The Best and the Brightest

1. The Best and Brightest Were Blinded by Their Own Brilliance

They were extraordinarily intelligent, well-educated, informed, experienced, patriotic, and capable leaders. They were elegant and persuasive. They seemed born to govern, and America once had as much confidence in them as they so abundantly had in themselves. But, in the end, they had more confidence than vision, and that failing bred in them a fateful hubris. No irony here, but a classic tragedy.

Intellect vs. Wisdom. The Kennedy administration was filled with men of exceptional intelligence and academic achievement, yet they lacked the wisdom and experience necessary to navigate the complexities of Vietnam. Their confidence in their own abilities blinded them to the limitations of their knowledge and the realities on the ground.

• They were "the best and the brightest" by conventional standards, but their intellectual prowess did not translate into effective governance.
• Their focus on abstract concepts and rational analysis led them to underestimate the human and political dimensions of the conflict.
• They were more concerned with appearing competent than with understanding the true nature of the situation.

Hubris and Overconfidence. The Kennedy team's belief in their own superiority led to a fatal hubris, a sense that they could control events and impose their will on the world. This overconfidence prevented them from seeking out diverse perspectives and from acknowledging the limitations of their own understanding.

• They believed they were uniquely qualified to govern, and that their intelligence and education would guarantee success.
• They underestimated the strength and resilience of their adversaries, as well as the complexities of the Vietnamese political landscape.
• Their hubris led them to dismiss dissenting opinions and to ignore warnings from those with more experience.

A Classic Tragedy. The story of the Kennedy administration and Vietnam is not one of irony, but of classic tragedy. The men who led the nation into war were not villains, but rather flawed individuals whose strengths became their greatest weaknesses. Their intelligence and ambition, when combined with a lack of wisdom and humility, led to a disastrous outcome.

2. The Cold War's Shadow Fueled the Vietnam Quagmire

The basic question behind the book was why men who were said to be the ablest to serve in government in this century had been the architects of what struck me as likely to be the worst tragedy since the Civil War.

Fear of Communism. The Cold War and the fear of Communism were the dominant forces shaping American foreign policy in the 1960s. The Kennedy administration, like its predecessors, viewed the world through the lens of the Cold War, seeing every conflict as a battle in the larger struggle against Soviet expansion.

• The fear of being seen as "soft on Communism" led to a rigid and inflexible approach to foreign policy.
• The domino theory, the idea that the fall of one country to Communism would lead to the fall of others, was a powerful motivator for intervention in Vietnam.
• The legacy of McCarthyism, with its accusations of treason and disloyalty, still lingered, making it difficult for policymakers to challenge the prevailing anti-Communist consensus.

The China Syndrome. The "loss" of China to Communism in 1949 had a profound impact on American politics, creating a deep-seated fear of further Communist expansion in Asia. This fear, combined with the domino theory, made Vietnam seem like a crucial battleground in the larger struggle against Communism.

• The fall of China was seen as a major failure of American foreign policy, and the Democrats were blamed for it.
• The fear of being accused of "losing" another country to Communism led to a reluctance to consider alternatives to military intervention.
• The destruction of the careers of China experts during the McCarthy era meant that the Kennedy administration lacked access to informed perspectives on Asia.

A Self-Fulfilling Prophecy. The Cold War mentality created a self-fulfilling prophecy, where the fear of Communism led to actions that ultimately strengthened the very forces they were intended to contain. The American intervention in Vietnam, driven by the fear of Communism, ultimately fueled the very conflict it sought to prevent.

3. Style Over Substance: The Kennedy Team's Fatal Flaw

Being verbal seemed to be an end in itself.

The Power of Image. The Kennedy administration was known for its style, its charisma, and its ability to project an image of competence and sophistication. This emphasis on style, however, often came at the expense of substance, leading to a superficial approach to complex problems.

• The Kennedy team was skilled at manipulating the media and creating a positive public image.
• They were more concerned with appearing intelligent and capable than with actually being so.
• Their focus on style and image led them to underestimate the importance of substance and expertise.

The Dazzle of the New Frontier. The Kennedy administration was seen as a new generation of leaders, bringing fresh ideas and a can-do attitude to Washington. This sense of novelty and excitement, however, often masked a lack of experience and a tendency to rely on untested theories.

• The Kennedy team was often more impressed by academic credentials and intellectual prowess than by practical experience.
• They were quick to dismiss the wisdom of older, more experienced policymakers, believing that they had all the answers.
• Their focus on the "new" led them to overlook the lessons of the past, particularly the French experience in Indochina.

The Limits of Charisma. While charisma and style can be powerful tools for leadership, they are not a substitute for sound judgment and a deep understanding of complex issues. The Kennedy administration's emphasis on style over substance ultimately contributed to its failure in Vietnam.

4. The Illusion of Control: How Decisions Were Made

The truth was that history—and in Indochina we were on the wrong side of it—was a hard taskmaster and from the early to the middle sixties, when we were making those fateful decisions, we had almost no choices left.

