Fiasco

1. The Unfinished Business of 1991 Fueled the 2003 Invasion

"I don't think you can understand how OIF... without understanding the end of the '91 war, especially the distrust of Americans" that resulted.

A Botched Ending: The 1991 Gulf War concluded prematurely, leaving Saddam Hussein in power and fostering deep distrust among Iraqis, particularly the Shiites and Kurds who were encouraged to rebel but then abandoned. This unfinished business created a sense of injustice and instability that would later contribute to the 2003 invasion.

• The U.S. encouraged uprisings but failed to provide support.
• Saddam's Republican Guard was left largely intact.
• The U.S. government assumed Saddam's fall was inevitable, which proved incorrect.

Seeds of Future Conflict: The failure to decisively remove Saddam in 1991 planted the seeds for future conflict, as it allowed him to maintain power and continue to be a source of instability in the region. This created a sense of unfinished business that would later be used to justify the 2003 invasion. The distrust created by the 1991 war would also make the U.S. occupation more difficult.

Wolfowitz's Dissent: Paul Wolfowitz, then a mid-level Pentagon official, was a vocal critic of the 1991 war's conclusion, arguing that the U.S. should have done more to support the rebels and remove Saddam. This view, though a minority at the time, would later become a driving force behind the 2003 invasion. His determination to not defer to military judgments about avoiding getting stuck in Iraq would prove to be a major factor in the second Bush administration's drive to war.

2. Containment of Saddam: A Policy of Ambiguity and Missed Signals

"We contained Saddam. We watched his military shrink to less than half its size from the beginning of the Gulf War until the time I left command."

A Decade of Containment: For over a decade after the 1991 war, the U.S. pursued a policy of containment, using no-fly zones, sanctions, and military exercises to limit Saddam's power. While this policy did degrade his military capabilities, it also created a sense of resentment and instability in the region.

• Operation Northern Watch and Operation Southern Watch were costly and largely ignored by the American public.
• The policy was seen as a "steady white noise" by the U.S. military.
• The cost of containment was roughly $1.5 billion a year.

Saddam's Ambiguous Stance: Saddam Hussein's behavior during the containment period was carefully calibrated to show defiance without provoking a full-scale U.S. response. He got rid of his chemical and biological stocks but wouldn't let international inspectors prove it, likely to intimidate his neighbors and citizens. This ambiguity was misinterpreted by the U.S. government.

Wolfowitz's Critique: Paul Wolfowitz viewed containment as immoral and ineffective, comparing it to trying to contain Hitler. He argued that it was a costly strategy that did nothing for the Iraqi people and gave Osama bin Laden a major recruiting tool. He believed that the only solution was regime change.

3. Wolfowitz's Vision: A Crusade for Democracy, Blind to Reality

"More than any of the other dramatis personae in contemporary Washington, Wolfowitz embodies the central convictions to which the United States in the age of Bush subscribes."

Idealism vs. Realism: Paul Wolfowitz, a key architect of the Iraq war, was driven by a strong belief in the righteousness of American actions and the efficacy of American power to spread democracy. This idealistic vision often clashed with the more pragmatic views of military leaders and other policymakers.

• Wolfowitz saw Saddam as a modern-day Hitler and containment as immoral.
• He believed that every country is capable of becoming democratic.
• He had an "extraordinary certainty in the righteousness of American actions married to an extraordinary confidence in the efficacy of American arms."

Ignoring the Ground Truth: Wolfowitz's idealism led him to underestimate the complexities of Iraq and the potential for resistance to a U.S.-led occupation. He constructed a mirage of a land saturated with weapons of mass destruction and yearning to be liberated by American troops, ignoring the realities on the ground.

A Dangerous Naivete: Wolfowitz's advocacy of toppling Saddam through supporting Iraqi rebels was seen by some as a dangerous and naive approach whose consequences hadn't been adequately considered. His academic background and low-key manner cloaked a tough-minded determination that ran far deeper than is common in compromise-minded Washington.

4. 9/11: The Catalyst for a Preemptive War

"We cannot go back to business as usual. We cannot think that this problem of Islamic extremist-based terrorism is going to leave us alone."

