Fire in the Lake

1. A Profound Cultural Chasm Doomed American Efforts

To find the common ground that existed between them, both Americans and Vietnamese would have to re-create the whole world of the other, the whole intellectual landscape.

Two different dimensions. The encounter between the United States and Vietnam was a collision of vastly different societies and historical epochs. America, a nation of boundless optimism and belief in progress, saw history as a straight line and itself at the cutting edge, capable of solving any problem. Vietnam, shaped by centuries of enclosure and resistance, viewed history as a cycle and prized survival and tradition.

Effort of translation. The cultural distance was immense, making genuine understanding incredibly difficult. American concepts like "freedom and democracy" or "objective truth" had no direct translation into a Vietnamese worldview where:

• Society was a system of relationships, not individuals.
• Knowledge was practical and moral, not abstract or for its own sake.
• Sincerity meant fidelity to social role, not inner feeling.

Fundamental misunderstanding. This inability to translate perspectives led to monumental errors. Americans saw themselves building world order, while many Vietnamese saw them merely as producers of garbage. The effort required to bridge this gap was too great, leading to a fundamental misunderstanding that undermined the entire American enterprise.

2. Vietnamese History Forged a Unique Political Identity

Our state of Dai Viet [Greater Vietnam] is indeed a country wherein culture and institutions have flourished.

Orbit of China. Vietnam's identity was forged in a complex relationship with China, its powerful neighbor. For centuries, Vietnam existed first as a Chinese colony, then as a tributary state, adopting Chinese political culture (Confucianism, mandarinate) while fiercely resisting Chinese political domination. This created a unique blend of cultural assimilation and national resistance.

March to the South. Expansion southward into the Mekong Delta altered Vietnamese society. The disciplined, communal villages of the north gave way to more dispersed settlements in the south, leading to a "cultural washout" and a less cohesive social structure. This historical division contributed to later political fragmentation.

Tradition of resistance. Despite internal divisions, Vietnam developed a deep tradition of resistance to foreign invaders. This often manifested not in conventional warfare but in decentralized, underground resistance rooted in the self-sufficient villages, a tactic that would prove crucial in later conflicts.

3. The Southern State Was an Artificial Construct

The American ability to intervene in the affairs of South Vietnam was not, then, at all in question: the southern politicians were ready to accept any foreign power that would feed and protect them.

French creation. The concept of "South Vietnam" as a distinct political entity was largely a product of French colonial administration and later, American policy. Historically, Vietnam was a unified state, albeit with regional differences. The French divided the country into three administrative regions, treating the south (Cochin China) as a direct colony.

Lack of indigenous base. Unlike the north, which had a long history as the center of the Vietnamese state, the south lacked a strong, unified political tradition. The French conquest found a region populated by dispersed villages and powerful, often competing, sects and warlords. The French and later the Americans struggled to create a cohesive government here.

Dependent elite. The urban elite in the south, particularly in Saigon, was largely a product of French colonial rule. They were dependent on foreign patronage and lacked deep roots in the countryside. This elite was more interested in manipulating foreign powers for their own benefit than in building a truly independent nation-state, making the southern state inherently fragile and reliant on external support.

4. Diem's Traditionalism Clashed with Modern Realities

Ngo Dinh Diem was in many respects a curious candidate for the role of American protégé.

Mandarin out of time. Ngo Dinh Diem, a Catholic mandarin from central Vietnam, embodied a traditionalist worldview rooted in Confucian ideals of benevolent authoritarianism and moral example. He saw himself as a father figure destined to restore order and virtue, not as a leader of a modern, pluralistic democracy.

Unworkable system. Diem's attempt to govern based on traditional principles failed in the context of a society fractured by colonialism and war. His administration became characterized by:

• Nepotism and family rule (Nhu, Madame Nhu, Can).
• Suppression of dissent and political factions.
• Ineffective and corrupt bureaucracy.
• Failure of land reform and rural development programs.

Alienation and collapse. Diem's policies, particularly the repression of former Viet Minh and the imposition of appointed officials on villages, alienated the peasantry. His inability to build a political base or adapt to the changing social landscape led to the disintegration of his regime, culminating in the Buddhist crisis and his overthrow.

5. The NLF Succeeded by Organizing from the Ground Up

The National Liberation Front was founded in 1960, but the guerrilla movement in the south began some two or three years earlier.

Continuity and adaptation. The NLF emerged from the remnants of the Viet Minh in the south, building on existing networks and experience. Unlike the GVN, which focused on the cities and a top-down approach, the NLF concentrated on organizing the rural population, adapting its strategy to the specific conditions of the south.

Understanding the village. The NLF cadres understood the importance of the village as the fundamental unit of Vietnamese society. They worked to rebuild community structures, address peasant grievances (especially land), and provide a sense of belonging and purpose in a disordered world. Their approach was based on:

• Living, eating, and working with the people.
• Political education and mobilization.
• Addressing local economic issues.

Building a counter-state. The NLF created a parallel government and social structure in the areas it controlled. Through mass organizations and local committees, it involved villagers in collective activities, provided social services, and instilled a sense of shared identity and purpose, effectively creating a "nation" from the ground up.

6. US Aid Created a Dependent and Ineffective GVN

In its economic aspect, American aid represents a large-scale relief project more than an economic development program, and because development has not been emphasized, termination of American aid would almost certainly produce both political and economic collapse in Viet-Nam.

Fueling the military. The vast majority of American aid went into building and supporting the GVN military and security forces, not into genuine economic development. This created an army and bureaucracy dependent on foreign funds, lacking a self-sustaining economic base.

Distorting the economy. American aid and the presence of US troops created an artificial, service-based economy in the cities, fueled by dollars and imported goods. This led to:

• High inflation.
• Destruction of local industry and agriculture.
• Widespread corruption and black markets.

