Shopping for Bombs

1. Pakistan's Nuclear Quest Born from Defeat and Fear

If India builds the bomb, we will eat grass or leaves, even go hungry, but we will get one of our own.

Humiliation drove ambition. Pakistan's catastrophic military defeat by India in 1971, leading to the creation of Bangladesh, profoundly shook the nation's leadership and instilled a deep fear for its survival. This humiliation, coupled with a mistrust of Western allies who failed to intervene, convinced Pakistan's leaders that conventional military parity with India was impossible and nuclear weapons were the only viable deterrent.

Bhutto's resolve. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, who took power after the 1971 defeat, famously vowed that Pakistan would acquire nuclear weapons even if it meant extreme hardship. He convened a secret meeting of scientists in 1972, initiating the formal pursuit of the bomb, driven by national pride and the perceived need for ultimate security against a larger, hostile neighbor.

India's test accelerated efforts. India's "peaceful nuclear explosive" test in 1974 served as a critical catalyst, transforming Pakistan's nuclear program from an option into an imperative. This event solidified the national consensus that Pakistan needed its own bomb, setting the stage for A. Q. Khan's pivotal entry onto the scene.

2. A. Q. Khan's Espionage Laid the Foundation

Knowledge, not physical material, was the essence of Khan’s work and the secret to his success.

Accidental opportunity. A. Q. Khan, a metallurgist studying in Europe, was deeply affected by Pakistan's 1971 defeat and India's 1974 nuclear test. His offer to help Pakistan develop nuclear technology came at a critical time, leading him to a job at FDO in the Netherlands, a subcontractor to URENCO, which was at the forefront of centrifuge technology.

Exploiting openness. Despite only having low-level security clearance, Khan found it remarkably easy to access highly sensitive information at URENCO due to lax security and an "open atmosphere." He systematically gathered designs, drawings, specifications, and supplier lists for the latest centrifuge models, often taking documents home.

Foundation for proliferation. This stolen knowledge became the bedrock of Pakistan's enrichment program and, later, Khan's international network. He acquired not just the technical blueprints but also the crucial understanding of the supply chain – who made which parts – enabling him to replicate the process outside of state control.

3. Building the Bomb: Procurement and Rivalry

Khan had the great advantage of being the only person in the entire Pakistan program who had ever actually seen a working centrifuge.

Establishing Kahuta. Upon returning to Pakistan, Khan quickly leveraged his unique expertise to gain autonomy, establishing Engineering Research Laboratories (later KRL) in 1976, reporting directly to the Prime Minister. He personally selected the secretive site at Kahuta, near Islamabad, for the clandestine enrichment plant.

Global shopping spree. Khan devised a strategy to buy necessary components openly from around the world, exploiting commercial greed and weak export controls. His network spanned Europe, using front companies and diplomatic channels to acquire everything needed for a centrifuge plant, from vacuum pumps to specialized steel.

Internal conflict. Khan's rise fueled a bitter rivalry with the established Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC). This competition, coupled with compartmentalization and a lack of clear oversight, allowed Khan significant freedom and power within Pakistan's nuclear program, even as he began to diversify into missile development and conventional arms sales.

4. Afghan War Shielded Pakistan's Nuclear Progress

Prioritizing the Afghan issue over proliferation was a rational policy choice, especially in the context of the Cold War. But it was one that would have consequences.

Strategic shift. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 dramatically altered the U.S.-Pakistan relationship. Pakistan became a crucial ally in the covert war against the Soviets, leading the United States to prioritize counter-communism over nuclear non-proliferation.

Aid and blind eyes. Despite growing intelligence about Pakistan's clandestine nuclear program, the U.S. lifted sanctions and provided billions in aid to secure Pakistan's cooperation in Afghanistan. Successive administrations issued waivers to proliferation laws, effectively turning a blind eye to Pakistan's activities as long as they didn't conduct a nuclear test.

Khan's protection. This strategic prioritization provided A. Q. Khan with a crucial shield. U.S. intelligence knew of his procurement activities but was often prevented from acting decisively for fear of jeopardizing the Afghan effort. This period allowed Khan to consolidate his network and capabilities largely unimpeded.

5. Khan Transformed from Buyer to Global Seller

Here was an individual willing to proliferate to any country that was ready to pay—including Iran, North Korea, and Libya.

Post-Cold War shift. With the end of the Afghan war and the imposition of U.S. sanctions in 1990, Pakistan's access to Western aid and technology diminished. This, coupled with Khan's established procurement network and the need for alternative funding sources, spurred his transition from importing technology for Pakistan to exporting it to others.

Exploiting a niche. Khan recognized a global demand for nuclear technology, particularly enrichment know-how, which was difficult for states to acquire legitimately. He offered a unique "one-stop shopping" service, providing designs, components, and expertise outside of state control.

