2052

1. Global Population Will Peak Early and Begin Decline

By 2052 it will already be declining.

Population peak. Contrary to many expectations, the global population is projected to peak well before 2052, specifically in the early 2040s, at around 8.1 billion people. This is primarily due to a continuing decline in fertility rates worldwide.

Urbanization's impact. The shift towards urban living is a major driver of lower birth rates. As more people move to cities, having large families becomes less economically advantageous, and access to education, healthcare, and contraception improves.

• Global population peaks around 2040s (8.1 billion)
• Fertility rates decline due to urbanization, education, contraception
• Life expectancy continues to rise

Workforce dynamics. The potential workforce (ages 15-65) will peak slightly earlier than the total population. While the burden of supporting an aging population will increase, this is partly offset by a decrease in the number of children, keeping the overall support burden relatively stable compared to recent decades.

2. World Economic Growth Will Slow Significantly

By 2052 the world economy will be big—2.2 times as big as today.

Slower growth rate. While the global economy will still grow significantly, doubling in size by 2052, this is much slower than the trebling seen in the previous 40 years. This reduced growth rate is a key factor in mitigating the human footprint on the planet.

Lower than expected. This forecast is significantly below conventional projections based on past growth rates. The slowdown is not primarily due to resource depletion but rather a combination of factors that constrain both workforce size and productivity gains.

Regional variations. Economic growth will vary dramatically by region:

• China and BRISE nations will experience substantial growth as they catch up.
• OECD nations, particularly the US, will see much slower growth or stagnation.
• The poorest regions may see limited progress.

3. Productivity Growth Will Decline Due to Multiple Headwinds

Social tension and social strife do not aid the fine-tuning of the economy that is required to increase labor productivity by a percentage point or so every year.

Slowing gains. The rate of growth in gross labor productivity (GDP per person aged 15-65) is expected to continue its downward trend. While emerging economies benefit from copying existing technologies, mature economies face challenges in increasing efficiency in service sectors.

Compounding factors. Several issues will hinder productivity growth globally:

• Economies shifting towards less easily automated service/care sectors.
• Increasing social friction and inequity disrupting economic efficiency.
• Erratic weather patterns making planning harder in key sectors like agriculture.
• Resource depletion adding costs and complexity.

Impact on GDP. This decline in productivity growth, combined with a peaking and declining workforce, is the primary reason the overall global GDP growth rate will slow and eventually plateau after 2052.

4. Increased Investment Will Be Forced, Reducing Consumption

If society invests more, there will be less to consume.

Rising costs. Humanity will face increasing costs from resource depletion, pollution, climate damage, and biodiversity loss. These challenges will necessitate significant increases in both proactive (voluntary) and reactive (forced) investments.

Investment surge. The share of global GDP allocated to investment is projected to rise substantially, potentially from the current 24% to 36% by 2052. This includes spending on:

• Developing and implementing resource substitutes and cleaner technologies.
• Repairing damage from extreme weather and adapting to climate change.
• Maintaining infrastructure in a more challenging environment.

Consumption squeeze. Since total GDP growth is slowing, this necessary increase in investment means a smaller portion of the economic pie is available for immediate consumption. Average per capita consumption will stagnate or decline in many regions, particularly the wealthy ones.

5. Energy Use Will Peak, Driven by Efficiency and Renewables

The real winner will be the new renewables—solar, wind, and biomass—which, along with hydro, will grow from 8% of energy use in 2010 to 37% in 2050.

Peak energy. Global energy use is projected to peak around the 2030s and begin a slow decline, despite continued economic growth for much of the period. This is a result of significant improvements in energy efficiency.

Efficiency gains. The energy intensity of the global economy (energy used per unit of GDP) is expected to fall by another third by 2052, continuing a trend seen over the past 40 years. This is driven by economic incentives and the shift to less energy-intensive sectors.

Renewable surge. While fossil fuels will still dominate in 2052, renewables will grow dramatically, reaching 37% of the energy mix. This transition is driven by technological advances and falling costs, although it is slower than needed to avoid significant warming.

6. Climate Change Will Reach 2°C by 2052, Bringing Visible Damage

By 2052 humanity will already have reached the danger threshold: the temperature will already be plus 2°C over preindustrial times.

Exceeding the target. Despite some efforts to reduce emissions, the sum of global actions will not be enough to keep warming below the internationally agreed 2°C target by 2052. The temperature will continue to rise beyond this point.

Visible impacts. The world will experience increasingly frequent and severe climate impacts:

• More extreme weather events (droughts, floods, storms).
• Rising sea levels (an additional 36 cm by 2052).
• Melting glaciers and Arctic summer ice.
• Ecosystem shifts and biodiversity loss.

