Key Takeaways
Stop asking why nations are poor; ask why any got rich
Poverty is the human default, not an anomaly. Sowell opens by inverting the standard question. At the dawn of the twentieth century, only 10 percent of American homes had flush toilets and 3 percent had electric lights. For most of human history, standards of living far below today's poverty line were universal. Prosperity, not poverty, is the rare achievement demanding explanation.
Equality is even rarer than prosperity. Vast disparities in wealth have existed as far back as recorded history. Ancient Greeks built the Acropolis and produced Plato and Euclid while Britons lived as illiterate tribesmen with no buildings at all. Sowell argues the reflexive modern assumption, that outcomes would be equal or random absent human villainy, collapses under even a modest survey of history.
This reframing echoes economic historians like Deirdre McCloskey, who argues the "Great Enrichment" after 1800 is the true historical puzzle. Sowell's move is rhetorically powerful because it shifts the burden of proof: instead of hunting for who stole from the poor, we investigate what rare combination of factors generates wealth. Critics note this framing can understate how colonialism and extraction actively destroyed existing wealth-creating capacity. But the core insight holds: treating prosperity as natural and its absence as suspicious leads to systematically wrong diagnoses, since the baseline condition of humanity was universal material scarcity.
Nine-tenths of prerequisites can still yield total failure
Success often requires many factors at once. Sowell's central mechanism for explaining wild disparities is that many endeavors demand multiple prerequisites simultaneously. A group with nine of ten required factors does not succeed 90 percent as often; it may fail utterly. This explains why groups can languish for centuries, then surge to the forefront once the last missing ingredient arrives, as eighteenth-century Scotland and nineteenth-century Japan did.
It also explains sudden collapses. A civilization at the peak of achievement can lose just one prerequisite and fall dramatically behind. China led the world in printing, navigation, and cast iron (produced a thousand years before Europe), then its fifteenth-century rulers banned ocean voyages and destroyed the records, triggering six centuries of relative decline. One political decision negated countless advantages.
This is arguably the book's most underappreciated analytical contribution, and it maps neatly onto Liebig's Law of the Minimum in biology, where growth is limited by the scarcest resource, not the total. It also resembles the "O-ring theory" of economic development by Michael Kremer, where production chains fail if any single link is weak. The framework elegantly explains discontinuous history: why change is often not gradual but sudden. The challenge is that it risks unfalsifiability, since any outcome can be retrofitted to a missing factor. Its predictive power depends on identifying prerequisites in advance, not just narrating them afterward.
Geography expands or shrinks your cultural universe, not just your wealth
Geography works through knowledge, not just resources. Sowell insists geography influences but never determines. Its deepest effect is on the size of a people's "cultural universe," the range of other peoples and ideas they can access. Africa is twice Europe's size yet has a shorter coastline, because Europe's coast twists into harbors and peninsulas. Sub-Saharan rivers plunge over waterfalls, blocking navigation inland. The Sahara isolated the region for centuries.
Isolation is the recurring thread of backwardness. Mountain peoples on every continent (the Appalachians, the Rif, the Pindus, the Himalayas) show strikingly similar patterns of poverty despite no genetic connection. In 1830, shipping a ton of cargo 3,000 miles by sea cost 10 dollars; moving it 300 miles overland cost over 30 dollars. Access to navigable water meant access to the world.
Sowell's geography draws on Fernand Braudel and anticipates Jared Diamond's continental-axis argument, which he cites approvingly: Eurasia's east-west orientation let crops and knowledge diffuse across similar latitudes, while the Americas' north-south axis forced ideas through incompatible climate zones. The convergence of independent mountain cultures toward similar poverty is genuinely compelling evidence against purely genetic explanations. A modern caveat: containerized shipping, air freight, and the internet have collapsed many geographic barriers, so the framework explains historical divergence better than present-day outcomes. Yet Sowell's point stands that centuries of accumulated cultural development cannot be retroactively downloaded once roads finally arrive.
Groups carry their culture across oceans, so environment can't explain outcomes
Portable culture is the natural experiment. If surroundings determined outcomes, the same group should perform identically everywhere. Instead, Germans built pianos and pioneered optics in Germany, Brazil, Russia, and the United States alike. German farming communities in nineteenth-century Brazil built schools in their first forest clearings while native-born Brazilians remained largely illiterate. In the Austrian Empire in 1900, German male illiteracy was 5 percent versus 71 percent among Romanians in the same empire.
