Key Takeaways
1. Importance isn't absolute, it's tethered to the valuer.
Things are important to creatures; the creatures themselves do not stand in some absolute rank ordering of importance.
Value is relational. Importance and value are not free-floating concepts; they are always tethered to a valuer, a creature for whom things can be good or bad. This perspective challenges the notion of a universal hierarchy where humans are inherently more important than other animals.
No objective ranking. There is no neutral standpoint from which to objectively rank the importance of different creatures. Each being's value is intrinsically linked to its own experience and perspective.
- A human's life is important to the human.
- A dog's life is important to the dog.
- A tree's life is important to the tree.
Absolute importance is universal relativity. The closest we can get to absolute importance is something that is important to everyone, to every sentient creature. This perspective shifts the focus from ranking beings to ensuring that every creature has the opportunity to pursue its own good.
2. Animals have a final good: conscious well-functioning.
The final good came into the world with animals, for an animal is, pretty much by definition, the kind of thing that has a final good—a good, in the sense that might matter morally.
Functional vs. final good. "Good" has two senses: evaluative (functional) and final. The functional good refers to something's ability to perform its purpose, while the final good is worth having for its own sake.
Animals as agents. Animals are unique because they function by representing their environment and acting in light of those representations. This agency is guided by valenced experiences, making them beings for whom things can be good or bad.
- Animals seek things that are good for them.
- Animals avoid things that are bad for them.
- Animals experience their own condition as good or bad.
Life as a good. For most animals, life itself is a good, a state worth having and maintaining. This is because to be well-functioning is to be alive and in reasonably good health, making existence a positive value for them.
3. Rationality distinguishes humans through normative self-governance.
I fully subscribe to the judgment of those writers who maintain that of all the differences between man and the lower animals, the moral sense or conscience is by far the most important.
Rationality vs. intelligence. While intelligence involves problem-solving and learning, rationality is the capacity for normative self-governance. It's the ability to evaluate reasons for beliefs and actions and to act accordingly.
Teleological perception. Non-rational animals perceive the world teleologically, with everything having a place in a purposive order determined by their instincts. Rational beings, however, can question these instinctive responses.
- Animals see a lion as danger.
- Humans can evaluate whether fear of the lion is a good reason to run.
Autonomy and moral law. Rationality allows humans to be governed by laws they give themselves, rather than being controlled by instinct. This autonomy is the foundation of morality, enabling us to make choices based on principles rather than mere impulse.
4. Human superiority is a nearly incoherent comparison.
I have not exactly been arguing that animals are just as important as people. I have been arguing that the comparison is nearly incoherent.
Evaluative vs. final good. "Good" can mean excellent (evaluative) or desirable (final). The question of human superiority involves both: Are humans more excellent? Is human life more desirable?
Morality doesn't confer superiority. The capacity for moral action doesn't make humans superior, as moral standards don't apply to animals. It's an internal standard for human action, not a universal measure.
- Knives should be sharp because they are for cutting.
- Human actions should be moral because they are for reasons.
Cognitive sophistication and the self. The degree of psychological unity in a creature's self may influence how deeply affected they are by certain goods and evils. However, this doesn't make them more important, just differently affected.
5. Moral standing is atemporal, not a temporary state.
The fact that man can have the idea “I” raises him infinitely above all the other beings living on earth.
Rationality and moral standing. Kant associates moral standing with rationality, but this raises questions about infants, the demented, and animals. Are they excluded?
Moral standing as a life-long attribute. Moral standing should be assigned to persons and animals considered as the subjects of their whole lives, not just particular life stages. This ongoing self is the proper unit of moral concern.
- A human infant is not a particular kind of creature, but a human creature at a particular life stage.
- Moral standing does not belong to particular life stages or to particular conditions, but to the subjects of whole lives.
Atemporal existence. Moral standing is atemporal, meaning it's not acquired or lost over time. Once a life begins, moral standing exists, allowing for actions before or after that life to be morally relevant.
6. Kant's indirect duty view is almost incoherent.
Any action whereby we may torment animals, or let them suffer distress, or otherwise treat them without love, is demeaning to ourselves.
Animals as mere means. Kant argues that animals, lacking reason, are mere means to human ends. However, he also insists on treating them with kindness and avoiding cruelty.
The indirect duty view. This view combines two theses:
- Duties to animals are owed to ourselves, not the animals.
- The ground of these duties is the effect of our treatment on our own characters.
Incoherence of the indirect duty view. The attitudes it invites are almost incoherent. It's difficult to genuinely love animals while simultaneously seeing that love as a means to improve our own moral character.
7. The animal antinomy reveals conflicting duties.
We are all of us born in moral stupidity, taking the world as an udder to feed our supreme selves.
The animal antinomy. This is a practical problem where two reasonable-sounding arguments lead to opposite conclusions.
- Duty to protect animals implies making them all domestic.
- Duty not to harm animals implies making them all wild.
The source of the conflict. The disturbance comes from a conflict between our moral standards and the way that nature works. The natural world staunchly resists moral reorganization.
The need for special principles. The animal antinomy shows why animal ethics is a special subject requiring principles for dealing with the special problems that it generates.
