Key Takeaways
1. US-China Competition is a Contest for Global Order
For rising states, the act of peacefully displacing the hegemon consists of two broad strategies generally pursued in sequence.
Competition over Order. The core of US-China competition since the Cold War has been over regional and now global order. A hegemon's position in regional and global order emerges from three broad "forms of control" that are used to regulate the behavior of other states: coercive capability, consensual inducements, and legitimacy.
Strategies of Displacement. Rising states like China can peacefully displace hegemonic powers like the United States through two broad strategies generally pursued in sequence: blunting the hegemon's exercise of those forms of control, particularly those extended over the rising state; and building forms of control over others.
Global Expansion. Unless a rising power has first blunted the hegemon, efforts to build order are likely to be futile and easily opposed. And until a rising power has successfully conducted a good degree of blunting and building in its home region, it remains too vulnerable to the hegemon’s influence to confidently turn to a third strategy, global expansion, which pursues both blunting and building at the global level to displace the hegemon from international leadership.
2. The CCP's Nationalist-Leninist Structure Drives Grand Strategy
Party, government, military, civilian, and academic, north, south, east, west, and center, the Party leads everything.
Nationalist Aims. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is a nationalist institution that emerged from the patriotic ferment of the late Qing period and has sought to restore the country to its rightful place. The core theme animating the Party across that stretch is the search for something that could restore China to its former greatness and would help it achieve the goal of "national rejuvenation."
Leninist Instrument. The CCP is a Leninist party that has built centralized institutions—blended with a ruthless amorality—to govern the country and achieve its nationalist mission. The Party sits above the state and penetrates every level of it as well. In this way, it serves as an instrument for coordinating grand strategy and gives policymakers relative autonomy from parochial interests in foreign policy matters so that they can pursue grand strategic ones.
Party as a Subject of Research. A careful review of the Party's own voluminous publications can provide insight into its grand strategic concepts. To identify the existence, content, and adjustment of China’s grand strategy, researchers must find evidence of grand strategic concepts in authoritative texts; grand strategic capabilities in national security institutions; and grand strategic conduct in state behavior.
3. China's Grand Strategy Shifts with Perceptions of US Power
Shifts in these perceptions are driven more by events, especially shocks, than statistical measures.
Perception of Power and Threat. Grand strategies rest on perceptions of power and threat, and shifts in these perceptions are driven more by events, especially shocks, than statistical measures. By comparing descriptions of power and threat in Chinese texts before and after foreign policy shocks, one can determine whether perceptions of power and threat changed and produced strategic adjustment too.
Grand Strategies of Rising Powers. When the rising power views the hegemon as much more powerful than it but not particularly threatening, the rising power tends to accommodate hegemonic order. When a rising power thinks the hegemon is much more powerful than it and also very threatening, then the rising power will pursue a blunting strategy. When a rising power thinks the external hegemon is only modestly more powerful than it but still very threatening, the rising power will pursue a building strategy.
Sequential Strategies. These four strategies generally occur sequentially from accommodation to blunting to building and then to dominance, but there are exceptions. In China’s case, the conventional sequence appears to be at work: China initially accommodated a powerful but non-threatening United States after normalization; sought to blunt it after the Cold War’s conclusion led it to see the United States as more threatening; began to build its own order after the Global Financial Crisis led it to see the United States as weakening; and may pursue regional dominance if the United States acquiesces or is defeated in a regional conflict.
4. Post-Trifecta: Blunting US Power Became China's Priority
It seems that one Cold War has come to an end but that two others have already begun.
The Traumatic Trifecta. The trifecta of Tiananmen Square (1989), the Gulf War (1990–1991), and the Soviet collapse (1991) led China to see the United States and not the Soviet Union as China’s primary threat. In response, Beijing launched its blunting strategy under the Party guideline of "hiding capabilities and biding time."
Hiding Capabilities and Biding Time. This strategy was instrumental and tactical. Party leaders explicitly tied the guideline to perceptions of US power captured in phrases like the "international balance of forces" and "multipolarity," and they sought to quietly and asymmetrically weaken American power in Asia across military, economic, and political instruments.
Blunting, Not Building. Under this strategy, China chose not to build the foundations for Asian hegemony because it feared doing so would unsettle the United States and its own neighbors. It avoided major investments in aircraft carriers, ambitious international organizations, and regional economic schemes and instead pursued blunting.
5. Military Blunting: Sea Denial and Asymmetric Warfare
Whatever the enemy fears most, we develop that.
Shift to Sea Denial. The trifecta prompted China to depart from a "sea control" strategy increasingly focused on holding distant maritime territory to a "sea denial" strategy focused on preventing the US military from traversing, controlling, or intervening in the waters near China.
