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The Dictator's Handbook

The Dictator's Handbook

Why Bad Behavior is Almost Always Good Politics
by Bruce Bueno de Mesquita 2011 462 pages
4.26
10k+ ratings
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Key Takeaways

1. Political survival drives leadership behavior, not ideology or public good

Successful leaders are not above repression, suppression, oppression, or even killing their rivals, real and imagined.

Self-interest rules politics. Leaders, whether in democracies or dictatorships, prioritize staying in power above all else. Their actions are driven by political survival rather than ideological principles or the public good. This explains why seemingly benevolent leaders may engage in corrupt practices, while ostensibly corrupt leaders occasionally enact beneficial policies.

Survival strategies vary. The specific tactics leaders employ depend on their political context:

  • In autocracies: Suppression of dissent, rewarding loyalists, controlling information
  • In democracies: Appealing to voters, gerrymandering, campaign financing
  • In businesses: Manipulating boards, controlling information flow, strategic mergers

Leaders adapt their behavior to the institutional constraints they face, always with the primary goal of maintaining their position of power.

2. Leaders rely on essential supporters to stay in power

No leader is monolithic. If we are to make any sense of how power works, we must stop thinking that North Korea's Kim Jong Il can do whatever he wants.

The winning coalition. Every leader depends on a group of essential supporters - the "winning coalition" - to maintain power. This coalition can vary in size:

  • Autocracies: Small group of elites (military, party officials, wealthy backers)
  • Democracies: Large group of voters
  • Corporations: Board members and key shareholders

Balancing act. Leaders must continually satisfy their coalition to stay in power:

  • Provide sufficient rewards (financial, policy, status) to maintain loyalty
  • Prevent coalition members from defecting to rivals
  • Balance coalition demands with broader governance

Understanding the dynamics of these essential supporter groups is crucial for analyzing political behavior and outcomes across different systems.

3. Small coalitions lead to corruption, large coalitions to public goods

If corruption empowers, then absolute corruption empowers absolutely.

Coalition size shapes governance. The size of a leader's winning coalition fundamentally affects how they rule:

Small coalitions (typical in autocracies):

  • Encourage corruption and kleptocracy
  • Focus on private goods for elites
  • Neglect public welfare

Large coalitions (typical in democracies):

  • Promote broader public goods
  • Invest in infrastructure, education, healthcare
  • Implement policies benefiting larger segments of society

Incentive structures matter. This pattern emerges not because democratic leaders are inherently more virtuous, but because their political survival depends on satisfying a larger group. Autocrats can stay in power by enriching a small elite, while democratic leaders must provide broader benefits to win elections.

4. Taxation and resource allocation reflect coalition size

Taxation, especially in small-coalition settings, redistributes from those outside the coalition (the poor) to those inside the coalition (the rich).

Fiscal policy reveals priorities. How governments tax and spend clearly demonstrates the influence of coalition size:

Small coalitions:

  • High tax rates on general population
  • Low taxes or exemptions for elites
  • Revenue funneled to private rewards for supporters

Large coalitions:

  • More moderate, broader-based taxation
  • Greater investment in public goods and services
  • More transparent budgeting processes

Resource curse. Nations with easily extractable natural resources (oil, diamonds, etc.) often develop small-coalition systems, as leaders can fund their regime without relying on broad-based taxation. This reduces accountability and often leads to worse outcomes for the general population.

5. Foreign aid often props up corrupt regimes

Aid is decidedly not given primarily to alleviate poverty or misery; it is given to make the constituents in donor states better off.

Aid as foreign policy tool. Contrary to popular belief, foreign aid is primarily used by democratic nations to advance their own interests, not to help the poor:

  • Buying policy concessions from recipient nations
  • Securing strategic alliances
  • Opening markets for donor country businesses

Perpetuating bad governance. Aid often has negative consequences in recipient countries:

  • Reduces government accountability to citizens
  • Provides resources for corrupt leaders to maintain power
  • Creates dependence and undermines local economic development

Reform challenges. Improving aid effectiveness is difficult because:

  • Donor country voters support the idea of aid, even if misused
  • Recipient country leaders resist reforms that would reduce their power
  • Geopolitical considerations often override good governance concerns

6. Democracies and autocracies respond differently to war

Democrats are much more sensitive to war outcomes than autocrats.

