Why Civil Resistance Works

1. Nonviolent resistance campaigns are more effective than violent ones

Between 1900 and 2006, nonviolent resistance campaigns were nearly twice as likely to achieve full or partial success as their violent counterparts.

Statistical evidence. Analysis of 323 violent and nonviolent resistance campaigns between 1900 and 2006 shows that nonviolent campaigns have been significantly more successful in achieving their objectives. Nonviolent campaigns succeeded 53% of the time, compared to 26% for violent campaigns. This holds true across different types of regimes, including against highly repressive authoritarian governments.

Reasons for effectiveness. Nonviolent campaigns are more likely to:

• Attract broad-based participation from diverse segments of society
• Maintain resilience in the face of repression
• Induce defections among regime supporters
• Garner domestic and international support
• Utilize a wider range of tactics and strategies

Types of campaigns. The study focused on maximalist campaigns seeking regime change, anti-occupation, or secession. Even in these high-stakes conflicts, nonviolent resistance proved more effective than armed struggle.

2. Mass participation is the key to nonviolent campaign success

The moral, physical, informational, and commitment barriers to participation are much lower for nonviolent resistance than for violent insurgency.

Lower barriers to entry. Nonviolent campaigns have an inherent advantage in mobilizing large numbers of participants:

• Physical: Don't require special skills or high fitness levels
• Moral: Easier for people to justify participation
• Informational: More visible, allowing people to gauge levels of support
• Commitment: Offer varying levels of involvement and risk

Diverse participation. Large-scale participation allows campaigns to include people across gender, age, class, and ideological lines. This diversity enhances:

• Tactical innovation and flexibility
• Resilience against repression
• Ability to impose costs on the regime through widespread non-cooperation

Strategic advantages. High participation translates into greater leverage against opponents:

• Increases economic and political pressure on regimes
• Makes violent repression more likely to backfire
• Provides more potential links to regime insiders, facilitating defections

3. Structural conditions do not predetermine campaign outcomes

Civil resistance can be more effective than violent resistance, regardless of circumstances commonly thought to condition the probability of success.

Challenging conventional wisdom. The study found that nonviolent campaigns succeed even in conditions typically considered unfavorable:

• Against authoritarian regimes
• Against militarily powerful opponents
• In the face of violent repression
• Across different regions and time periods

Agency over structure. While structural factors shape the environment, they do not determine outcomes. Key findings include:

• Regime type (democracy vs. autocracy) does not significantly impact success rates
• A country's military capabilities do not predict campaign outcomes
• Violent repression reduces success chances, but nonviolent campaigns still outperform violent ones

Implications. This suggests that activists and policymakers should not assume certain conditions make nonviolent resistance futile. Strategic choices and campaign dynamics play a more decisive role than previously thought.

4. Loyalty shifts and backfire are critical mechanisms of success

Successful nonviolent campaigns have been, on average, more likely to have a larger number of participants than violent campaigns. The average nonviolent campaign has over 200,000 members—about 150,000 more active participants than the average violent campaign.

Loyalty shifts. Mass participation increases the likelihood of defections within the regime's pillars of support:

• Security forces are more likely to refuse orders or defect
• Economic elites may withdraw support due to disruption
• Bureaucrats and civil servants may engage in non-cooperation

Backfire dynamics. When regimes use repression against nonviolent activists:

• It often appears illegitimate and disproportionate
• Can increase sympathy and participation in the movement
• May lead to loss of international support for the regime

Synergistic effects. These mechanisms reinforce each other:

• Loyalty shifts make repression less effective
• Backfire increases pressure for defections
• Both contribute to eroding the regime's power base

5. External support plays a limited role in nonviolent campaign success

Half of the violent campaigns that received direct material support from other states succeeded, without accounting for covert aid or support from nonstate actors.

Contrasting roles. External support has different impacts on violent and nonviolent campaigns:

• Violent campaigns often rely heavily on foreign state sponsors
• Nonviolent campaigns succeed primarily through domestic mobilization

Limitations of external support:

• Can delegitimize movements as "foreign agents"
• May create dependency and reduce local initiative
• Often comes with strings attached, limiting strategic flexibility

Effective forms of external assistance for nonviolent campaigns:

• Diplomatic pressure on repressive regimes
• Targeted sanctions against human rights violators
• Support for independent media and communications
• Training in nonviolent strategies and tactics

6. Maintaining nonviolent discipline is crucial for campaign effectiveness

The failure to form a national umbrella organization to aggregate and coordinate the resistance seriously weakened the opposition vis-à-vis the organized and efficient SLORC [in Burma].