A Political Opening: The 9/11 attacks provided the political opening that Paul Wolfowitz, Richard Perle, and others needed to push for a more aggressive foreign policy, including regime change in Iraq. They argued that 9/11 was precipitated by a myopic and false realism that wrongly had sought accommodation with evil.

• Wolfowitz pressed for attacking Iraq in response to 9/11, arguing that it was a state sponsor of terrorism.
• Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz brought briefing materials to Camp David that offered three targets in the war on terrorism: al Qaeda, Afghanistan's Taliban, and Iraq.
• The attacks created a new opportunity for those arguing that the professional intelligence analysts were underestimating the threat presented by Iraq.

Shifting Priorities: While President Bush initially focused on Afghanistan, the attacks created a new opportunity for those arguing that the professional intelligence analysts were underestimating the threat presented by Iraq. The new doubts about intelligence, along with the caution of top military officers, combined to deeply frustrate Rumsfeld.

The Iraq War Planning Begins: Formal Pentagon consideration of how to attack Iraq began in November 2001, just after the fall of Kabul. By early December, Army Gen. Tommy R. Franks was reviewing planning for an invasion of Iraq. From the outset, there was tension between the uniformed military and the office of the secretary of defense over whether to attack Iraq, and if so, how many troops to use.

5. The Flawed Planning and the Seeds of Occupation Failure

"There was no authoritative, systematic review and consolidation of viewpoints between intelligence producers and senior policymakers."

Tension Between Military and Civilians: From the outset, there was tension between the uniformed military and the office of the secretary of defense (OSD) over whether to attack Iraq, and if so, how many troops to use. The military favored a larger force, while Rumsfeld pushed for a smaller, faster invasion.

• Gen. Franks became the fulcrum in the planning for the war, siding with the Rumsfeld view.
• The military was comfortable with a big invasion force of about 350,000 troops, but Rumsfeld wanted a smaller, faster force.
• Rumsfeld's intervention, especially his demand that three successive versions of the invasion plan be produced, didn't improve planning and, in fact, weakened it.

Neglecting Postwar Planning: While the Bush administration focused heavily on the invasion plan, it gave little serious thought to the postwar occupation. This lack of planning would have disastrous consequences for the U.S. position in postwar Iraq.

• Central Command spent over a year figuring out how to take down a reeling, hollow regime, and gave almost no serious thought to how to replace it.
• The focus was almost all their energies on the easier of the two tasks, with disastrous consequences for the U.S. position in postwar Iraq.
• Zinni's post-Desert Fox study, which envisioned attacking Iraq with three heavy armored divisions, was discarded.

Miller's Tale: Judith Miller's reporting in the New York Times, based on flawed intelligence and the accounts of defectors, helped drive the nation toward war. Her stories about Iraqi WMD programs were later proven to be false.

6. The War of Words: Selling a War Based on False Premises

"There is no doubt that Saddam Hussein now has weapons of mass destruction. There is no doubt that he is amassing them to use against our friends, against our allies, and against us."

Cheney's Certitude: Vice President Cheney emphatically asserted that there was "no doubt" that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction, framing the debate in a way that powerfully helped the administration. His hardline no debate stance was adopted by others in the administration.

• Cheney's speech hit like a preemptive strike, limiting the president's options.
• His certainty dampened skepticism in the intelligence community.
• He put the opposition on the defensive, effectively saying, If you think I'm wrong, prove it.

A Flawed NIE: The National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iraq's WMD programs, prepared in September 2002, was a flawed document that overstated the threat and minimized internal doubts. It effectively presented opinion as fact and was a serious misrepresentation of views in the intelligence community.

• The NIE was pushed out unusually quickly, in just a few weeks.
• The Senate Intelligence Committee later found that "most of the major key judgments [in the NIE] either overstated, or were not supported by, the underlying intelligence reporting."
• The errors and exaggerations weren't random, but all pushed in the same direction, toward making the argument that Iraq presented a growing threat.

Redefining Intelligence: Richard Perle and others at the Pentagon argued that they were better at parsing the data than were their opponents in the intelligence community. They took individual factoids, built them into long lists, and then thought because of the length of the list, it was credible. This led to a data vacuum in which wild claims could be made about Saddam's armaments programs in 2002 that later would be proven wrong but at the time couldn't be refuted.

