Charmides

1. Plato's Charmides: A Blend of Drama, History, and Philosophy.

The Charmides is a difficult and enigmatic dialogue traditionally considered one of Plato’s Socratic dialogues.

A layered work. Plato's Charmides is more than just a philosophical treatise; it's a masterfully crafted narrative weaving together dramatic elements, historical context, and complex philosophical arguments. Set in Athens during the early Peloponnesian War, the dialogue captures the city's vibrant intellectual and social life, even as it subtly hints at the impending political turmoil and the tragic fates of its key participants. The dialogue's structure, narrated by Socrates, allows for multiple perspectives on the events and characters.

Historical shadows. The dialogue's dramatic date (around 432 or 429 BCE) is crucial, as the audience knows the future of the young Charmides and his guardian Critias – both prominent figures in the brutal regime of the Thirty Tyrants that briefly ruled Athens after its defeat in 404 BCE. This historical subtext adds a layer of tragic irony, contrasting the youthful promise and philosophical potential shown in the dialogue with the later reality of their tyranny and violent deaths, which also contributed to Socrates' own trial and execution in 399 BCE.

Interwoven elements. The dialogue's power lies in how seamlessly it integrates these different dimensions. The characters' personalities and relationships influence the philosophical discussion, while the historical context provides a somber backdrop against which the abstract arguments about virtue and knowledge gain poignant relevance. This intricate interplay makes the Charmides a challenging but deeply rewarding work, inviting readers to consider the relationship between individual character, political action, and philosophical understanding.

2. The Elusive Virtue: Exploring Sôphrosynê (Temperance).

Sôphrosynê, temperance, and the successive attempts to define it turn out to be the main subject of the conversation...

A core concept. The central focus of the Charmides is the exploration of sôphrosynê, a multifaceted Greek virtue often translated as temperance, self-control, or soundness of mind. The dialogue presents a series of attempts to define this virtue, moving from outward behavior to inner disposition and finally to a form of knowledge. This quest for a definition is typical of Plato's early Socratic dialogues, highlighting the difficulty of pinning down essential moral concepts.

Multiple facets. The dialogue reveals that sôphrosynê encompasses various aspects:

• Quiet, orderly, and decorous behavior.
• Modesty and a sense of shame (aidôs).
• 'Doing one's own' or minding one's own business.
• Doing good deeds or acting beneficially.
• Knowing oneself.

Beyond simple definition. The repeated refutations of proposed definitions underscore the complexity and elusiveness of sôphrosynê. The dialogue suggests that it's not easily reducible to a single formula or behavior. Instead, it seems to involve a combination of inner state, outward conduct, and a particular kind of understanding, setting the stage for a deeper dive into the nature of self-knowledge.

3. Socratic vs. Critianic Self-Knowledge: Two Competing Ideas.

At the core of my interpretation lies the contention that two different conceptions of sôphrosynê or self-knowledge are present in the dialogue, one belonging to Critias, the other associated with Plato’s Socrates.

A central contrast. The dialogue implicitly contrasts two distinct notions of self-knowledge, which becomes the focus after earlier definitions of temperance fail. Socrates' conception, familiar from the Apology, involves knowing the limits of one's own wisdom – specifically, knowing what one knows and, crucially, what one does not know, particularly regarding "the most important things" (virtue, truth, the soul). This self-awareness is achieved through dialectical self-examination and is linked to human wisdom, distinct from divine wisdom.

Critias's ambitious view. Critias, on the other hand, proposes a more abstract and ambitious form of self-knowledge. He interprets the Delphic maxim "Know Thyself" not as advice to recognize human limitations, but as the god's greeting, equivalent to "Be Temperate." His definition evolves into temperance as the unique "science of itself and the other sciences" (epistêmê epistêmês). This is conceived as a higher-order, strictly reflexive knowledge that governs all other sciences but has no object distinct from science itself.

Different aims. The contrast is stark:

• Socratic: Knowing one's ignorance, focused on moral self-assessment, achieved through dialectic, linked to human wisdom.
• Critianic: Knowing knowledge itself, focused on cognitive structure and control, potentially achieved through abstract reasoning, linked to a claim of superior understanding.