Poverty at arrival predicts little. Chinese immigrants arrived in Southeast Asia and America with nothing, often facing brutal discrimination, yet rose. By 1994, 57 million overseas Chinese produced roughly as much wealth as mainland China's one billion people. Cubans who fled Castro as dishwashers and janitors had children out-earning white Americans within a generation.
This is Sowell's sharpest methodological weapon: middle-class economists cannot dismiss group differences as mere products of local discrimination when the same group thrives or lags across radically different societies. The argument parallels natural-experiment methods now prized in economics. However, selection effects complicate it, since emigrants are rarely random samples of their origin populations, often being unusually driven or skilled, a point Sowell acknowledges regarding downwardly-biased colonial samples. The deeper provocation is his redefinition of "environment" to include what is inside a group (values, habits, skills) rather than only what surrounds it, a distinction that reframes entire debates about inequality.
Windfall wealth can be a curse that stunts human capital
Free wealth removes the pressure to develop skills. Sowell argues the deepest form of wealth is human capital: the knowledge, skills, and habits to create and maintain physical wealth, not the physical wealth itself. Sixteenth-century Spain received tons of New World gold and silver, spending it on imported goods rather than developing its own craftsmen and scientists. A Venetian noted Spain had almost no skilled workers even at its imperial peak. The gold flowed through "like rain on a roof."
The pattern repeats with oil. Middle Eastern petroleum states import both Western technicians and Asian laborers, so neither elites nor masses fully develop human capital. Per capita output in oil-rich nations often trails resource-poor ones. Western Europe rebuilt within years after WWII destruction because the human capital survived; decades of aid to the Third World couldn't replicate it.
Sowell's human-capital-over-physical-capital thesis aligns with Nobel work by Theodore Schultz and Gary Becker and finds strong support in the postwar German and Japanese recoveries. The "resource curse" is now a well-documented empirical regularity in development economics, with mechanisms including Dutch Disease and rent-seeking that Sowell gestures toward. His Toynbee-derived "challenge and response" framing adds a behavioral layer: adversity as a spur to capability. The claim deserves nuance, since resource wealth clearly helped Norway and Botswana, where institutions channeled it productively. The variable is not the windfall itself but whether the surrounding culture and institutions convert it into durable capability.
Honesty is an economic asset, and its absence taxes everyone
The radius of trust shapes prosperity. Sowell introduces the "radius of trust," the circle within which people can cooperate reliably. Its costs are invisible but enormous: not the bribes paid, but the businesses never started, loans never granted, and investments never made because the returns can be stolen. The Soviet Union, arguably the most resource-rich nation on earth, had a lower living standard than resource-poor Japan, partly because pervasive corruption strangled productivity.
Trust varies measurably across cultures. When wallets with money were left in cities worldwide, 11 of 12 were returned in Helsinki but only 1 of 12 in Lisbon. Groups with tight internal trust (Hasidic Jewish diamond dealers, Marwari traders, overseas Chinese networks) transact on verbal agreements alone, a decisive edge in countries with corrupt courts.
Sowell here converges with a major strand of institutional economics: Francis Fukuyama's "Trust" made social capital central to prosperity, and Robert Putnam quantified its civic dimensions. The insight that corruption's true cost is opportunity cost (the transactions that never happen) is subtle and correct, matching Hernando de Soto's work on why informal economies stay poor. The wallet experiments are vivid but methodologically thin, and cross-country honesty comparisons risk circularity, since prosperity itself may build trust rather than only the reverse. Still, the mechanism whereby high-trust minorities gain competitive advantage in low-trust societies is well-documented across trading diasporas throughout history.
Median age gaps of 20 years alone guarantee unequal group outcomes
Equal outcomes are mathematically near-impossible. Even if every comparable individual earned identically, groups would still differ because they differ in median age, family size, and geographic concentration. Japanese Americans are more than two decades older on average than Puerto Ricans; a 40-year-old has over ten times the work experience of a 20-year-old. Income peaks with experience, so age gaps alone create income gaps.