7. The Invasion: A Tactical Success, a Strategic Failure

"I believe demolishing Hussein's military power and liberating Iraq would be a cakewalk."

A Swift Invasion: The U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in March 2003 was a swift and decisive military victory, with U.S. forces quickly taking control of Baghdad and toppling Saddam Hussein's regime. However, this tactical success masked a deeper strategic failure.

• The invasion began with a volley of cruise missiles and bunker-penetrating bombs against Doura Farms, a group of houses sometimes used by Saddam Hussein.
• The ground attack began at dawn on March 21, with the 3rd Infantry Division spearheading the attack.
• The invasion force was relatively small, consisting of fewer than three Army divisions, plus a big Marine division and a British division.

A Limited Goal: The war plan focused on the relatively narrow goal of regime change, neglecting the more complex challenges of postwar stabilization and reconstruction. This lack of strategic vision would have disastrous consequences for the U.S. occupation.

• The plan was designed to achieve the goal of "regime change."
• The plan focused on the destruction of the Iraqi army and the state apparatus.
• The plan did not address the long-term consequences of the invasion.

Contradictory Delusions: The Bush administration pursued two contradictory delusions: overstating the threat of Iraqi WMD while underestimating the difficulty of occupying and remaking the country. This combination of pessimism and optimism helped pave the way to war.

• The administration emphasized worst-case scenarios for WMD, dismissing contrary evidence.
• At the same time, the administration emphasized best-case scenarios for postwar Iraq, assuming a warm welcome and a swift transition to democracy.
• Both the pessimism of the threat assessment and the optimism of the postwar assessment helped pave the way to war.

8. The Occupation: A Descent into Chaos and Abuse

"You are going to be the proud owner of twenty-five million people. You will own all their hopes, aspirations, and problems.... It's going to suck the oxygen out of everything.... This will become the first term."

A Power Vacuum: The U.S. military's swift victory created a power vacuum in Iraq, as the old regime was dismantled without a clear plan for its replacement. This led to widespread looting, violence, and a breakdown of law and order.

• The U.S. military was unprepared for the challenges of postwar Iraq.
• The lack of a clear plan for postwar Iraq led to chaos and instability.
• The U.S. government assumed that Iraqis would greet the U.S. presence warmly, which proved incorrect.

The Abu Ghraib Scandal: The abuse of detainees at Abu Ghraib prison, revealed in 2004, became a symbol of the U.S. occupation's moral failings. The scandal was a result of a combination of factors, including poor training, inadequate supervision, and a lack of clear guidance on the treatment of detainees.

• The abuses were not isolated incidents but rather a result of systemic failures.
• The scandal damaged the U.S. image and undermined its credibility.
• The abuses were a direct result of the lack of planning for postwar Iraq.

Rumsfeld's Dismissal: Defense Secretary Rumsfeld's dismissive attitude toward the looting and his refusal to acknowledge the problems in Iraq further alienated the Iraqi population and undermined the U.S. effort. His comment, "Stuff happens!" became a symbol of the administration's lack of concern for the consequences of its actions.

9. The Insurgency: A Product of Misguided Policies

"The idea that we could live with another 20 years of stagnation in the Middle East that breeds this radicalism and breeds terrorism is, I think, just unacceptable—especially after September 11th."

A Self-Fulfilling Prophecy: The U.S. invasion and occupation of Iraq, intended to combat terrorism, inadvertently created a new breeding ground for it. The insurgency was fueled by a combination of factors, including the dissolution of the Iraqi army, the de-Baathification policy, and the lack of economic opportunities.

• The de-Baathification order purged tens of thousands of Iraqis from their jobs, creating a pool of resentment.
• The dissolution of the Iraqi army left hundreds of thousands of soldiers unemployed and angry.
• The lack of a clear plan for postwar Iraq created a power vacuum that was filled by insurgents.

A Growing Resistance: The insurgency was not simply a collection of "dead-enders" but a complex and evolving movement with a variety of motivations. It was fueled by a combination of nationalism, religious extremism, and resentment of the U.S. occupation.