Asymmetric Weapons. Beijing declared it would "catch up in some areas and not others" and vowed to build "whatever the enemy fears" to accomplish it—ultimately delaying the acquisition of costly and vulnerable vessels like aircraft carriers and instead investing in cheaper asymmetric denial weapons.
Investments in Denial. Beijing then built the world's largest mine arsenal, the world's first anti-ship ballistic missile, and the world's largest submarine fleet—all to undermine US military power.
6. Political Blunting: Joining and Stalling Regional Institutions
An important reason why China now increasingly values multilateral diplomacy is US hegemonic behavior after the Cold War and its superpower position.
Reversing Opposition to Regional Institutions. The trifecta led China to reverse its previous opposition to joining regional institutions. Beijing feared that multilateral organizations like APEC and the ARF might be used by Washington to build a liberal regional order or even an Asian NATO, so China joined them to blunt American power.
Stalling Institutional Progress. It stalled institutional progress, wielded institutional rules to constrain US freedom of maneuver, and hoped participation would reassure wary neighbors otherwise tempted to join a US-led balancing coalition.
Limited Ambitions. China’s participation in APEC fit within its larger strategy to blunt American power. It helped deny the United States a platform for promulgating Western economic and political norms, as well as coordinating security or military policy through what it feared might become an Asian NATO.
7. Economic Blunting: Securing Trade and Limiting US Leverage
The question of most-favored nation status between China and the United States is a central issue that will determine the rotation of world history.
Economic Dependence. The trifecta laid bare China's dependence on the US market, capital, and technology—notably through Washington's post-Tiananmen sanctions and its threats to revoke most-favored-nation (MFN) trade status, which could have seriously damaged China's economy.
Binding US Economic Power. Beijing sought not to decouple from the United States but instead to bind the discretionary use of American economic power, and it worked hard to remove MFN from congressional review through "permanent normal trading relations," leveraging negotiations in APEC and the WTO to obtain it.
Defensive Strategy. China’s efforts in this period were primarily driven by grand strategic considerations. They were part of a blunting strategy that sought to minimize American economic power and leverage over China—relational, structural, and domestic—all while ensuring Beijing could continue to access American markets, capital, and technology.
8. Post-Crisis: Building Regional Order in Asia
In the past we had to keep a low profile because we were weak while other states were strong. . . . Now, with ‘Striving for Achievement,’ we are indicating to neighboring countries that we are strong and you are weak. This is a change at a very fundamental level.
The Global Financial Crisis. The shock of the Global Financial Crisis led China to see the United States as weakening and emboldened it to shift to a building strategy. The Party sought to lay the foundations for order—coercive capacity, consensual bargains, and legitimacy—under the auspices of the revised guidance "actively accomplish something" issued by Chinese leader Hu Jintao.
Building Regional Order. This strategy, like blunting before it, was implemented across multiple instruments of statecraft—military, political, and economic. China now sought the capability to hold distant islands, safeguard sea lines, intervene in neighboring countries, and provide public security goods.
Shifting Priorities. China now sought the capability to hold distant islands, safeguard sea lines, intervene in neighboring countries, and provide public security goods. For these objectives, China needed a different force structure, one that it had previously postponed for fear that it would be vulnerable to the United States and unsettle China’s neighbors.
9. Military Building: From Sea Denial to Sea Control
Make more offensive moves.
Shift to Sea Control. The Global Financial Crisis accelerated a shift in Chinese military strategy away from a singular focus on blunting American power through sea denial to a new focus on building order through sea control.
Investing in Power Projection. China promptly stepped up investments in aircraft carriers, capable surface vessels, amphibious warfare, marines, and overseas bases.
Regional Ambitions. China now sought the capability to hold distant islands, safeguard sea lines, intervene in neighboring countries, and provide public security goods. For these objectives, China needed a different force structure, one that it had previously postponed for fear that it would be vulnerable to the United States and unsettle China’s neighbors.
10. Political Building: Launching New Regional Institutions
Establish regional architecture.
Launching New Institutions. The Global Financial Crisis caused China to depart from a blunting strategy focused on joining and stalling regional organizations to a building strategy that involved launching its own institutions.
AIIB and CICA. China spearheaded the launch of the AIIB and the elevation and institutionalization of the previously obscure CICA. It then used these institutions, with mixed success, as instruments to shape regional order in the economic and security domains in directions it preferred.
Building a Sphere of Influence. China’s building strategy sought to lay the foundations for order—coercive capacity, consensual bargains, and legitimacy. China sought to lay the foundations for order—coercive capacity, consensual bargains, and legitimacy—under the auspices of the revised guidance “actively accomplish something” issued by Chinese leader Hu Jintao.
11. Economic Building: The Belt and Road Initiative and Economic Statecraft
Aboard our development train.
Offensive Economic Statecraft. The Global Financial Crisis helped Beijing depart from a defensive blunting strategy that targeted American economic leverage to an offensive building strategy designed to build China's own coercive and consensual economic capacities.