Contrasting war strategies:

Democracies:

  • Fight wars they expect to win
  • Invest heavily in military technology and soldier protection
  • Leaders face high political costs for military failures

Autocracies:

  • More willing to engage in risky conflicts
  • Less concerned with troop casualties
  • Leaders can often survive military defeats

Explaining the "democratic peace". Democracies rarely fight each other because:

  • Both sides must be confident of victory to engage
  • Shared values and economic ties reduce conflict incentives
  • Democratic leaders face high costs for unsuccessful wars

These dynamics help explain patterns of international conflict and why democracies tend to be more selective in their military engagements.

7. Institutional change is difficult but possible

If we are going to play the game of politics, and we all must from time to time, then we ought to learn how to win the game.

Vested interests resist change. Altering political institutions is challenging because those in power benefit from the status quo. However, change can occur through:

  • Gradual reforms pushed by coalition members
  • External pressures (economic, geopolitical)
  • Revolutionary movements

Tipping points for reform:

  • Economic crises forcing leaders to broaden support
  • Technological changes empowering new groups
  • Generational shifts in values and expectations

Strategic thinking required. Effective reformers must understand:

  • Existing power structures and incentives
  • How proposed changes affect different stakeholders
  • Timing and sequencing of reforms for maximum impact

8. Economic factors can force political reform

Financial crises, from an autocratic leader's perspective, are political crises.

Economic pressures drive change. Leaders may be forced to implement reforms when:

  • Economic downturns reduce resources for patronage
  • Foreign debt or aid becomes unavailable
  • New economic sectors create powerful stakeholders

Reform or perish. In times of crisis, leaders face a choice:

  • Broaden their coalition and implement reforms
  • Double down on repression (risking overthrow)

Examples of economically-driven reform:

  • South Korea's democratization in the 1980s
  • Soviet perestroika under Gorbachev
  • China's market reforms under Deng Xiaoping

Economic factors can create windows of opportunity for significant political change, even in seemingly entrenched authoritarian systems.

9. Revolution occurs when people believe it can succeed

Successful rebellions, mass movements, and revolutions are not commonplace, but neither are they extremely rare.

Tipping point for revolt. People rise up when:

  • Existing suffering outweighs fear of failure
  • They believe there's a realistic chance of success
  • Coordination becomes possible (often through technology)

Factors enabling revolution:

  • Economic crises weakening regime's ability to reward supporters
  • Military/security forces refusing to suppress protests
  • External support for opposition movements
  • Contagion effect from successful revolutions in similar countries

Not all revolutions succeed. Outcomes depend on:

  • Unity of opposition forces
  • Regime's willingness to use violence
  • International reactions and support
  • Post-revolution leadership and governance

Understanding these dynamics helps explain why some seemingly stable regimes suddenly collapse, while others endure despite significant opposition.

Last updated:

Review Summary

4.26 out of 5
Average of 10k+ ratings from Goodreads and Amazon.

The Dictator's Handbook is a provocative analysis of political power dynamics, arguing that all leaders, democratic or autocratic, prioritize their own survival in power. The book explains how rulers maintain control through strategic allocation of resources and rewards to key supporters. While some readers found it insightful and eye-opening, others criticized its oversimplification and repetitiveness. The authors' cynical perspective on politics and foreign aid sparked both praise and skepticism. Overall, the book offers a thought-provoking, if controversial, framework for understanding political behavior and decision-making.

Your rating:

About the Author

Bruce Bueno de Mesquita is a renowned political scientist and professor at New York University, as well as a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution. He specializes in international relations, foreign policy, and nation building, and is co-founder of selectorate theory. Bueno de Mesquita has applied his expertise to practical forecasting, founding a company that uses game theory and rational choice theory to predict political and foreign policy outcomes. His work has gained widespread attention, including a feature documentary on the History Channel titled "Next Nostradamus," which explores his use of computer algorithms to predict future world events.

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