The Closing of Options. The Kennedy administration believed that it had a wide range of options in Vietnam, but in reality, its choices were severely limited by past decisions and the momentum of events. The United States had been steadily closing off its options since 1946, when it reluctantly supported the French return to Indochina.

• The decision to support the French in their colonial war had set the stage for future American involvement.
• The growing commitment to anti-Communism had further limited the range of acceptable policy choices.
• By the time the Kennedy administration took office, the options had narrowed to either withdrawal or escalation.

The Bureaucratic Machine. The decision-making process in the Kennedy administration was often driven by bureaucratic momentum and institutional self-interest. The various agencies and departments, each with its own agenda and priorities, often pushed for policies that served their own interests rather than the best interests of the nation.

• The military, for example, pushed for greater defense spending and a more aggressive approach to the war.
• The CIA, with its covert operations and secret agendas, often operated outside the control of civilian policymakers.
• The State Department, with its emphasis on diplomacy and international relations, often found itself at odds with the more hawkish elements of the government.

The Illusion of Rationality. The Kennedy administration prided itself on its rational approach to decision-making, but in reality, its decisions were often driven by emotion, fear, and a desire to maintain control. The belief that they could manage events and control the outcome of the war was ultimately an illusion.

5. The Limits of Power: A Nation's Hubris Unveiled

They misjudged American power. They misjudged our South Vietnamese allies. They misjudged the Soviets and the Chinese. They misjudged the world. And, most of all, they misjudged themselves.

Misreading the Enemy. The Kennedy administration, like its predecessors, underestimated the strength and determination of the Vietnamese Communists. They failed to understand the political and social forces that were driving the insurgency, and they overestimated the effectiveness of American military power.

• They viewed the Vietcong as a monolithic force controlled by Hanoi, rather than as a complex and diverse movement with deep roots in Vietnamese society.
• They underestimated the Vietcong's ability to adapt to American tactics and to replenish their losses.
• They failed to understand the importance of nationalism and anti-colonialism in the Vietnamese struggle.

Misjudging Allies. The Kennedy administration also overestimated the strength and reliability of its South Vietnamese allies. They failed to recognize the deep divisions within South Vietnamese society and the corruption and incompetence of the Diem regime.

• They viewed the South Vietnamese government as a legitimate and popular force, rather than as a fragile and unpopular regime propped up by American aid.
• They underestimated the extent to which the South Vietnamese military was dependent on American support and lacked the will to fight on its own.
• They failed to understand the deep-seated resentment of the South Vietnamese people toward the Diem regime and its American backers.

A World of Miscalculations. The Kennedy administration's misjudgments extended beyond Vietnam to include its understanding of the Soviet Union, China, and the larger world. They failed to recognize the limits of American power and the complexities of international relations.

• They overestimated the extent to which the Soviet Union and China were united in their support for Communism.
• They underestimated the power of nationalism and anti-colonialism in the developing world.
• They failed to understand the limits of American influence and the importance of cultural and historical context.

6. The Unseen War: The Human Cost of Policy

No other national endeavor requires as much unshakable resolve as war. If the nation and the government lack that resolve, it is criminal to expect men in the field to carry it alone.

The Dehumanization of War. The Kennedy administration's focus on strategy and tactics often obscured the human cost of the war. The emphasis on body counts and kill ratios dehumanized the conflict, reducing it to a series of statistics and abstractions.

• The war became a numbers game, where success was measured by the number of enemy casualties rather than by the progress of the political struggle.
• The focus on military objectives often overlooked the impact of the war on the civilian population.
• The dehumanization of the enemy made it easier to justify the use of violence and to ignore the moral implications of the war.

The Burden on Soldiers. The Kennedy administration's failure to define clear objectives and to provide adequate support for the war placed an enormous burden on American soldiers. They were asked to fight a war that was poorly understood and lacked a clear purpose.

• They were often sent into combat without adequate training or equipment.
• They were asked to fight a war that was unpopular at home and lacked the support of the American people.
• They were forced to endure the dehumanizing experiences of combat for a cause that seemed increasingly futile.

The Moral Cost. The war in Vietnam had a profound moral cost, not only for the soldiers who fought it, but for the nation as a whole. The self-delusion and the lack of candor about the war undermined the nation's sense of purpose and its belief in its own ideals.

7. The Seeds of Doubt: A Bureaucracy Divided

What the American army at the highest levels lost in Vietnam, my close friend and colleague Charlie Mohr told me years later, in the best summation of that time, was its intellectual integrity.

The Erosion of Trust. The Kennedy administration's failure in Vietnam was not just a failure of policy, but also a failure of the bureaucratic system itself. The various agencies and departments, each with its own agenda and priorities, often worked at cross-purposes, undermining the effectiveness of the government.

• The military, the CIA, and the State Department often presented conflicting assessments of the situation in Vietnam.
• The lack of coordination and communication between the various agencies led to a fragmented and incoherent approach to the war.
• The emphasis on secrecy and control often prevented policymakers from accessing accurate information and from making informed decisions.