The Belt and Road Initiative. At the core of this effort were China's Belt and Road Initiative, its robust use of economic statecraft against its neighbors, and its attempts to gain greater financial influence.
Asymmetric Interdependence. China’s Belt and Road Initiative, its robust use of economic statecraft against its neighbors, and its attempts to gain greater financial influence.
12. "Great Changes": China's Global Expansion Strategy
Toward the world’s center stage.
A New Trifecta. China is launching a third strategy of displacement, one that expands its blunting and building efforts worldwide to displace the United States as the global leader. This strategy emerged following another trifecta, this time consisting of Brexit, the election of Donald Trump, and the West’s poor initial response to the coronavirus pandemic.
Global Ambitions. In this period, the Chinese Communist Party reached a paradoxical consensus: it concluded that the United States was in retreat globally but at the same time was waking up to the China challenge bilaterally.
Displacing the United States. In Beijing’s mind, “great changes unseen in a century” were underway, and they provided an opportunity to displace the United States as the leading global state by 2049, with the next decade deemed the most critical to this objective.
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FAQ
1. What is The Long Game: China's Grand Strategy to Displace American Order by Rush Doshi about?
- Comprehensive analysis of China’s strategy: The book examines how China, under the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), has developed and executed a grand strategy to displace the United States from regional and global leadership since the end of the Cold War.
- Phased approach: Doshi identifies three main phases in China’s strategy: blunting U.S. power (1989–2008), building Chinese order regionally (2009–2016), and expanding globally (2017 onward).
- Methodological rigor: The analysis is grounded in a unique database of CCP documents, speeches, and memoirs, providing a social-scientific approach to understanding China’s intentions and actions.
- Focus on displacement and building: The book details how China uses military, economic, and political tools to undermine U.S. order and construct a new Chinese-led order.
2. Why should I read The Long Game by Rush Doshi?
- Unprecedented insight: Doshi offers a document-based, historically informed perspective on China’s grand strategy, moving beyond common narratives and speculation.
- Clarifies complex concepts: The book demystifies key Chinese strategic ideas like “Tao Guang Yang Hui” and “striving for achievement,” and explains how China’s approach has evolved.
- Policy relevance: It provides actionable recommendations for U.S. policymakers, emphasizing asymmetric strategies and the importance of alliances and innovation.
- Essential for understanding U.S.-China rivalry: The book is highly recommended for policymakers, scholars, business leaders, and anyone interested in international relations and great power competition.
3. What are the key takeaways of The Long Game by Rush Doshi?
- China’s grand strategy is real: The CCP has pursued a coordinated, long-term plan to displace U.S. order, not just opportunistic or personality-driven actions.
- Phased strategic evolution: China’s approach has shifted from blunting U.S. power, to building its own regional order, to seeking global influence as U.S. power is perceived to decline.
- Integrated use of statecraft: China combines military modernization, economic statecraft, and political influence through institutions to achieve its goals.
- U.S. response must be asymmetric: Doshi argues the U.S. should avoid direct, costly competition and instead focus on blunting China’s advances and rebuilding American strengths.
4. How does Rush Doshi define “grand strategy” in The Long Game?
- Integrated security theory: Grand strategy is a state’s intentional, coordinated theory for achieving security-related ends—sovereignty, safety, territorial integrity, and power position—across military, economic, and political means.
- Beyond military strategy: It is broader than military strategy, integrating all instruments of statecraft to pursue overarching objectives.
- Identification criteria: Doshi identifies grand strategy through three elements: authoritative strategic concepts, corresponding capabilities, and consistent conduct.
- Sticky but adaptable: Grand strategy is resistant to change but can shift in response to major shocks that alter perceptions of power and threat.
5. What are the “blunting” and “building” strategies in The Long Game by Rush Doshi?
- Blunting strategy: China’s initial focus was on quietly undermining U.S. military, economic, and political influence, especially after the Cold War and Tiananmen, to avoid containment and buy time for growth.
- Building strategy: After the 2008 Global Financial Crisis, China shifted to actively constructing regional order through military modernization, new institutions (like AIIB), and economic initiatives (like BRI).
- Sequential and conditional: The transition from blunting to building was triggered by China’s perception of reduced U.S. power and threat.
- Global expansion: Since 2017, China has sought to expand its influence globally, aiming to reshape the international order in its favor.
6. How does The Long Game explain the role of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in China’s grand strategy?
- Centralized coordination: The CCP, as both a nationalist and Leninist institution, provides the organizational capacity for unified, ruthless coordination of military, economic, and political tools.
- Party leads everything: Key Party organs like the Politburo Standing Committee and Central Military Commission ensure that foreign policy and grand strategy are centrally directed and insulated from parochial interests.
- Document-based analysis: Doshi’s research relies on authoritative Party texts and speeches to uncover the CCP’s strategic concepts and decisions.