This fundamental divergence in understanding self-knowledge drives the latter half of the dialogue's philosophical investigation.

4. Charmides' Early Attempts: Temperance as Quietness and Shame.

So', he said, 'it seems to me that, in a word, what you are asking about is a sort of quietness or calmness'.

Initial definitions. Following Socrates' "best method" of looking within himself, Charmides offers two initial definitions of temperance based on his self-perception and conventional values. First, he suggests temperance is a kind of quietness or calmness (hêsychiotês), doing everything in an orderly and quiet manner. This reflects the traditional aristocratic ideal of decorous and unobtrusive behavior.

Shame as temperance. When the first definition is refuted (as quickness is often more admirable than quietness in various activities), Charmides proposes a second definition: temperance is a sense of shame or modesty (aidôs). This points to an inner disposition rather than just outward behavior, suggesting that temperance involves a feeling of restraint and a concern for how one appears to others, particularly those whose opinion is valued.

Conventional limitations. While these definitions capture aspects of conventional sôphrosynê and reflect Charmides' own character (he blushes when asked if he is temperate), they are ultimately found wanting. Socrates' elenchus shows that:

• Quietness is not always admirable; sometimes quickness is better.
• Shame is not always good; Homer says it's bad for a man in need.

These early attempts, though plausible on a superficial level, fail to capture the essential nature of temperance, prompting Charmides to turn to an external source for his next definition.

5. Critias Enters: Temperance as 'Doing One's Own' and Good Deeds.

But consider the following view about temperance to judge whether you like it. For I just remembered something that I once heard someone say, that temperance might be doing one’s own.

A borrowed definition. Charmides, having exhausted his own ideas, offers a definition he heard from someone else – implicitly, Critias: temperance is "doing one's own" (ta heautou prattein). This phrase was politically charged in Athens, often associated with the oligarchic ideal of minding one's private affairs versus democratic engagement (polypragmosynê). Socrates finds this definition puzzling, calling it a "riddle."

Critias takes over. When Charmides struggles to defend the definition, Critias steps in, revealing himself as its author. He refines the idea, distinguishing between "making" (poiein) and "doing" or "working" (prattein/ergazesthai), arguing that temperance is not just making one's own things, but doing or making good things. He appeals to Hesiod to support the idea that only good activities count as true "work" or "doing."

Linking virtue and value. This move introduces the crucial element of value into the definition of temperance. Temperance is now explicitly tied to performing actions that are beneficial or good. However, this leads to a new problem: if temperance is simply doing good things, does the temperate person necessarily know that they are doing good things, or can they be temperate without being aware of it? This question sets the stage for the introduction of self-knowledge as the core of temperance.

6. The 'Science of Science': Temperance as Unique, Reflexive Knowledge.

Rather, while all the others are sciences of something other than themselves and not of themselves, this one alone is the science both of all the other sciences and of itself.

A radical proposal. Faced with the implication that one could be temperate (by doing good) without knowing it, Critias rejects this possibility, insisting that temperance must involve self-awareness. This leads him to propose a new definition: temperance is knowing oneself (gignôskein heauton). Socrates helps him articulate this further, leading to the complex notion that temperance is the unique "science of itself and the other sciences and the absence of science" (epistêmê autê heautês kai tôn allôn epistêmôn kai anepistêmosynês), or simply, the "science of science" (epistêmê epistêmês).

Distinctive features. This "science of science" is characterized by:

• Uniqueness: It is the only science of its kind.
• Strict Reflexivity: Its object is science itself (including itself and other sciences) and the lack of science, but nothing else.
• Intransparency: It does not access the specific objects of the other sciences (e.g., the science of science knows medicine as a science, but not health or disease).
• Higher-Order Status: It governs or presides over all other sciences.

A new target. This abstract and peculiar conception of knowledge becomes the primary focus of the subsequent arguments. It represents a departure from the earlier, more conventional definitions and sets up a rigorous examination of the possibility and value of a purely reflexive, higher-order form of understanding.

