Introduction to Phenomenology

1. Consciousness is fundamentally "of" something, overcoming the egocentric predicament.

The core doctrine in phenomenology is the teaching that every act of consciousness we perform, every experience that we have, is intentional: it is essentially “consciousness of” or an “experience of” something or other.

Intentionality is primary. Unlike philosophies that trap the mind in an "egocentric predicament" – believing we are only directly aware of our own internal ideas or brain states – phenomenology asserts that consciousness is inherently directed outwards. Awareness is always awareness of something, whether it's a perceived object, an imagined scene, a remembered event, or a judged fact.

Breaking the internal bubble. The idea that the mind is like an enclosed cabinet, only indirectly connected to the "outside" world through inferences from internal impressions, is a philosophical confusion. Phenomenology argues that this starting point is false; we are not trapped inside ourselves but are fundamentally related to objects and the world from the outset.

Publicness of mind. By emphasizing intentionality, phenomenology reclaims the public nature of thinking and perception. It shows that our awareness is not confined to a private, internal space but is actively engaged with a world that is available for disclosure and shared understanding.

2. Phenomenology studies how things appear, revealing structures of parts, wholes, identity, presence, and absence.

By phenomena we mean, for example, pictures as opposed to simple objects, remembered events as opposed to anticipated ones, imagined objects as opposed to perceived, mathematical objects such as triangles and sets as opposed to living things, words as opposed to fossils, other people as opposed to nonhuman animals, political reality as opposed to the economic.

Giving an account of appearances. Phenomenology, derived from Greek phainomenon (that which appears) and logos (account), is the philosophical discipline that describes the various ways things present themselves to us in experience. It insists that appearances are real and belong to the being of things, not just subjective illusions.

Fundamental structures of appearance. Across all types of phenomena, phenomenology identifies recurring formal structures that shape our experience:

• Parts and Wholes: Distinguishing between pieces (independent parts) and moments (dependent parts).
• Identity in Manifolds: Recognizing a single object or meaning through a variety of different presentations (e.g., a cube through its many sides/aspects/profiles).
• Presence and Absence: Understanding how objects are given through a blend of what is currently present and what is absent but cointended (e.g., the hidden sides of a cube, a remembered past, an anticipated future).

Beyond mere impressions. These structures demonstrate that experience is not just a stream of disconnected sensory impressions. It involves active synthesis and recognition of identity across difference, revealing the inherent intelligibility and structure in the way things show up.

3. Philosophical analysis requires shifting from the natural attitude to the contemplative phenomenological attitude.

The phenomenological attitude, on the other hand, is the focus we have when we reflect upon the natural attitude and all the intentionalities that occur within it.

Two fundamental stances. We primarily live in the "natural attitude," directly engaged with the world and its objects, accepting their reality through an underlying "world belief." Philosophical analysis, however, requires adopting the "phenomenological attitude," a reflective stance that contemplates the natural attitude itself.

The phenomenological reduction (epochē). This shift involves suspending or "bracketing" our natural beliefs and intentionalities, not by doubting them, but by neutralizing them for the purpose of contemplation. This allows us to examine how things appear and how we intend them, rather than simply being absorbed by them.

Contemplating intentionality and its correlates. From the phenomenological viewpoint, we analyze the intentional acts (noeses) and their corresponding objects as they are experienced (noemas). This isn't introspection into private mental states, but a description of the universal structures of consciousness and appearance, revealing the correlation between mind and world.

4. Human experience involves diverse intentionalities like perception, memory, imagination, and anticipation.

Besides seeing and hearing things, we also recollect, anticipate, and fantasize, and in doing so we live a private, even secret conscious life.

Variations on perception. While perception gives us objects directly in their presence, our conscious life extends beyond the immediate "here and now" through modifications of this basic intentionality. Memory, imagination, and anticipation allow us to intend objects in different modes of absence.

Displacement of the self. These intentionalities involve a displacement of the self, allowing us to live mentally in other times and places.

• Memory: Reliving past perceptions, bringing the "there and then" to the "here and now" as past.
• Imagination: Projecting into unreal or hypothetical scenarios, operating in an "as if" mode.
• Anticipation: Projecting into possible future situations, often with a realistic belief mode for planning.

Manifolds of the self and object. These displaced intentionalities create new manifolds of appearance for both the object (e.g., the same house perceived, remembered, or imagined) and the self (the self here-and-now remembering the self there-and-then). This interplay is crucial for establishing personal identity over time.

5. We intend things through external representations like words, pictures, and symbols.

Here we are conscious of external things that are not merely perceived but interpreted as images or words or other kinds of representations.

Intentionalities built on perception. Beyond internal modifications, perception can also serve as a base for intentionalities directed towards external objects that function as representations. We perceive marks or sounds, but we intend them as something more.

Distinct modes of representation:

• Signification (Words): Taking perceived marks or sounds as words that point away to an absent object or meaning (e.g., seeing "hotel" and intending the building). This is a discrete, empty intention.
• Picturing (Pictures): Taking a perceived surface (canvas, paper) as depicting something else, bringing the intended object towards us, embodied in the image. This is more concrete and perspective-bound than signification.
• Indication (Symbols/Signals): Taking a perceived object (pile of stones, flag) as pointing to or signaling something else, often an absent object, but without the articulation of words or the embodiment of pictures.

Expanding manifolds and identity. These representational intentionalities add further layers to the manifolds through which objects are given and identified. They allow for communication and shared understanding of things, whether present or absent, enriching the being of the object and the self's capacity for disclosure.