Delayed action. The slow pace of global decision-making, particularly in democratic systems, means that significant action to cut emissions will be postponed until climate damage becomes undeniable and widespread, likely in the 2030s and beyond.

7. Food Production Will Keep Pace, But Resource Limits Intensify

Food production will satisfy reduced demand.

Sufficient supply. Globally, enough food will be produced to feed the population in 2052, partly because demand growth will be lower than expected (due to slower population growth and dietary shifts in wealthy nations) and partly due to continued increases in agricultural yields.

Yield challenges. While technology and practices will boost yields, climate change will increasingly pose challenges, potentially leading to a net negative impact on global yields after 2040. Land area for cultivation may also decline due to urbanization and degradation.

Distribution issues. Despite sufficient global supply, hunger will persist due to unequal distribution and the inability of the poorest populations to afford food, especially as biofuel production competes for agricultural land and drives up prices.

8. Nature Will Retreat as Urbanization Accelerates

Undisturbed nature will be constrained to protected areas.

Shrinking wilderness. The human ecological footprint, particularly the nonenergy footprint (land use for food, fiber, cities), will continue to expand, drastically reducing the amount of unused, biologically productive land.

Loss of space. Unused bio-capacity per person will plummet, falling by 75% from 1970 to 2052. This means less space for:

• Wild ecosystems and biodiversity.
• Natural processes like water purification and carbon absorption.
• Traditional rural lifestyles.

Urban dominance. The world will become overwhelmingly urban, with megacities housing the majority of the population. This concentration offers some efficiencies (e.g., lower per capita emissions, easier defense against climate impacts) but further distances humanity from nature.

9. Rising Inequity Will Force Redistribution and Tension

The young, I predict, will not take over the burden unabridged.

Growing disparities. The slowdown in economic growth, particularly in wealthy nations, will exacerbate existing income and wealth inequalities. Without a growing pie to share, tensions between different social groups will rise.

Intergenerational conflict. Younger generations in wealthy nations face the burden of national debt, unfunded pensions, and high asset prices (like housing), inherited from older generations. This is likely to lead to conflict and forced redistribution.

Social friction. Increased inequity and tension will contribute to social strife and instability, which in turn will negatively impact productivity growth, creating a feedback loop of slower growth and increased conflict.

10. Short-Termism Hinders Action, Boosting the State's Role

Both modern democracy and capitalist markets are amazingly shortsighted.

Delayed response. The inherent short-term focus of democratic politics (driven by election cycles) and capitalist markets (driven by quarterly profits) makes it difficult to address long-term challenges like climate change that require significant up-front investment for future benefits.

Crisis-driven action. Meaningful, large-scale action on global problems is often postponed until crisis strikes and the damage is undeniable. This reactive approach is less efficient and more costly in the long run.

Increased state intervention. As market mechanisms fail to solve critical long-term problems, there will be a growing demand for stronger government intervention. The state will play a larger role in directing investment, setting standards, and managing resources, even if this means less market freedom.

11. Capitalism Will Be Modified as a New Paradigm Emerges

By 2052, the new paradigm—“sustainable well-being based on renewable energy”—will be exerting increasing influence on policy making.

Modified system. Capitalism will not disappear but will be significantly modified. Investment flows will increasingly be influenced by political decisions aimed at addressing societal needs (like green energy) rather than solely by short-term profitability.

Beyond GDP. While economic growth will remain a goal, particularly in developing nations, there will be a growing recognition, especially in wealthier regions, that sustainable well-being is a more appropriate measure of societal success than just GDP.

Transparency and responsibility. Corporations will face increasing pressure for transparency and accountability regarding their environmental and social impacts. Sustainability reporting will become more standardized and mandatory, pushing companies towards more responsible practices.

12. Regional Futures Will Diverge Dramatically

The world in 2052 will be one of huge regional and class differences.

Uneven development. The global average masks vastly different regional trajectories.

• United States: Stagnation or slight decline in per capita consumption, loss of global hegemony, slow adaptation to climate change due to political gridlock.
• China: Explosive economic growth, catching up to OECD living standards, strong state-led investment in green technology and adaptation, becoming the new global hegemon.
• OECD-less-US: Gradual stagnation, population decline, significant progress in reducing emissions, but slower economic dynamism than China.
• BRISE: Solid economic growth, lifting billions out of poverty, significant energy expansion and emissions growth, facing major climate impacts.
• ROW: Continued poverty for billions, slower growth than BRISE, facing severe climate vulnerability, remaining on the periphery of the global economy.

Shared challenges. Despite diverging economic paths, all regions will face the increasing reality of climate change, resource constraints, and the need to adapt to a more turbulent world.

New alliances. Climate impacts and resource needs may drive new regional alliances (e.g., a "New North" benefiting from warming, a unified Mediterranean facing heat/drought) and exacerbate tensions elsewhere.

Last updated: May 17, 2025