Undermining governance. The influx of aid relieved the GVN of the necessity to rely on or organize its own population for resources. Officials became more focused on siphoning off aid than on governing effectively or addressing the needs of the peasantry, further alienating the government from its people.

7. Political Chaos Plagued the Saigon Government

In the resulting chaos it became very difficult to tell where the government began and ended and where the realm of ideological and religious conflict met that of factional and personal ambition.

Post-Diem instability. Following Diem's overthrow, South Vietnam entered a period of extreme political instability characterized by a rapid succession of military juntas and short-lived civilian governments. This reflected deep divisions within the non-Communist elite.

Factionalism and distrust. The GVN was plagued by intense factionalism among:

• Military cliques.
• Religious sects (Catholics, Buddhists, Hoa Hao, Cao Dai).
• Urban political parties and intellectual groups.
• Regional interests.

Lack of unity. These groups were often more hostile to each other than to the NLF. They lacked a shared vision or the capacity to compromise, making it impossible to form a stable, unified government capable of effectively prosecuting the war or undertaking meaningful reforms.

8. The US-Vietnamese Dynamic Mirrored Colonialism

In their struggle movement the Buddhists gave this contradiction its most violent and dramatic expression.

Prospero and Caliban. The relationship between the US and the GVN elite often resembled the dynamic between colonial master (Prospero) and native subject (Caliban or Ariel). The US, seeing itself as a powerful, benevolent force, expected gratitude and obedience.

Dependent resentment. The GVN elite, dependent on US aid and military power, simultaneously desired American protection and resented American domination. This led to:

• Duplicity and manipulation of the US.
• Passive resistance and sabotage of US efforts.
• Displaced aggression (feuding, corruption) instead of direct confrontation.

Tragic paradox. The more the US tried to control the GVN and make it effective, the more it fostered dependence and resentment, ultimately undermining the very goals it sought to achieve. The Buddhist crisis starkly revealed this dynamic, as the Buddhists protested both the GVN's weakness and the US support that maintained it.

9. American Strategy Prioritized Destruction Over Hearts and Minds

The American war was to be a conventional military operation.

Military focus. Despite rhetoric about "winning hearts and minds," the American war effort was overwhelmingly military. Strategy focused on:

• Search and destroy operations against enemy units.
• Attrition of enemy forces.
• Massive use of firepower (bombing, artillery).

Devastating consequences. This approach, while inflicting heavy casualties on the enemy, had catastrophic effects on the civilian population and the countryside. Tactics like "free fire zones," forced relocation, and widespread use of herbicides led to:

• Mass displacement and refugee generation.
• Destruction of villages and agricultural land.
• High civilian casualties.

Counterproductive outcome. Instead of winning loyalty, these tactics often alienated the population and drove them towards the NLF. The military focus, divorced from political reality, prioritized killing the "termites" (NLF fighters) even if it meant destroying the "house" (Vietnamese society).

10. The Tet Offensive Shattered Illusions, Not Just Buildings

The offensive came as an almost total surprise to the Allied military command.

Strategic surprise. The coordinated NLF/North Vietnamese attacks across South Vietnam during the 1968 Tet holiday caught the US and GVN completely off guard, revealing major intelligence failures and the enemy's continued reach into "secure" areas.

Military vs. political impact. While the offensive resulted in heavy losses for the NLF and was a military setback for the enemy in the short term, its political and psychological impact was immense. It:

• Contradicted official US optimism about the war's progress.
• Led to a significant decline in US public support for the war.
• Exposed the GVN's fragility and lack of popular support.

Confirming despair. For the urban Vietnamese, Tet was a devastating confirmation of their helplessness and the war's destructive trajectory. It reinforced cynicism towards the GVN and the US, leading to increased apathy and withdrawal from political life.

11. "Vietnamization" Increased Suffering Without Building a State

His aim was still to force Hanoi to accept an American-supported government in Saigon, and his strategy was still that of attrition.

Shifting the burden. Nixon's "Vietnamization" policy aimed to withdraw US ground troops while building up the ARVN to continue the fight, supported by US air power and aid. This was a political strategy to manage domestic dissent, not a plan for peace or GVN viability.

Exacerbating problems. Vietnamization increased Vietnamese casualties and dependence on the US. The expanded ARVN became a larger, more heavily armed version of the ineffective GVN bureaucracy, prone to:

• Corruption and banditry.
• Ineffectiveness in combat without direct US support.
• Terrorizing the civilian population (e.g., Phoenix program).

Delaying the inevitable. Operations like the invasions of Cambodia and Laos, while temporarily disrupting enemy supply lines, expanded the conflict and increased Vietnamese suffering without fundamentally altering the strategic balance or creating a GVN capable of surviving without US support.

12. War's Devastation Created a Vacuum for Revolution

South Vietnam is a country shattered so that no two pieces fit together.

Social breakdown. Years of war, bombing, defoliation, and forced urbanization devastated traditional Vietnamese society. Millions became refugees, losing their land, family connections, and sense of identity. Cities swelled with a population dependent on the war economy, lacking productive skills or social cohesion.

Political vacuum. The GVN, an artificial construct dependent on foreign aid, proved incapable of governing or uniting the country. Its corruption and ineffectiveness alienated the population, leaving a void of legitimate authority outside the NLF-controlled areas.

Revolutionary potential. The war's destruction, while immense, did not extinguish the Vietnamese desire for peace, unity, and a coherent way of life. The NLF, with its deep roots in the countryside and its program of social justice and national unity, remained the only force capable of filling the vacuum left by the collapse of traditional society and the failure of the American-backed state.

Last updated: June 8, 2025