6. Categorial intentionality articulates states of affairs and judgments, grounding language and thought.

When we move to the categorial domain, we move from simple, “one-rayed” intentions to complex, “many-rayed” intentions.

From perception to intellection. Categorial intentionality is the rational activity that goes beyond simple perception to articulate relationships, features, and states of affairs (e.g., moving from perceiving a car to registering "the car is damaged"). It introduces syntax and structure into our experience.

Constitution of categorial objects. This process involves:

• Passive perception of an object.
• Highlighting a specific feature or part.
• Explicitly registering the whole as containing the part, articulating a relation (e.g., subject-predicate).

Grounding language and logic. Categorial intentionality is the basis for human language and thinking. The syntax of language expresses the part-whole relationships and articulations achieved in categorial consciousness. This domain is the "space of reasons," where logic and argument become possible.

7. Judgments and meanings are not mental entities but arise from reflection on states of affairs.

The benefit of this new explanation of how propositions and meanings come to be is that it avoids the need to posit judgments and meanings as mysterious mental or conceptual entities.

Overcoming mentalism. Phenomenology offers a powerful alternative to the traditional view that meanings, judgments, or propositions are private, mental entities mediating between the mind and the world. This view leads to philosophical perplexities about their nature and how they connect us to reality.

Propositional reflection. Instead, phenomenology argues that a "proposition" or "sense" arises when we adopt a specific reflective attitude towards a state of affairs – taking it as proposed by someone rather than simply as the way things are. This is "propositional reflection."

Truth as correspondence in presentation. The correspondence theory of truth is reinterpreted: truth is not a match between a mental entity and a fact, but a blending or identification between a state of affairs taken as proposed (the proposition/sense) and the same state of affairs given in direct evidence (the fact). The proposition is "disquoted" when confirmed.

8. The self is a public, embodied, transcendental ego, the responsible agent of truth.

The ego is the dative of manifestation.

Empirical vs. Transcendental. The self is ambiguously both an empirical thing in the world (a body, a psyche) and a transcendental ego, the center of disclosure to whom the world appears and the agent responsible for truth claims. These are not two entities, but one being considered in its dual aspect.

Beyond psychologism. Phenomenology combats the reductionist view that reason, truth, and the self are merely psychological or biological phenomena. While grounded in the body and psyche, the transcendental ego enters the public "space of reasons" through intentional acts, becoming an agent of truth and meaning.

Public and embodied. The transcendental ego is not a private, hidden entity but is actualized and revealed in public, embodied actions like speaking, judging, and acting. Our corporeality, with its unique modes of experience (like the reversibility of touch), is the ineluctable "here" from which the ego operates and identifies itself over time.

9. Temporality is layered, with a fundamental consciousness of time underlying all experience.

In phenomenology, this third level, with the special flow that occurs in it, is an absolute.

Three levels of time. Phenomenology distinguishes:

• World Time: Objective, public time of clocks and events.
• Internal Time: Subjective, private duration and sequence of conscious experiences.
• Internal Time Consciousness: The fundamental, pre-personal "flow" that constitutes the temporality of both internal and world time.

The Living Present. This deepest level is not a series of atomic "nows" but a "living present" composed of inseparable moments: primal impression (the actual now), retention (immediate past), and protention (immediate future). This structure allows for the experience of duration and continuity.

Origin of temporal manifestation. Internal time consciousness is the ultimate, non-founded source for the appearance of time itself. It is the "standing-flowing" origin where the most basic distinctions and identities of temporality are constituted, making possible all other temporal experiences and objects.

10. The life world is the primary reality, from which modern science originates but does not replace.

The world we live in and directly perceive is only a construct made by our minds responding to the input from our senses, and the senses react biologically to physical stimuli that are transmitted from objects.

Science vs. Lived World. Modern science, with its mathematical idealizations and claim to describe the "true" reality (atoms, forces), created a philosophical problem: is the world we directly experience (the "life world") merely subjective appearance?

Foundation in the Life World. Phenomenology argues that the exact sciences are not a competing reality but are founded upon the life world. Scientific concepts (like geometric surfaces or light rays) are idealizations derived from our direct experience of things through a special intentionality mixing perception and imagination.

Intersubjectivity and shared reality. The life world is not a private construct but a world held in common. Our experience of objects is inherently intersubjective; we perceive things as also being seen and understood by others from different perspectives, enriching the object's identity and transcendence.

11. Reason aims at truth and evidence, achieved through disclosure and verification, amidst vagueness and hiddenness.

In science, we wish simply to find the truth of things; the scientific enterprise is an attempt just to show the way things are, apart from how they can be used or how we might wish them to be.

Reason's teleology. Reason is inherently ordered towards truth and evidence, the successful manifestation and confirmation of how things are. This is its natural end and perfection.

Two kinds of truth and evidence:

• Truth of Disclosure: The simple display or presencing of an intelligible object or state of affairs (e.g., seeing the tire is flat). Correlated with the subjective act of evidencing.
• Truth of Correctness: The verification that a proposition (a state of affairs taken as proposed) corresponds to the truth of disclosure (e.g., confirming the claim "the tire is flat").

Navigating obscurity. The life of reason involves navigating vagueness (inchoate thinking), error, and hiddenness. Vagueness, especially, can mask failures in syntactic form, logical consistency, and content coherence, which must be overcome for distinct thinking and truth to be achieved.

Last updated: May 11, 2025