People never behave randomly. Immigrants cluster with precision: 88 percent of Italian immigrants to Australia between 1881 and 1899 came from regions holding just 10 percent of Italy's population. Different German provinces settled different American cities. To randomly distribute Southern-European-descended New Yorkers across the metro area would require relocating over half of them. Non-random outcomes reflect purposeful, differing human choices, not necessarily discrimination.
This demographic point is deceptively powerful and often ignored in inequality debates. If two populations differ in median age by twenty years, comparing their aggregate incomes without adjustment is statistically meaningless, yet such raw comparisons drive policy and litigation. Sowell's broader claim, that purposeful clustering produces skewed outcomes absent any villainy, is well-supported by migration studies. The critical tension he underplays: real discrimination has also produced clustering (redlining, restrictive covenants), so non-randomness alone cannot adjudicate between benign self-sorting and imposed constraint. His strongest version simply demands that analysts rule out mundane explanations before inferring malice, a reasonable evidentiary standard too often skipped.
Track the same people over time, and "the rich get richer" reverses
Income brackets are not fixed groups of people. Most statistics compare abstract brackets year to year, with ever-changing occupants, then talk as if "the poor" and "the rich" are the same humans over time. When researchers followed identical individuals from 1975 to 1991, 95 percent of those starting in the bottom fifth had left it; 29 percent reached the top fifth. Those initially in the top fifth had the smallest income gains.
Turnover is fastest at the very top. An IRS study of 1996 to 2005 found the bottom fifth's incomes nearly doubled while the much-discussed top one percent saw incomes fall 26 percent. Most Americans reach the top tenth at some point; 11 percent touch the top one percent. The top 400 earners are mostly one-year visitors cashing in capital gains, not a permanent aristocracy.
This is Sowell's most technically important critique and it targets a real confusion in public discourse: the conflation of cross-sectional brackets with longitudinal cohorts. His argument sharply challenges Piketty's "Capital," which he accuses of converting a fluid process into a rigid caste structure. The distinction between annual income and multi-year capital gains is genuinely clarifying, since a business owner selling a lifetime asset appears as a one-year millionaire. The counterpoint, which mobility researchers emphasize, is that relative mobility (rank versus one's parents) has indeed stagnated, and Sowell's own cited Pew data show two-thirds born at the bottom stay near it. Both can be true: absolute gains widespread, relative rigidity persistent.
Ethnic leaders profit from keeping their followers isolated and resentful
Isolation helps leaders even as it harms the led. Because absorbing a more successful culture threatens a leader's constituency, leaders of lagging groups have incentives to promote grievance, cultural separatism, and resentment of high achievers, even though isolation is a prime cause of backwardness. Sowell traces this from nineteenth-century Czech nationalists demanding Czech-only street signs to twentieth-century Quebec restricting English to American ghettos stigmatizing academic effort as "acting white."
Resentment targets achievement, not inheritance. Malays took pride in wealthy Malay sultans while resenting Chinese shopkeepers, because personal achievement threatens the ego more than inherited status. Expelling productive minorities (Asians from Uganda, Germans from Czechoslovakia, Jews from Spain) repeatedly wrecked the expelling economy, since the confiscatable physical wealth was trivial compared to the unc013onfiscatable human capital that created it.
Sowell's political-economy of ethnic leadership is cynical but has explanatory teeth, resonating with Amy Chua's "World on Fire," which documented how market-dominant minorities become targets when democracy inflames majority resentment. The public-choice logic (leaders maximizing their own constituency-power rather than group welfare) is a serious application of Buchanan-style analysis to identity politics. The framework can veer toward uncharitable mind-reading, since many activists genuinely believe separatism preserves dignity and heritage. And Sowell himself concedes displaced indigenous peoples face real dilemmas where the ancestral economy is irretrievably gone. The durable insight is that policies which feel like solidarity can entrench the very isolation that perpetuates disadvantage.
The welfare state's worst cost is the human capital never built
Guaranteed necessities can remove civilizing pressures. Sowell argues the welfare state's deepest damage is not fiscal but developmental: it reduces the need to build human capital and can subsidize counterproductive behavior. He marshals timing evidence against the "legacy of slavery" thesis: black two-parent families were the norm for the first century after slavery. In 1960, 22 percent of black children lived with a single mother; by 1995, 67 percent lived without both parents, after the welfare state expanded.
