisms of consciousness.

• Reasons to be skeptical of introspection:
  • Prone to confabulation and post-hoc rationalization
  • Limited access to unconscious processes
  • Influenced by our theories and expectations about consciousness

Instead of relying solely on introspection, a scientific understanding of consciousness requires a combination of behavioral experiments, neuroscientific studies, and philosophical analysis. This approach can help us move beyond intuitive but misleading models of consciousness.

Last updated: January 23, 2025