Afghanistan

1. Pakistan's ISI Covertly Directed the Afghan Jehad

From 1983 to 1987 Brigadier Mohammad Yousaf was the head of the Afghan Bureau of Pakistan’s Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI – akin to the CIA), and as such was effectively the Mujahideen’s commander-in-chief.

Secret command. Brigadier Mohammad Yousaf, head of ISI's Afghan Bureau, was the operational director of the Afghan resistance from 1983-1987. Operating under deep cover, he managed the flow of arms, training, and planning for the Mujahideen, effectively acting as their general against the Soviet presence. This role was kept secret even from most senior Pakistani military officers and Yousaf's own family.

Vast operation. Yousaf's bureau, starting with a small staff, grew to include 60 officers and 300 men, managing a massive logistical and training effort. They oversaw the distribution of thousands of tons of arms and ammunition and trained tens of thousands of Mujahideen, all while maintaining the official Pakistani government denial of involvement. The ISI headquarters for the Afghan war was Ojhri Camp, a seemingly innocuous facility near Rawalpindi.

Personal risk. Despite the elaborate smokescreen, Yousaf and his staff operated under constant threat from enemy agents. They adopted covert practices like using cover names, changing vehicles, and avoiding public appearances, though Yousaf himself lived openly. The risk of capture and exposure was ever-present, particularly for Pakistani military personnel sent on missions inside Afghanistan.

2. Zia and Akhtar Masterminded a "Death by a Thousand Cuts" Strategy

He convinced the president that no only was it vital to Pakistan’s interests to fight the aggressors, but that there was every chance of defeating them.

Strategic vision. President Zia-ul-Haq, advised by ISI Director General General Akhtar Abdur Rahman Khan, made the pivotal decision in 1979 to support the Afghan Jehad. Against initial skepticism, Akhtar argued that confronting the Soviet military was vital for Pakistan's defense and that victory was possible through a large-scale guerrilla war.

Guerrilla warfare. The chosen strategy was "death by a thousand cuts," avoiding direct confrontation with the superior Soviet conventional forces. This involved:

• Ambushes and assassinations
• Attacks on supply convoys, bridges, pipelines, and airfields
• Concentration on soft targets
• Utilizing Pakistan as a secure base for sanctuary, training, and supply.

Political and religious motives. Beyond military strategy, Zia saw supporting the Jehad as a way to defend Islam, gain international sympathy (especially from the US), and consolidate his own political position after executing former Prime Minister Bhutto. Akhtar's personal wish was to see the Soviets defeated and offer prayers in a liberated Kabul.

3. Afghan Mujahideen: Fierce Warriors Hampered by Feuding

Add to the above the Afghan’s hardy physique, his ability to endure privations, his great resilience, and you have the makings of a first-class guerrilla soldier.

Warrior culture. The Afghan fighter possessed inherent qualities making him a formidable guerrilla:

• Exceptional physical courage and stoicism in the face of pain
• Deep religious conviction in the Jehad, promising paradise for martyrs (Shaheed)
• Intimate knowledge of the harsh, mountainous terrain
• Inbred affinity for weapons and ability to live off the land.

Internal divisions. Despite their strengths, the Mujahideen were plagued by deep-seated feuding ("Badal" - vengeance) and a lack of unity among the seven political parties and numerous field commanders. This internal conflict often overshadowed the fight against the common enemy, leading to:

• Refusal to cooperate on joint operations
• Commanders prioritizing personal gain (loot, prestige) over strategic objectives
• Wasted effort and casualties in inter-Party clashes.

Tactical limitations. While brave, the Mujahideen often exhibited tactical inflexibility, preferring noisy, direct assaults over covert methods. They were reluctant to dig defensive positions, disliked crawling, and their command structure, though nominally under Party leaders, was often fragmented, making coordinated action difficult.

4. The Soviet Enemy: Static, Casualty-Shy, and Vulnerable

My impression was that both these superpowers had been geared up to wage a conventional, or even nuclear, war in Europe, but never a counter-insurgency campaign in Asia.

Conventional mindset. The Soviet military, trained for large-scale conventional warfare in Europe, struggled with counter-insurgency in Afghanistan's terrain. Their deployment was largely static, focused on holding cities, airfields, and main supply routes, leaving vast rural areas to the Mujahideen.

Weaknesses exploited. The "thousand cuts" strategy targeted key Soviet vulnerabilities:

• Over-reliance on the Salang Highway as a single, vulnerable lifeline
• Conscript soldiers with low morale, poor training, and little motivation beyond survival
• Excessive casualty-consciousness, leading to reluctance to dismount from vehicles or operate at night
• Dependence on airpower, which was initially unchallenged but became vulnerable later.