Britain shows the same pattern without race. Low-income white Britons displayed nearly identical family breakdown, crime surges, and educational collapse after the 1960s. London armed robberies rose from 12 in 1954 to 1,600 by 1991. Meanwhile children of immigrants, not steeped in grievance ideology, outperformed native-born poor in both countries.
This is the book's most politically charged and contested argument. The timing evidence on black family structure is real and was raised earlier by Daniel Patrick Moynihan, but scholars like William Julius Wilson attribute the shift substantially to the disappearance of urban manufacturing jobs rather than welfare incentives alone, and cross-national data on generous Scandinavian welfare states without comparable social breakdown complicate a pure incentives story. Sowell partly anticipates this by invoking cultural interaction effects. The transatlantic parallel between poor white Britons and black Americans is his strongest card, since it severs the correlation between welfare-era dysfunction and race, pointing instead toward a shared ideology of entitlement and grievance.
Judge institutions by where harm began, not where statistics were collected
Correlation is not causation, and location of data is not location of cause. Sowell warns that data gathered at a business, school, or hospital does not mean the cause originated there. Elite hospitals have higher death rates precisely because they take the hardest cases. Children of imprisoned parents are seven times likelier to be imprisoned, which may reflect inherited attitudes and associates, not bias in courts that rarely know parental history.
Test causation with finer breakdowns. Black students from families earning 50,000 dollars scored below Asian and white students from families earning under 6,000 dollars on the SAT math section, and below whites whose parents had only high-school diplomas even when black parents had postgraduate degrees. Since income cannot explain gaps that persist across income levels, the residual points to cultural and behavioral differences, not just external barriers.
The methodological caution here is genuinely valuable and widely violated: "disparate impact" reasoning often treats the site of measurement as the site of causation. Sowell's hospital-mortality example is a clean illustration of selection bias that any epidemiologist would endorse. The SAT breakdowns are provocative and real, though critics argue that wealth measured in a single year understates the multigenerational accumulation of advantage, so high-income black families may still hold far less wealth and neighborhood quality than high-income white families. The honest reading is that income alone is an incomplete control, and both accumulated structural factors and cultural factors likely operate, which is precisely why finer decomposition matters.
Slavery was humanity's norm; abolishing it was the West's true anomaly
The moral history is the reverse of the popular one. Sowell stresses that slavery existed on every inhabited continent for millennia, based on vulnerability rather than race. The word slave derives from Slav, because so many Slavs were enslaved by fellow Europeans. Barbary pirates enslaved at least a million Europeans between 1500 and 1800, more than the number of Africans shipped to the United States and its colonial predecessors.
What was rare was the movement to end it. Western civilization was the first to turn against slavery as an institution, abolishing it within the West in the nineteenth century and then using military dominance to stamp it out globally over non-Western resistance. Calling slavery uniquely "America's original sin," Sowell argues, mistakes a universal human evil for a localized one, obscuring more than it reveals.
Sowell's global framing corrects a genuine parochialism in popular discourse and aligns with historians like David Eltis and Orlando Patterson, whom he cites, on slavery's near-universality. The point that abolition, not slavery, was the historical novelty is defensible and important. The rhetorical risk is that emphasizing universality can seem to minimize the specific brutality and racialized afterlife of chattel slavery in the Americas, which was unusually hereditary and dehumanizing. The strongest synthesis: acknowledging slavery's universality does not diminish American slavery's particular horrors, but it does undermine explanations that treat one nation's guilt as the sole engine of present disparities.
Analysis
Wealth, Poverty and Politics is a thesis-driven work of comparative economic history and political economy, sprawling across geography, culture, demography, and institutions. Its difficulty for a summarizer lies in its deliberate structure: Sowell refuses a single-factor explanation, instead accumulating hundreds of examples to demonstrate that outcomes emerge from interacting factors, none decisive alone. The book is less an argument than a sustained assault on one assumption: that economic outcomes would be equal or random absent human wrongdoing.
Sowell's intellectual signature is the separation of causation from morality. He insists that conquest, slavery, and exploitation, however monstrous, are empirical questions as causes, not automatic explanations. This is his most bracing and most resisted move. It lets him argue that Spain's empire left it poor while resource-poor Switzerland prospered, that expelled minorities carried their productivity with them, and that human capital, not seizable physical wealth, is the true engine of prosperity.