First customers emerge. Iran, seeking to revive its nuclear program after the 1979 revolution and the war with Iraq, became one of Khan's first known customers in the late 1980s. North Korea, needing missile technology and cash, also entered into a suspected barter arrangement with Pakistan involving Khan's nuclear expertise in the 1990s.

6. A Transnational Network Fueled by Greed and Ambition

Khan was a middleman: a broker for businesses willing to supply and for states wanting to buy, he fused the commercial greed of the former with the strategic interests of the latter.

Global reach. Khan built a sophisticated, transnational network of businesses and individuals across Europe, the Middle East, and Asia. This network, initially established for Pakistan's procurement, became the engine for his export business, sourcing materials and manufacturing components globally.

Dubai as a hub. Dubai in the UAE emerged as a central hub for the network's operations, offering a strategic location, minimal regulation, and a business-friendly environment. Khan and his associates used Dubai for meetings, transshipment, and establishing front companies.

Businessmen as key players. The network relied heavily on a core group of businessmen, many of whom had supplied Pakistan for years. Driven by lucrative profits and commissions, these individuals were willing to exploit loopholes in export controls and disguise the true nature and destination of goods.

7. Intelligence Tracked Khan, But Action Was Delayed

But intelligence itself is not enough. The question is how it is used.

Early warnings missed. Western intelligence agencies had glimpses of Khan's activities and network as early as the 1980s, but often underestimated his ambition and the scale of his operations. The focus remained primarily on state-level proliferation and plutonium programs, overlooking the growing threat of clandestine enrichment via Khan.

Challenges in tracking. Khan's use of dual-use items, front companies, and transshipment points made his activities difficult to definitively track and prove. Intelligence agencies faced dilemmas: reveal sources to confront Pakistan or continue watching to understand the full network?

Post-9/11 complexities. While 9/11 heightened fears of WMD proliferation, it also made Pakistan a crucial counter-terrorism partner, complicating efforts to pressure Musharraf on Khan. The focus on Iraq further diverted attention and resources from other proliferation threats, including Khan's network.

8. The Libya Deal: A Turning Point and a Breakthrough

The interception of the BBC China had come after a difficult, even depressing summer for the small team working jointly between America’s Central Intelligence Agency and Britain’s Secret Intelligence Service...

Libya's renewed push. After years of failed attempts, Libya under Colonel Gadaffi made a determined push for nuclear weapons in the mid-1990s, turning to the Khan network for a full, turnkey enrichment program. This deal was unprecedented in its scale and scope for a private proliferation network.

Secret negotiations. Simultaneously, Libya began secret talks with the UK and US, seeking to end its international isolation. These negotiations became intertwined with the intelligence efforts to expose Khan, as the US and UK used their knowledge of Libya's program (derived from penetrating Khan's network) to pressure Gadaffi.

The BBC China interception. A crucial breakthrough came in October 2003 with the interception of the BBC China, a ship carrying centrifuge components for Libya from Malaysia. This provided irrefutable evidence of the network's activities and forced Libya's hand in the disarmament talks.

9. Confronting Pakistan: Evidence Forces Khan's Downfall

The scale of detail made Khan’s activities undeniable.

Mounting pressure. With the exposure of Iran's nuclear program, the IAEA's investigation pointing to Pakistan, and the interception of the BBC China, the evidence against Khan became overwhelming. The US and UK intensified pressure on President Musharraf, presenting him with detailed intelligence on Khan's global activities.

Musharraf's dilemma. Musharraf faced a difficult choice: protect the national hero Khan and risk severe damage to Pakistan's crucial relationship with the US, or act against Khan and risk domestic backlash and instability. Khan's popularity and potential to expose military complicity complicated the decision.

Confession and pardon. Under intense pressure, Musharraf ordered an investigation into Khan and his associates. Khan eventually confessed to his activities, claiming sole responsibility and acting without government knowledge. In return for his confession and silence, he was pardoned and placed under house arrest, avoiding prosecution or extradition.

10. The Enduring Legacy: Proliferation Risks Remain

Khan may be out of business but the world is still sifting through the wreckage left by his work and looking warily over its shoulder to see what may be next.

Knowledge spread. Khan's most dangerous legacy is the spread of sensitive nuclear designs and technical knowledge, now potentially circulating in electronic formats. This information can enable other states or groups to pursue nuclear capabilities more easily, bypassing the need for complex espionage.

Network tentacles. While Khan is sidelined, questions remain about the full extent of his network's reach and whether all its members and customers have been identified. The possibility of other states receiving technology or material from Khan remains a significant concern.

Weakened non-proliferation. Khan's activities exposed critical weaknesses in the global non-proliferation regime, including lax export controls and the challenge of secondary proliferation from non-Western states. The rise of new nuclear aspirants and the erosion of the non-proliferation treaty continue to pose serious threats to international security.

Last updated: June 10, 2025