Importance of discipline. Maintaining nonviolent discipline:

• Maximizes participation by lowering barriers to entry
• Increases the likelihood of security force defections
• Makes regime repression more likely to backfire

Challenges to discipline:

• Provocateurs or radical flanks engaging in violence
• Frustration and impatience among participants
• Regime efforts to provoke violent responses

Strategies for maintaining discipline:

• Clear communication of nonviolent principles
• Training in de-escalation tactics
• Rapid response to isolate violent incidents
• Building a culture of nonviolent action

7. Successful nonviolent campaigns lead to more stable democracies

Controlling for other factors, if Egypt follows the pattern of other successful nonviolent campaigns, our estimates indicate that it has more than a 30 percent chance of being a democracy.

Long-term impacts. The mode of resistance affects post-conflict outcomes:

• Countries with successful nonviolent campaigns are more likely to transition to democracy
• They have a lower risk of civil war recurrence
• Tend to have higher levels of civil society engagement

Comparative outcomes:

• 57% of countries with successful nonviolent campaigns became democracies within five years
• Only 6% of countries with successful violent campaigns became democracies in the same timeframe

Explanations for this trend:

• Nonviolent movements build democratic skills and norms
• They create broader coalitions that can check power post-transition
• Avoid the militarization of politics that often follows violent struggles

8. Case studies illustrate the dynamics of nonviolent and violent campaigns

In Iran, the Philippines, and the Palestinian Territories, nonviolent campaigns were indeed more successful than their violent counterparts. The nonviolent campaign in Burma was unsuccessful, but violent campaigns in Burma have also failed.

Iran (1977-1979). Mass nonviolent mobilization succeeded where armed groups had failed:

• Diverse participation across social classes
• Economic disruption through strikes
• Security force defections

First Palestinian Intifada (1987-1992). Initially successful through nonviolent means:

• Widespread civil disobedience and non-cooperation
• International sympathy and pressure on Israel
• Ultimately undermined by shift to violence

Philippines People Power Movement (1983-1986). Ousted Marcos through nonviolent action:

• Broad coalition including middle class and business elite
• Strategic use of elections and mass demonstrations
• Military defections at a critical moment

Burma (1988-1990). Failed nonviolent uprising:

• Initial mass mobilization, but lack of sustained strategy
• Inability to create lasting divisions within the regime
• International isolation limiting external pressure

9. Strategic factors influence campaign outcomes beyond tactics alone

Just because a campaign is nonviolent does not guarantee its success. Campaigns do not succeed simply because they have won the moral high ground, as some may suggest.

Beyond methods. While nonviolent tactics provide advantages, strategic choices are crucial:

• Unity: Ability to create broad coalitions
• Planning: Clear goals and adaptive strategies
• Tactical diversity: Employing a range of nonviolent methods
• Resilience: Capacity to persist in the face of repression

Key strategic considerations:

• Targeting regime pillars of support
• Managing the pace of escalation
• Responding effectively to regime concessions or repression
• Maintaining nonviolent discipline

Learning and adaptation. Successful campaigns continuously refine their approaches:

• Analyzing opponent vulnerabilities
• Innovating new tactics
• Building capacity for long-term struggle

10. Nonviolent resistance has implications for policy and insurgents

Insurgents who claim that violent resistance is necessary are probably always wrong.

Policy implications:

• Support for civil society and nonviolent movements can be more effective than military intervention
• Diplomatic and economic pressure should target regime vulnerabilities identified by local activists
• Democracy promotion should focus on building capacity for nonviolent civic engagement

For potential insurgents:

• Nonviolent methods offer a more promising path to achieving political goals
• Even in highly repressive environments, civil resistance has succeeded where violence failed
• Building broad-based movements is more strategically advantageous than armed struggle

Shifting the paradigm:

• Challenges the notion of violence as a "last resort"
• Emphasizes the agency of civilian populations in political change
• Suggests the need for greater study and support of nonviolent conflict

Last updated: March 23, 2025