7. The Argument from Relatives: Questioning Reflexive Knowledge.

For if you consider this very same thing in other cases, you will surely come to think, as I do, that it is impossible.

Testing possibility. Socrates, though initially perplexed by the idea of a "science of science," agrees to investigate its possibility. He does this by examining analogous cases of relatives, arguing that if these analogues cannot be strictly reflexive (i.e., directed only towards themselves and nothing else), then neither can science. The argument proceeds by induction, looking at different categories of relatives.

Categories of relatives:

• Perceptual: Sight (of color), hearing (of sound), sense (of sensibles). Can there be a sight only of sight, hearing only of hearing, sense only of sense?
• Psychological: Desire (of pleasure), will (of good), love (of beautiful), fear (of fearsome), belief (of opinable). Can these be only of themselves?
• Quantitative: Greater (than smaller), double (of half), more (than less), heavier (than lighter), older (than younger). Can these be only of themselves?

Incoherence of strict reflexivity. Socrates argues that in many cases, particularly with quantitative relatives, strict reflexivity leads to logical impossibility (e.g., something greater than itself must also be smaller than itself). In other cases, like perception and psychological states, strict reflexivity seems deeply strange or unbelievable, as it would mean these capacities are cut off from their characteristic objects (e.g., a sight that sees no color). The argument suggests that a relative is constituted by its relation to a distinct correlative.

Tentative conclusion. The Argument from Relatives concludes that a strictly reflexive entity, like the proposed "science of science," appears either impossible or highly implausible. However, Socrates acknowledges that this is a difficult issue requiring further, more rigorous investigation (perhaps using the method of division) by a "great man."

8. The Argument from Benefit: Is the 'Science of Science' Useful?

In what way, then, will temperance be beneficial since it is not the producer of any benefit? – In no way at all, Socrates, it seems.

Shifting focus. Even if the "science of science" were possible, Socrates asks, what benefit would it bring? This question drives the second major argument against Critias's definition. The interlocutors initially assumed that this science would be greatly beneficial, enabling its possessor to know what they know and don't know and to govern effectively.

Challenging substantive content. Socrates questions how a science only of science (and lack of science) can provide substantive knowledge (knowing what one knows or doesn't know), not just discriminatory knowledge (knowing that one knows or doesn't know). He argues that since each first-order science is defined by its distinct object (medicine by health, building by houses), the "science of science," having no such object, cannot access or judge the content of these sciences. It can only tell that someone has knowledge, not what that knowledge is about.

The uselessness conclusion. This leads to the devastating conclusion: if temperance is merely discriminatory knowledge, it cannot reliably distinguish true experts from frauds (as only an expert in a field can truly judge another expert). Furthermore, it cannot produce any specific good or benefit, as that function belongs to the first-order sciences (health from medicine, houses from building). Since temperance produces no benefit, it cannot be the great good they assumed it to be.

Critias's last stand. Critias attempts to save his definition by arguing that the "science of science" is beneficial because it rules over the science of good and evil, thus appropriating its beneficial function. However, Socrates refutes this by reiterating that the "science of science," being only of science, cannot access the object (good and evil) or function (producing benefit) of another science. The argument concludes that the "science of science" is utterly useless.

9. The 'Dream' and Other Thought-Experiments: Critiquing Technocratic Rule.

But that by acting scientifically we would also do well and be happy, this, my dear Critias, we cannot know as yet.

Imagining the ideal. Throughout the Argument from Benefit, Socrates employs thought-experiments to explore the implications of Critias's definition. The most significant is the "dream," depicting a society governed by temperate rulers possessing the "science of science" (initially assumed to include substantive knowledge). In this society, everything is done "according to the sciences," error is eliminated, and true experts are utilized.

A hollow perfection. While the "dream" portrays a perfectly efficient and scientifically managed state, Socrates raises a crucial question: does acting scientifically necessarily lead to acting well and being happy? The subsequent argument suggests not. Even if all tasks are performed expertly, without the science of good and evil, the overall direction and purpose of these activities remain unclear, and happiness is not guaranteed.