The book's methodological core, multiple prerequisites producing skewed non-random outcomes, is genuinely original and underappreciated, mapping onto limiting-factor logic in biology and O-ring models in economics. His portable-culture natural experiment (the same group thriving or lagging across different societies) is a serious empirical challenge to purely structural accounts of inequality.
The weaknesses are equally real. Sowell's framework risks unfalsifiability, since any outcome can be attributed to a missing prerequisite after the fact. His treatment of the welfare state and family structure relies heavily on timing correlations while dismissing labor-market explanations advanced by scholars like William Julius Wilson. And his emphasis on culture over structure can underweight how discrimination itself shapes the very cultural adaptations he observes.
Still, the book's central discipline endures: rule out mundane explanations (age, geography, culture, self-sorting) before inferring villainy, distinguish brackets from people, and prize the invisible capital of skills and trust over visible physical wealth. It is a demand for evidentiary rigor in debates usually driven by moral fervor, and that demand is its lasting contribution.
Review Summary
Wealth, Poverty and Politics receives mostly positive reviews for its comprehensive analysis of factors influencing economic outcomes. Readers praise Sowell's clear reasoning and data-driven approach, though some criticize his perceived ideological bias. The book examines geographic, cultural, social, and political factors affecting wealth creation and poverty. Sowell challenges popular narratives about inequality and emphasizes productivity as the key to prosperity. While some find the book repetitive, many consider it an essential read for understanding economic disparities and policy implications.
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Glossary
Cultural universe
Range of accessible peoples and ideasThe total scope of other peoples, cultures, technologies, and knowledge a given group can access and interact with. Sowell argues geography's deepest economic effect is expanding or shrinking this universe. Isolated peoples (in mountains, deserts, or remote islands) have small cultural universes and lag, while peoples on navigable waterways or open trade routes access the accumulated advances of humanity and progress faster.
Human capital
Skills and knowledge creating wealthThe knowledge, skills, habits, values, and experience that enable people to produce, maintain, and renew physical wealth. Sowell treats it as more fundamental than physical or financial capital, since human capital survives war and can rebuild destroyed economies, whereas transferred physical wealth without human capital gets consumed and cannot be replenished.
Radius of trust
Circle of reliable cooperationThe range of people within which individuals can trust and cooperate in economic and social dealings. A wider, more reliable radius (whether across a whole society or within a tight-knit group) enables transactions on informal agreement, lowers costs, and attracts investment. Its absence, through corruption or dishonesty, imposes huge invisible costs by preventing businesses, loans, and investments that never happen.
Multiple prerequisites
Many factors needed at onceSowell's principle that many achievements require several necessary factors simultaneously, so having most but not all can mean total failure rather than proportional success. This explains why groups or nations can stay backward for centuries then surge forward once a final missing ingredient arrives, and why leaders in the forefront can suddenly collapse after losing just one prerequisite.
Causation versus blame
Cause differs from moral faultSowell's insistence that identifying the cause of an outcome is analytically distinct from assigning moral blame. A misfortune (blindness, geographic isolation, inherited culture) can have causes that involve no villain. Data collected at an institution does not mean that institution caused the outcome. Conflating morality with causation, he argues, produces plausible but wrong and often counterproductive policies.
Challenge and response
Adversity spurs human achievementA thesis Sowell borrows from historian Arnold Toynbee: peoples forced by circumstances to develop skills and discipline tend to advance most, while those spared such challenges (through windfall wealth or easy climates) may fail to develop human capital. Sowell applies it to argue that guaranteed welfare benefits can remove the civilizing pressures that historically drove progress.
FAQ
What's Wealth, Poverty and Politics about?
- Exploration of Disparities: The book examines the complex factors contributing to economic disparities among nations and groups, challenging simplistic explanations like exploitation or genetic differences.
- Focus on Causation: Thomas Sowell emphasizes understanding the causes of wealth and poverty, highlighting geographic, cultural, social, and political influences.
- Historical Context: Sowell uses historical examples, such as Scotland and Japan, to illustrate how various factors can lead to significant economic changes over time.
Why should I read Wealth, Poverty and Politics?
- Informed Perspective: The book provides a deeper understanding of the complexities behind economic disparities, encouraging critical thinking about common narratives.
- Evidence-Based Analysis: Sowell supports his arguments with historical data and examples, making it a well-researched resource for understanding economic issues.