8. Creation ethics raises questions of intervention.
Assume a human being who honors the moral law, and who allows himself to think (as he can hardly avoid doing) what sort of a world he would create, were this in his power, under the guidance of practical reason.
McMahan's proposal. Jeff McMahan suggests eliminating carnivorous species and replacing them with herbivorous ones to reduce suffering. This raises questions about the extent of human intervention in nature.
The problem of "playing God." Intervening in nature to eliminate predation raises concerns about human hubris and the potential for unintended consequences. Are we justified in altering the natural order?
- What if we create a Malthusian dystopia?
- What if we eliminate the predators, or redirect their predatory tendencies into harmless play?
The question of for whom. Any intervention must be evaluated in terms of its impact on the well-being of the animals themselves, not just abstract notions of a "better" world.
9. Species are both populations and types, but not generic organisms.
Presumably, however, to say that happiness is the chief good seems a platitude, and a clearer account of what it is is still desired.
Species as populations and types. A species can be viewed as both a population of interbreeding individuals and a type characterized by certain traits. This dual nature complicates discussions about their value.
The generic organism fallacy. It's tempting to think of species as generic organisms, leading to the idea that what's good for the species is necessarily good for its members. This overlooks the individual experiences and needs of animals.
- The wolf has gone extinct in England.
- The wolf is hungry.
- The wolf is injured.
- The wolf is endangered.
The importance of individual lives. Every sentient animal is a real individual with a center of subjectivity of her own, with experiences that matter to her. It is the individual, not the species, that has moral significance.
10. Abolitionism and apartheid are two sides of the same coin.
We are all of us born in moral stupidity, taking the world as an udder to feed our supreme selves.
Abolitionism's goal. Abolitionists seek to abolish all human uses of animals, viewing them as inherently exploitative. This leads to a separation between humans and animals.
The problem of apartheid. By advocating for a complete separation, abolitionism risks creating a kind of moral apartheid, where animals are excluded from human society and their needs are ignored.
- Humans and animals must be separate but equal.
- Humans and animals must live on the opposite sides of a great divide.
The need for ethical interaction. A more nuanced approach involves finding ways to interact with animals that respect their autonomy and promote their well-being, rather than simply avoiding them altogether.
11. Pleasure and pain are perceptions of the good.
Presumably, however, to say that happiness is the chief good seems a platitude, and a clearer account of what it is is still desired.
Two views of pleasure and pain.
- Benthamite: Pleasure and pain are particular sensations with measurable intensity and duration.
- Aristotelian: Pleasure and pain are reflexive reactions to experiences, indicating whether they are welcome or unwelcome.
Pleasure and pain as perceptions. Pleasure and pain are not merely sensations, but perceptions of the good or bad condition of the animal. They are the animal's way of experiencing its own well-functioning.
- An animal experiences her own condition, and the things that affect it, as good- and bad-for her.
- An animal functions, in part, by making her own well-functioning, the things that are good for her in the functional sense, an end of action, a thing to go for, a final good.
Conscious life as the good. The final good for a creature is conscious well-functioning. Pleasure is the awareness of that good, and pain is the awareness of threats to it.
12. Ethical action requires empathy and reason.
I want to describe a way of looking at the world and living in it that is suitable for complex beings without a naturally unified standpoint.
The limits of reason. Reason alone cannot provide all the answers in ethical dilemmas. Empathy, the ability to understand and share the feelings of others, is also essential.
The importance of empathy. Empathy allows us to appreciate the significance of things from another's point of view, even if their experiences are different from our own. This is crucial for extending moral consideration to animals.
- It is the perpetual temptation, especially of the safe and the privileged, to harbor the thought that those less fortunate than ourselves are also simpler beings to whom misfortune probably does not matter as much, or in the same vivid way, as it would if the same things were happening to us.
- It is particularly easy to harbor such thoughts if the unfortunate ones are illiterate or inarticulate or unsophisticated, and if they are in some other way alien, like being of another race.
The need for both. Ethical action requires both empathy and reason. Empathy provides the motivation to care, while reason guides us in determining the best course of action.
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FAQ
What is Fellow Creatures: Our Obligations to the Other Animals by Christine M. Korsgaard about?
- Central claim: Korsgaard argues that humans have moral obligations to all sentient animals, treating them as “ends in themselves” with intrinsic moral value.
- Philosophical framework: The book uses Kantian ethics and Aristotelian theories of the good to analyze why animals deserve moral standing.
- Scope: It addresses practical ethical issues such as eating animals, animal experimentation, and environmental concerns, while exploring the nature of moral value and human-animal differences.
Why should I read Fellow Creatures by Christine M. Korsgaard?
- Philosophical depth: The book offers a rigorous, nuanced exploration of animal ethics, going beyond common intuitions to address deep philosophical questions.
- Bridging traditions: Korsgaard connects Kantian moral philosophy with Aristotelian ideas, providing a novel foundation for animal moral claims.
- Practical relevance: The arguments have direct implications for everyday decisions about diet, animal use, and environmental responsibility, making it valuable for both philosophers and general readers.