Critiquing technocracy. These thought-experiments, particularly the "dream," serve as a critique of a purely technocratic ideal of rule. They suggest that simply having a higher-order knowledge of how to manage other forms of expertise is insufficient for good governance and human flourishing. A true ruling science must be directed towards value – specifically, towards the good and evil – a function that the "science of science," as defined by Critias, lacks. The dialogue thus points towards the need for a ruling art grounded in ethics, foreshadowing the political philosophy of the Republic and Statesman.

10. The Limits of Method: Socrates Reflects on the Enquiry's Failure.

And now, you see, we are vanquished on all fronts, and are unable to discover to which one of the things there are the lawgiver attached this name, temperance.

Acknowledging defeat. At the conclusion of the arguments, Socrates explicitly states that the search has failed. They have been unable to define temperance or determine what it is. He takes responsibility for this failure, blaming himself for not conducting the enquiry well and for allowing unwarranted concessions.

Critique of the process. Socrates identifies key flaws in their method:

• Making concessions not logically required by the argument (e.g., granting the possibility of a "science of science").
• Granting premises that appear irrational (e.g., knowing what one doesn't know).
• Failing to rigorously examine the possibility of the "science of science" using proper methods like division.

Methodological shortcomings. While Socrates blames himself as an enquirer, he also implicitly criticizes the limitations of the elenchus itself when applied to complex ontological and epistemological issues like the nature of reflexive knowledge. The method, as practiced here, proved insufficient to grasp the truth about temperance, leading to an absurd conclusion (that temperance is useless). This suggests the need for more robust philosophical tools and methods to tackle such fundamental questions.

11. Character and Fate: The Dark Historical Subtext.

For I believe that what I had supposed was entirely true, namely that Charmides had heard this answer concerning temperance from Critias.

Ambiguous portraits. Plato's portrayal of Charmides and Critias is deliberately ambiguous throughout the dialogue. While they exhibit moments of philosophical promise, intelligence, and conventional virtue (Charmides' modesty, Critias's dialectical skill), the narrative also hints at their flaws: Charmides' passivity and slyness, Critias's arrogance, irascibility, and love of power. The historical context looms large, as the audience knows these men will become notorious tyrants.

Foreshadowing tyranny. The final scene is particularly chilling, as the playful banter about compulsion and authority takes on a sinister tone in light of their future actions. Charmides' declaration that he will use force because Critias commands him directly foreshadows his role in the brutal regime of the Thirty. Critias's commanding presence and the cousins' alliance against Socrates subtly hint at the violence and disregard for law that will characterize their rule.

Socrates' position. Socrates' calm demeanor and prophetic words in the final scene contrast sharply with the cousins' emerging authoritarianism. His refusal to oppose them, while seemingly passive, can be read as a foreshadowing of his later principled disobedience to the Thirty's unjust orders, ultimately leading to his death. The dialogue, therefore, serves as a powerful reminder of the tragic gap between philosophical ideals explored in conversation and the harsh realities of political power and human character.

12. Beyond Aporia: The Enduring Questions of Virtue and the Good Life.

Even though I am committed to it and shall try to defend it as convincingly as I can, I do not propose it with the intention of eliminating every other candidate from the map.

An open-ended search. Despite ending in aporia regarding the definition of temperance, the Charmides is far from a philosophical failure. It rigorously explores various conceptions of a cardinal virtue, revealing their strengths and weaknesses. It introduces and critically examines complex ideas like strictly reflexive knowledge and the possibility of a purely technocratic rule.

Lasting contributions. The dialogue makes significant contributions to philosophical inquiry:

• Pioneering work on relatives and reflexivity.
• Exploration of the relationship between knowledge, value, and happiness.
• Critique of different models of political authority.
• Reflection on the nature and limits of philosophical method.

Invitation to continue. The Charmides does not provide definitive answers but invites the reader to continue the search. By highlighting the shortcomings of the arguments presented and pointing towards more promising methods (like division) and concepts (like the science of good and evil), Plato encourages further philosophical
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Last updated: May 11, 2025