Afghan Army unreliability. The Soviet plan was hampered by the unreliability of the Afghan Army, which suffered from mass desertions and low morale. Despite Soviet efforts to rebuild and advise it, the Afghan Army often had to be locked into garrisons rather than used offensively, forcing the Soviets to bear the brunt of the fighting.

5. CIA Funding and Technical Aid Were Vital, But Often Inept

It was always galling to the Americans, and I can understand their point of view, that although they paid the piper they could not call the tune.

Financial lifeline. The US and Saudi Arabia provided billions of dollars in funding, channeled through the CIA, which was essential for purchasing arms, equipment, and covering operational costs. This financial backing was critical to sustaining the Jehad against a superpower.

Procurement problems. The CIA's arms procurement process was often inefficient and frustrating for ISI. Issues included:

• Lack of transparency regarding budget and costs
• Frequent purchase of unsuitable, outdated, or even unserviceable weapons (e.g., rusty Egyptian arms, heavy Oerlikon guns, ineffective Blowpipe missiles)
• Inconsistent shipment schedules causing logistical bottlenecks
• Suspicions of corruption or political influence overriding military suitability in purchasing decisions.

Valuable technical support. Despite procurement issues, the CIA provided invaluable technical assistance. This included:

• High-quality satellite photographs for operational planning
• Technical advice on demolitions and target analysis
• Wireless interception equipment providing tactical intelligence
• Training for Pakistani instructors on new weapons systems like the Stinger.

6. A Complex Pipeline Delivered Arms, Despite Bureaucracy and Corruption

Probably the most expensive leg of the journey was the last sector of the pipeline from the Parties to the Mujahideen who would use the weapons.

Multi-stage system. The supply chain was a complex, multi-national operation with three main stages:

• CIA procurement and delivery to Pakistan (often problematic)
• ISI transport, storage, and allocation within Pakistan (efficient and secure under Yousaf)
• Party distribution and transport into and across Afghanistan (costly, chaotic, and prone to feuding).

ISI control. ISI maintained strict control over the allocation of arms to the seven Parties based on military effectiveness and operational needs, resisting pressure from the CIA and others to change the system. This control, though criticized, was seen as essential for implementing the strategic plan and incentivizing Commanders.

Challenges and costs. Moving supplies across Pakistan and into Afghanistan faced numerous hurdles:

• Secrecy and security risks during transport
• Bureaucratic delays and occasional corruption at checkpoints
• Reliance on animal transport (mules, horses, camels) for the final leg into mountainous terrain
• Exorbitant transport costs within Afghanistan, sometimes reaching $15-20 per kilogram.

7. Mission-Oriented Training Was Key to Tactical Success

As experienced soldiers, General Akhtar and I both understood that without proper training we would indeed be throwing away the Mujahideen.

Expanding capacity. Recognizing the need for skilled fighters, ISI dramatically expanded training facilities in Pakistan, increasing throughput from 3,000 trainees in 1983 to over 1,000 per month by 1984. By 1987, over 80,000 Mujahideen had received formal training.

Practical focus. Training was intensive, practical, and mission-oriented, focusing on specific skills needed for guerrilla warfare:

• Heavy weapons (mortars, rockets, anti-tank/aircraft guns)
• Demolitions (pipelines, bridges, pylons)
• Mine-laying and lifting
• Urban warfare and sabotage techniques.

Pakistani instructors. Crucially, all training was conducted by Pakistani Army personnel, often former ISI staff, who sometimes accompanied Mujahideen teams on missions inside Afghanistan as advisers. This maintained secrecy and ensured training aligned with operational plans, despite initial resistance from some Party leaders to joint training.

8. Internal Feuding Was as Damaging as Enemy Attacks

While the Soviets, and their Afghan allies, remained in the country the Mujahideen could sink some of their internal differences to combine against a common enemy.

Endemic conflict. Despite the unifying cause of Jehad, deep-seated rivalries and blood feuds among tribes, clans, and political parties persisted. This feuding often erupted into violent clashes between Mujahideen groups, diverting resources and effort from the fight against the Soviets.

Impact on operations. Feuding severely hampered strategic and tactical coordination. Examples included:

• Commanders refusing passage to supply caravans or fighters from rival parties
• Lack of cooperation on joint offensives or defensive operations
• Commanders prioritizing personal gain or vengeance over military objectives
• Wasted time and effort by ISI trying to mediate disputes.