- National rejuvenation: The Party’s ultimate goal is “national rejuvenation,” restoring China’s status and power on the global stage.
7. What is the significance of “Tao Guang Yang Hui” (“hide capabilities and bide time”) in The Long Game by Rush Doshi?
- Foundational strategic guideline: Introduced by Deng Xiaoping, this principle guided China’s low-profile, non-provocative approach during its period of relative weakness.
- Instrumental and conditional: It was a temporary, power-dependent strategy to avoid U.S. confrontation while China built up its strength.
- Linked to blunting: The phrase is directly tied to China’s blunting strategy, focusing on quietly undermining U.S. leverage without overtly challenging American leadership.
- Evolved over time: Under Xi Jinping, China has moved from “hiding” to “striving for achievement,” reflecting greater confidence and assertiveness.
8. How did China use multilateral institutions and regional organizations according to The Long Game by Rush Doshi?
- Joining to blunt U.S. influence: China joined organizations like APEC and ASEAN forums to prevent them from becoming tools of U.S. containment and to reassure neighbors.
- Stalling and shaping: China worked to stall institutionalization in U.S.-involved forums while supporting or creating alternative institutions (e.g., SCO, ASEAN Plus Three) that exclude the U.S.
- Strategic participation: Involvement in these organizations was instrumental, aimed at managing threat perceptions and building regional influence.
- Political building: Over time, China shifted to using these institutions to set norms, build coalitions, and legitimize its leadership in Asia.
9. How does The Long Game describe China’s military modernization and strategy?
- From blunting to building: China’s military modernization began with a focus on asymmetric “assassin’s mace” weapons (e.g., anti-ship ballistic missiles, submarines) to deny U.S. power projection.
- Shift to power projection: After 2008, China invested in aircraft carriers, advanced surface combatants, and overseas bases to support regional and global ambitions.
- Integration with grand strategy: Military developments are closely coordinated with political and economic strategies through Party institutions.
- World-class military goal: China aims to build a “world-class” military capable of protecting its interests and projecting power globally by mid-century.
10. What is the “Community of Common Destiny” and its role in China’s strategy as explained in The Long Game by Rush Doshi?
- Core regional vision: The “Community of Common Destiny” is China’s framework for building a regional order centered on economic interdependence, political cooperation, and security arrangements under Chinese leadership.
- Peripheral diplomacy: It prioritizes integrating neighboring countries into China’s economic and security orbit, reducing the influence of U.S. alliances.
- Instrument of influence: The concept is advanced through initiatives like the Belt and Road, AIIB, and regional security forums, serving to legitimize and institutionalize China’s leadership.
- Strategic shift: It marks a move from defensive multilateralism to proactive order-building in Asia.
11. What is the meaning and significance of “great changes unseen in a century” in The Long Game by Rush Doshi?
- Strategic worldview: The phrase reflects China’s belief that the global order is undergoing historic transformation, with U.S. decline and rising opportunities for China.
- Catalyst for ambition: It justifies China’s shift from regional to global ambitions, aiming for “national rejuvenation” and a central role in world affairs by 2049.
- Response to crises: Events like the Global Financial Crisis and COVID-19 are seen as accelerants of these changes, prompting China to act more assertively.
- Guides policy priorities: The concept shapes China’s urgency in technology, economic restructuring, and global leadership efforts.
12. What are the best quotes from The Long Game by Rush Doshi and what do they mean?
- On trade and strategy: “The question of most-favored nation status between China and the United States is a central issue that will determine the rotation of world history.” —He Xin, 1993. This highlights how China viewed trade status as pivotal to its strategic autonomy.
- On strategic evolution: “In the past we had to keep a low profile [Tao Guang Yang Hui] because we were weak while other states were strong... Now, with ‘Striving for Achievement,’ we are indicating to neighboring countries that we are strong and you are weak.” —Yan Xuetong, 2013. This captures China’s shift from caution to assertiveness.
- On regional leadership: “In the final analysis, it is for the people of Asia to run the affairs of Asia, solve the problems of Asia, and uphold the security of Asia.” —Xi Jinping, 2014. This reflects China’s vision to exclude U.S. influence and lead Asian order.
- On U.S. decline: “The United States is unlikely to decline so long as its public is periodically convinced that it is about to decline.” —Samuel Huntington, 1988. Doshi uses this to
Review Summary
The Long Game is widely regarded as an important and comprehensive analysis of China's grand strategy to displace American global hegemony. Readers praise Doshi's meticulous research using primary Chinese sources to trace the evolution of China's approach over decades. While some find the writing dry and repetitive, most consider it a must-read for understanding US-China relations. The book outlines China's strategies of blunting, building, and expanding influence, and offers recommendations for US policy. Critics note potential bias and question some assumptions, but overall view it as a significant contribution.
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