- Policy Implications: Insights from the book can inform discussions on economic policy and social justice, relevant for policymakers, students, and anyone interested in economics.
What are the key takeaways of Wealth, Poverty and Politics?
- Multiple Influences: Economic outcomes are influenced by geographic, cultural, social, and political factors, challenging simplistic explanations.
- Causation vs. Blame: Understanding the causes of economic disparities is crucial, as policies based on blame can be counterproductive.
- Cultural Values Matter: Cultural values significantly impact economic behavior and success, with different cultures prioritizing education, work ethic, and innovation.
What are the best quotes from Wealth, Poverty and Politics and what do they mean?
- "Facts are stubborn things": Emphasizes the importance of relying on empirical evidence rather than emotions or ideologies in economic discussions.
- "The wealth of nations depends upon an infinite variety of causes": Highlights the complexity of economic systems and the inadequacy of simplistic explanations.
- "Geography does not predetermine what people will choose to do": Reflects Sowell's argument that human agency and cultural factors play crucial roles in economic success.
How does Thomas Sowell address the concept of causation versus blame in Wealth, Poverty and Politics?
- Understanding Causes: Sowell stresses the importance of understanding the underlying causes of economic disparities rather than assigning blame.
- Counterproductive Policies: Warns that policies based on blame can exacerbate problems if not grounded in a clear understanding of causes.
- Focus on Solutions: Advocates for solutions addressing root issues rather than superficial fixes, crucial for effective economic policies.
What role do geographic factors play in wealth and poverty according to Wealth, Poverty and Politics?
- Geographic Location: Features like rivers and mountains can facilitate or hinder economic development, affecting trade and isolation.
- Natural Resources: Wealth from resources depends on effective utilization, with mismanagement leading to poverty despite abundance.
- Cultural Interactions: Geography affects cultural diffusion, influencing a society's economic potential through the exchange of ideas and technologies.
How does culture impact economic outcomes in Wealth, Poverty and Politics?
- Cultural Values: Attitudes towards work, education, and innovation significantly influence economic behavior and success.
- Human Capital Development: Emphasizes the role of skills, knowledge, and experience in economic success, with cultures investing in education creating capable workforces.
- Resistance to Change: Some cultures resist adopting beneficial practices, leading to economic stagnation and limited progress.
What does Thomas Sowell say about the welfare state in Wealth, Poverty and Politics?
- Dependency Issues: Argues that welfare can create dependency, reducing incentives to work and improve circumstances.
- Impact on Family Structures: Discusses how welfare policies contribute to family disintegration, affecting economic success.
- Critique of Redistribution: Critiques income redistribution as a poverty solution, advocating for growth-promoting and responsibility-encouraging policies.
How does Wealth, Poverty and Politics explain differences in economic outcomes between racial and ethnic groups?
- Cultural Factors: Cultural attitudes towards education, work, and family significantly influence economic outcomes.
- Historical Context: Historical experiences shape economic prospects, with immigration patterns and social conditions affecting disparities.
- Individual Choices Matter: Emphasizes the role of personal responsibility and choices in economic success, beyond systemic factors.
What empirical evidence does Thomas Sowell provide in Wealth, Poverty and Politics to support his claims?
- Statistical Studies: References studies showing income mobility, countering narratives of fixed class structures.
- Historical Data: Provides examples of groups rising from poverty to prosperity, illustrating the importance of human capital and cultural values.
- Comparative Analysis: Compares nations and groups to highlight the complexity of economic outcomes and contributing factors.
How does Wealth, Poverty and Politics differentiate between correlation and causation?
- Statistical Misinterpretations: Highlights the mistake of conflating correlation with causation, especially in poverty and crime discussions.
- Examples of Misleading Correlations: Provides examples where correlations do not imply causation, emphasizing the need for understanding directionality.
- Importance of Directionality: Understanding causation direction is crucial for effective policy-making, avoiding misinterpretations.
What are the implications of Thomas Sowell's arguments in Wealth, Poverty and Politics for public policy?
- Focus on Human Capital: Advocates for policies promoting education and skill development over income redistribution.
- Critique of Welfare Programs: Suggests reforming welfare to encourage self-sufficiency and personal responsibility.
- Understanding Cultural Contexts: Emphasizes considering cultural contexts in policy design for effective economic advancement strategies.
About the Author
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