The Rise of Dissent. As the war progressed, a growing number of officials within the government began to question the wisdom of American policy. These dissenters, often working in the lower levels of the bureaucracy, found themselves increasingly isolated and marginalized.

• They were often dismissed as "soft" or "unrealistic" by their superiors.
• They were often denied access to information and excluded from key decision-making processes.
• Their dissenting voices, though often ignored at the time, would later prove to be prophetic.

The Loss of Integrity. The war in Vietnam ultimately undermined the intellectual integrity of the American government. The emphasis on loyalty and conformity, combined with the pressure to maintain a positive public image, led to a culture of self-delusion and dishonesty.

8. The Inevitable Escalation: A Path of No Return

Events are in the saddle, and ride mankind.

The Logic of Escalation. The Kennedy administration's initial commitment to Vietnam, though limited in scope, set in motion a chain of events that led to a gradual but inexorable escalation of the war. Each step, intended to achieve a limited objective, ultimately led to a larger and more costly commitment.

• The decision to send advisors led to the need for combat troops to protect them.
• The decision to bomb the North led to the need for ground troops to secure the air bases.
• The decision to engage in combat led to the need for more troops and more resources.

The Closing of Options. As the war escalated, the range of acceptable policy choices narrowed. The fear of defeat and the desire to maintain American prestige led to a reluctance to consider alternatives to military intervention.

• The fear of being seen as "soft on Communism" made it difficult to consider a negotiated settlement.
• The desire to avoid a humiliating withdrawal led to a commitment to "see it through" at any cost.
• The belief that American power could ultimately prevail led to a refusal to acknowledge the limits of military force.

The Inevitability of Tragedy. The escalation of the war in Vietnam was not the result of a single decision, but rather the culmination of a series of choices that were made over time. Each step, though seemingly rational in the moment, ultimately led to a tragic and avoidable outcome.

9. The Ghosts of the Past: Echoes of China in Vietnam

The memory of the fall of China and what it did to the Democrats, was, I think, more bitter for Lyndon Johnson than it was for John Kennedy.

The Shadow of China. The "loss" of China to Communism in 1949 cast a long shadow over American foreign policy, creating a deep-seated fear of further Communist expansion in Asia. This fear, combined with the domino theory, made Vietnam seem like a crucial battleground in the larger struggle against Communism.

• The memory of the fall of China led to a reluctance to consider alternatives to military intervention in Vietnam.
• The fear of being accused of "losing" another country to Communism made it difficult for policymakers to challenge the prevailing anti-Communist consensus.
• The destruction of the careers of China experts during the McCarthy era meant that the Kennedy administration lacked access to informed perspectives on Asia.

The Parallels of History. The American experience in Vietnam was eerily similar to the French experience in Indochina. Both countries underestimated the strength and determination of their adversaries, and both became mired in a long and costly war that they could not win.

• The French, like the Americans, had viewed the conflict as a military problem rather than a political one.
• The French, like the Americans, had underestimated the importance of nationalism and anti-colonialism in the Vietnamese struggle.
• The French, like the Americans, had ultimately failed to achieve their objectives in Vietnam.

The Failure to Learn. The Kennedy administration, despite its claims to be different from its predecessors, ultimately repeated the mistakes of the past. They failed to learn from the French experience in Indochina, and they failed to recognize the limits of American power.

10. The Price of Consensus: A Nation's Tragic Descent

The truth, in sharp contrast, was that all those critical decisions were primarily driven by considerations of domestic politics, and by political fears of the consequences of looking weak in a forthcoming domestic election.

The Illusion of Unity. The Kennedy administration, like many administrations before and since, sought to create a sense of national unity and consensus around its foreign policy. This desire for unity, however, often came at the expense of open debate and critical analysis.

• The emphasis on consensus led to a reluctance to challenge the prevailing anti-Communist consensus.
• The fear of being seen as "soft" or "unpatriotic" made it difficult for policymakers to express dissenting opinions.
• The desire to maintain a united front often led to a suppression of dissenting voices and a distortion of the truth.

The Politics of Fear. The decisions surrounding the Vietnam War were often driven by political fears and anxieties, rather than by a rational assessment of the situation. The fear of being accused of "losing" Vietnam to Communism led to a series of escalatory steps that ultimately proved disastrous.

• The desire to avoid political criticism often led to a reluctance to consider alternatives to military intervention.
• The fear of being seen as weak or indecisive led to a tendency to overreact to perceived threats.
• The emphasis on domestic political considerations often overshadowed the larger strategic and moral implications of the war.

The Tragedy of Self-Delusion. The war in Vietnam was ultimately a tragedy of self-delusion, where the desire to maintain a positive public image and to avoid political criticism led to a series of disastrous decisions. The failure to acknowledge the limits of American power and the complexities of the Vietnamese conflict ultimately led to a long and costly war that could have been avoided.

Last updated: March 28, 2025