Exploited by the enemy. The Soviets and their Afghan allies actively exploited these divisions through propaganda and infiltration by KHAD agents, aiming to exacerbate tensions and weaken the resistance from within. Pakistani tribesmen along the border also sometimes aided the enemy for profit, further complicating the situation.

9. Kabul Was the Strategic Center of Gravity

Whoever controlled Kabul controlled Afghanistan, both in the eyes of its people and the world.

Symbolic and practical importance. Kabul, as the capital, was the political, economic, and military heart of Afghanistan. Controlling it was essential for the communist regime's legitimacy and for the Mujahideen to claim ultimate victory. General Akhtar's directive was clear: "Kabul must burn."

Strategy to isolate and pressure. The plan to take Kabul involved:

• Cutting off supply lines and utilities (roads, power lines, water dams)
• Sabotage and assassination within the city targeting Soviet personnel, KHAD agents, and government officials
• Relentless stand-off rocket attacks on military installations, government buildings, and Soviet residential areas.

Challenges and setbacks. Despite continuous pressure, taking Kabul proved difficult. The city was heavily defended with multiple rings of fortifications. Winter conditions hampered Mujahideen operations, allowing the Soviets to push defenses outwards. Lack of effective long-range weapons initially limited the impact of rocket attacks, a problem partially solved by the introduction of the SBRL.

10. Soviet Offensives Tested Mujahideen Defenses, Leading to Tactical Shifts

I decided to ensure that any future attempt should also be defeated.

Border focus. The eastern border provinces, serving as the Mujahideen's main supply corridor from Pakistan, were frequent targets of large-scale Soviet/Afghan offensives. These operations aimed to disrupt supply lines, destroy bases, and push the Mujahideen back from the frontier.

Improving enemy tactics. Soviet and Afghan forces refined their tactics over time, incorporating:

• Elaborate pincer movements and heliborne encirclements
• Extensive use of airpower and artillery to soften targets
• Improved coordination between ground and air forces.

Controversial defense. The decision to defend key border bases like Zhawar conventionally, rather than withdrawing into Pakistan, was controversial but deemed necessary to protect vital supply points. The battle of Zhawar in 1986, though costly, demonstrated the Mujahideen's ability to hold ground and inflicted significant casualties on the attackers, ultimately forcing a Soviet withdrawal from the area.

11. The Stinger Missile Was the War's Turning Point

With a military triumph, Akhtar would be the hero; he had first advocated fighting, and he had devised and overseen the strategy of the war.

Air superiority challenged. For years, the Soviet Mi-24 Hind helicopter gunship was the Mujahideen's most feared opponent, operating with relative impunity due to the lack of effective anti-aircraft weapons. The outdated SA-7 was easily defeated by flares or altitude.

Political delays. The introduction of the US Stinger missile was delayed for years due to political fears in both Pakistan and the US regarding its potential capture by Soviets or terrorists. ISI and field commanders repeatedly pressed for the weapon, recognizing its critical importance.

Game changer. The Stinger's arrival in late 1986 dramatically shifted the tactical balance. Its effectiveness against helicopters forced Soviet and Afghan pilots to change tactics (flying higher, using flares constantly) and significantly boosted Mujahideen morale. The high hit rate achieved by trained Mujahideen teams proved the weapon's value and their capability to use it effectively.

12. Cross-Border Raids into the Soviet "Underbelly" Provoked Panic

Casey had been correct—we were touching an extremely tender spot.

Exploiting vulnerabilities. Inspired by William Casey's suggestion, ISI initiated a secret campaign of incursions into Soviet Central Asia across the Amu River. The aim was to exploit ethnic and religious ties, disrupt economic targets, and pressure Moscow by bringing the war onto Soviet soil.

Escalation of tactics. The campaign evolved from distributing propaganda (Holy Korans) to:

• Rocket attacks on Soviet border towns and airfields from Afghanistan
• Sabotage missions across the river (sinking barges, derailing trains, attacking power lines)
• Deeper penetration raids targeting industrial facilities up to 25km inside the USSR.

Soviet reaction and halt. These attacks, though small-scale, provoked a fierce Soviet reaction, including massive retaliatory bombing south of the Amu and, crucially, diplomatic threats against Pakistan's security. A particularly successful raid in April 1987 led to a direct Soviet ultimatum, causing panic in Islamabad and forcing Prime Minister Junejo to order an immediate halt to all cross-border operations.