What are the key takeaways from Fellow Creatures by Christine M. Korsgaard?
- Animals as moral subjects: Sentient animals have moral claims on us and should not be treated merely as means to human ends.
- Value is perspectival: Goodness and importance are always “good-for” or “important-to” some creature, not absolute across species.
- Critique of current practices: Korsgaard condemns factory farming, animal experimentation, and other widespread practices as moral atrocities.
- Limits of Kantian reciprocity: She challenges the Kantian view that only rational beings have moral standing, arguing for the inclusion of animals in the moral community.
How does Christine M. Korsgaard define “ends in themselves” in Fellow Creatures?
- Kantian roots: Being an “end in itself” means having intrinsic value and moral standing, not being used merely as a means.
- Two senses of ends: Korsgaard distinguishes between active (reciprocal, rational) and passive (having a final good) senses, extending the latter to animals.
- Ground for obligations: This concept underpins our direct moral obligations to respect animals’ interests and well-being.
How does Fellow Creatures by Christine M. Korsgaard challenge the idea of human superiority over animals?
- Critique of absolute value: Korsgaard argues that importance is always relative to a creature’s own perspective; there is no absolute scale of value.
- Tethered values: All value is “tethered” to the beings who experience it, so claims of human superiority lack a coherent, objective basis.
- Partiality vs. superiority: While humans may be more important to themselves, this does not justify treating animals as morally inferior.
What is the “Argument from Marginal Cases” and how does Christine M. Korsgaard address it in Fellow Creatures?
- Argument overview: The Argument from Marginal Cases points out that some humans lack rationality but are still granted moral standing, so animals with similar capacities should be as well.
- Korsgaard’s response: She argues that rationality is a functional unity, not a property, and that impaired humans are still rational beings by nature.
- Moral standing as atemporal: Moral standing belongs to the subject of a whole life, not just to particular life stages or capacities.
How does Christine M. Korsgaard distinguish between human and animal selves in Fellow Creatures?
- Degrees of selfhood: Having a self is a matter of degree; animals have varying levels of self-consciousness and functional unity.
- Human uniqueness: Humans actively constitute their selves through evaluative self-conception, involving pride, shame, and moral assessment.
- Implications for ethics: While this changes the nature of the human good, it does not negate animals’ moral claims based on their sentience and final good.
How does Christine M. Korsgaard reinterpret Kant’s concept of moral community in relation to animals in Fellow Creatures?
- Kant’s original view: Kant restricted the moral community to rational beings who can legislate moral laws reciprocally.
- Korsgaard’s extension: She argues that animals can be “passive citizens” in the moral community, deserving protection even if they cannot legislate.
- Two senses of ‘end in itself’: Animals qualify as ends in the passive sense, grounding their moral standing in their own final good.
What is the “universalization test” in Kantian ethics, and why does Christine M. Korsgaard find it inadequate for animal ethics in Fellow Creatures?
- Definition: The universalization test asks if a maxim can be willed as a universal law without contradiction.
- Limitations for animals: Many actions involving animals are natural acts, not governed by social conventions, so the test fails to rule them out as impermissible.
- Inadequacy revealed: Korsgaard argues this shows the test’s limitations for animal ethics, not a justification for harmful treatment.
How does Christine M. Korsgaard address the role of pleasure and pain in constituting the final good for animals in Fellow Creatures?
- Central to animal good: Pleasure and pain are not just sensations but perceptions that signal what is good or bad for the animal.
- Functional and final good: These experiences are tied to both the animal’s well-functioning and its conscious life as an end in itself.
- Critique of utilitarianism: Korsgaard challenges the view that pleasure is the sole intrinsic good, emphasizing the relational nature of value.
What is the “animal antinomy” discussed by Christine M. Korsgaard in Fellow Creatures, and what moral dilemmas does it highlight?
- Conflicting duties: The antinomy arises from the duty not to harm animals and the duty to protect them, leading to contradictory ethical conclusions.
- Creation ethics vs. abolitionism: Korsgaard explores the tension between controlling nature to eliminate suffering and letting animals live wild without human interference.
- Moral complexity: This dilemma highlights the difficulty of reconciling animal ethics with ecological realities.
What practical ethical issues regarding animals does Christine M. Korsgaard explore in Fellow Creatures?
- Factory farming: Korsgaard condemns factory farming for its cruelty and environmental harm, questioning the morality of even “humane” farming.
- Animal use in research and work: She argues against painful and fatal animal experimentation and raises questions about animals’ roles in military and working contexts.
- Pet-keeping and environmental concerns: The book discusses the moral challenges of pet-keeping, dependency, and the broader issues of habitat loss and species extinction.
Review Summary
Fellow Creatures receives largely positive reviews for its philosophical approach to animal ethics. Readers appreciate Korsgaard's unique Kantian perspective and her arguments for treating animals as ends in themselves. Many find the book intellectually stimulating, though some note its academic complexity. Reviewers commend Korsgaard's exploration of practical implications and her challenge to human superiority. While some disagree with certain arguments, most consider the book a valuable contribution to animal ethics discourse, praising its depth, clarity, and ability to reshape thinking about human-animal relationships.
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