• The insurgency was able to arm itself from the vast stockpiles of weapons left over from the old regime.
• The insurgency was able to finance itself through a variety of means, including donations from abroad and criminal activities.
• The insurgency was able to recruit new members from the ranks of the unemployed and disenfranchised.

The U.S. Response: The U.S. military's initial response to the insurgency was often counterproductive, as it relied on heavy-handed tactics that alienated the Iraqi population and fueled the cycle of violence. The U.S. military's focus on killing and capturing insurgents, rather than on winning the support of the population, was a major strategic error.

10. The Army's Struggle: Adapting to a New Kind of War

"We're running back-to-back marathons. The airplanes may not be able to take it, and more importantly, the people may not. At some point you've got to say, I love my country, but I can't stay away from my family for eight years."

A Stretched Military: The U.S. military, already stretched thin by operations in Afghanistan and elsewhere, was further strained by the demands of the Iraq war. The policy of containment had taken a toll on the military, with parts of the Air Force feeling badly stretched.

• The no-fly zones required an average of thirty-four thousand sorties a year.
• The cost of the no-fly zones was roughly $1 billion a year.
• The U.S. military was running "back-to-back marathons," with airplanes and people being pushed to their limits.

A Mismatch of Doctrine: The U.S. Army, trained for conventional warfare, struggled to adapt to the complexities of counterinsurgency. Its emphasis on firepower and technological superiority was often ineffective against an enemy that blended in with the civilian population.

• The Army's focus on the operational level of war led it to neglect the political and social dimensions of the conflict.
• The Army's emphasis on speed and precision was not well-suited to the challenges of counterinsurgency.
• The Army had forgotten the lessons of counterinsurgency it had learned in Vietnam.

Persistent Doubts: Many senior Army officers had profound doubts about the wisdom of invading Iraq and about the administration's approach to the war. These doubts were often suppressed or ignored by the civilian leadership at the Pentagon.

• Many generals had three major concerns about invading Iraq: the possibility of Saddam's using weapons of mass destruction, the danger of becoming enmeshed in urban warfare, and the worry that a postwar occupation could be costly.
• Only one top officer, Marine Lt. Gen. Gregory Newbold, really deeply objected to the entire war plan.
• The military concerns bubbled under the surface but never rose to the level of confrontation.

11. The Price of Hubris: A Legacy of Missed Opportunities

"The key thing was how normal it got. There were bumps. But it got to be a kind of steady white noise in the background. It really was just background noise.... It was almost like our presence in the Cold War, in Germany, in the early days, when we'd fly the Berlin Corridor, and occasionally the Russians would do something to intimidate us, just like Saddam would try to do something."

A Failure of Imagination: The U.S. government's failure to anticipate the challenges of postwar Iraq was a result of a lack of imagination and a refusal to consider alternative scenarios. The Bush administration's hubris led it to believe that it could easily transform Iraq and the Middle East.

• The administration's "intellectual acrobatics" involved "worst-casing" the threat while "best-casing" the occupation.
• The administration's public statements about Iraq's weapons grew more distant from the intelligence on which they were supposedly based.
• The administration's public statements about Iraq's weapons grew more distant from the intelligence on which they were supposedly based.

A Missed Opportunity: The U.S. had a brief window of opportunity after the fall of Baghdad to establish a stable and secure environment in Iraq. However, this opportunity was squandered by a combination of poor planning, inadequate resources, and a lack of understanding of the Iraqi culture and political landscape.

• The U.S. military focused on the easier task of toppling Saddam, neglecting the more difficult task of rebuilding Iraq.
• The U.S. government failed to provide adequate resources for the occupation.
• The U.S. government failed to develop a coherent strategy for postwar Iraq.

A Legacy of Mistakes: The U.S. invasion and occupation of Iraq was a series of missed opportunities and strategic missteps. The war was based on false premises, poorly planned, and incompetently executed. The consequences of these mistakes will be felt for years to come.

• The U.S. government failed to learn from its past mistakes in Vietnam and elsewhere.
• The U.S. government failed to listen to the advice of experts and critics.
• The U.S. government failed to understand the complexities of the Iraqi culture and political landscape.

Last updated: January 21, 2025