The Long Game

1. US-China Competition is a Contest for Global Order

For rising states, the act of peacefully displacing the hegemon consists of two broad strategies generally pursued in sequence.

Competition over Order. The core of US-China competition since the Cold War has been over regional and now global order. A hegemon's position in regional and global order emerges from three broad "forms of control" that are used to regulate the behavior of other states: coercive capability, consensual inducements, and legitimacy.

Strategies of Displacement. Rising states like China can peacefully displace hegemonic powers like the United States through two broad strategies generally pursued in sequence: blunting the hegemon's exercise of those forms of control, particularly those extended over the rising state; and building forms of control over others.

Global Expansion. Unless a rising power has first blunted the hegemon, efforts to build order are likely to be futile and easily opposed. And until a rising power has successfully conducted a good degree of blunting and building in its home region, it remains too vulnerable to the hegemon’s influence to confidently turn to a third strategy, global expansion, which pursues both blunting and building at the global level to displace the hegemon from international leadership.

2. The CCP's Nationalist-Leninist Structure Drives Grand Strategy

Party, government, military, civilian, and academic, north, south, east, west, and center, the Party leads everything.

Nationalist Aims. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is a nationalist institution that emerged from the patriotic ferment of the late Qing period and has sought to restore the country to its rightful place. The core theme animating the Party across that stretch is the search for something that could restore China to its former greatness and would help it achieve the goal of "national rejuvenation."

Leninist Instrument. The CCP is a Leninist party that has built centralized institutions—blended with a ruthless amorality—to govern the country and achieve its nationalist mission. The Party sits above the state and penetrates every level of it as well. In this way, it serves as an instrument for coordinating grand strategy and gives policymakers relative autonomy from parochial interests in foreign policy matters so that they can pursue grand strategic ones.

Party as a Subject of Research. A careful review of the Party's own voluminous publications can provide insight into its grand strategic concepts. To identify the existence, content, and adjustment of China’s grand strategy, researchers must find evidence of grand strategic concepts in authoritative texts; grand strategic capabilities in national security institutions; and grand strategic conduct in state behavior.

3. China's Grand Strategy Shifts with Perceptions of US Power

Shifts in these perceptions are driven more by events, especially shocks, than statistical measures.

Perception of Power and Threat. Grand strategies rest on perceptions of power and threat, and shifts in these perceptions are driven more by events, especially shocks, than statistical measures. By comparing descriptions of power and threat in Chinese texts before and after foreign policy shocks, one can determine whether perceptions of power and threat changed and produced strategic adjustment too.

Grand Strategies of Rising Powers. When the rising power views the hegemon as much more powerful than it but not particularly threatening, the rising power tends to accommodate hegemonic order. When a rising power thinks the hegemon is much more powerful than it and also very threatening, then the rising power will pursue a blunting strategy. When a rising power thinks the external hegemon is only modestly more powerful than it but still very threatening, the rising power will pursue a building strategy.

Sequential Strategies. These four strategies generally occur sequentially from accommodation to blunting to building and then to dominance, but there are exceptions. In China’s case, the conventional sequence appears to be at work: China initially accommodated a powerful but non-threatening United States after normalization; sought to blunt it after the Cold War’s conclusion led it to see the United States as more threatening; began to build its own order after the Global Financial Crisis led it to see the United States as weakening; and may pursue regional dominance if the United States acquiesces or is defeated in a regional conflict.

4. Post-Trifecta: Blunting US Power Became China's Priority

It seems that one Cold War has come to an end but that two others have already begun.

The Traumatic Trifecta. The trifecta of Tiananmen Square (1989), the Gulf War (1990–1991), and the Soviet collapse (1991) led China to see the United States and not the Soviet Union as China’s primary threat. In response, Beijing launched its blunting strategy under the Party guideline of "hiding capabilities and biding time."

Hiding Capabilities and Biding Time. This strategy was instrumental and tactical. Party leaders explicitly tied the guideline to perceptions of US power captured in phrases like the "international balance of forces" and "multipolarity," and they sought to quietly and asymmetrically weaken American power in Asia across military, economic, and political instruments.

Blunting, Not Building. Under this strategy, China chose not to build the foundations for Asian hegemony because it feared doing so would unsettle the United States and its own neighbors. It avoided major investments in aircraft carriers, ambitious international organizations, and regional economic schemes and instead pursued blunting.

5. Military Blunting: Sea Denial and Asymmetric Warfare

Whatever the enemy fears most, we develop that.

Shift to Sea Denial. The trifecta prompted China to depart from a "sea control" strategy increasingly focused on holding distant maritime territory to a "sea denial" strategy focused on preventing the US military from traversing, controlling, or intervening in the waters near China.

Asymmetric Weapons. Beijing declared it would "catch up in some areas and not others" and vowed to build "whatever the enemy fears" to accomplish it—ultimately delaying the acquisition of costly and vulnerable vessels like aircraft carriers and instead investing in cheaper asymmetric denial weapons.

Investments in Denial. Beijing then built the world's largest mine arsenal, the world's first anti-ship ballistic missile, and the world's largest submarine fleet—all to undermine US military power.

6. Political Blunting: Joining and Stalling Regional Institutions

An important reason why China now increasingly values multilateral diplomacy is US hegemonic behavior after the Cold War and its superpower position.

Reversing Opposition to Regional Institutions. The trifecta led China to reverse its previous opposition to joining regional institutions. Beijing feared that multilateral organizations like APEC and the ARF might be used by Washington to build a liberal regional order or even an Asian NATO, so China joined them to blunt American power.

Stalling Institutional Progress. It stalled institutional progress, wielded institutional rules to constrain US freedom of maneuver, and hoped participation would reassure wary neighbors otherwise tempted to join a US-led balancing coalition.

Limited Ambitions. China’s participation in APEC fit within its larger strategy to blunt American power. It helped deny the United States a platform for promulgating Western economic and political norms, as well as coordinating security or military policy through what it feared might become an Asian NATO.

7. Economic Blunting: Securing Trade and Limiting US Leverage

The question of most-favored nation status between China and the United States is a central issue that will determine the rotation of world history.

Economic Dependence. The trifecta laid bare China's dependence on the US market, capital, and technology—notably through Washington's post-Tiananmen sanctions and its threats to revoke most-favored-nation (MFN) trade status, which could have seriously damaged China's economy.

Binding US Economic Power. Beijing sought not to decouple from the United States but instead to bind the discretionary use of American economic power, and it worked hard to remove MFN from congressional review through "permanent normal trading relations," leveraging negotiations in APEC and the WTO to obtain it.

Defensive Strategy. China’s efforts in this period were primarily driven by grand strategic considerations. They were part of a blunting strategy that sought to minimize American economic power and leverage over China—relational, structural, and domestic—all while ensuring Beijing could continue to access American markets, capital, and technology.

8. Post-Crisis: Building Regional Order in Asia

In the past we had to keep a low profile because we were weak while other states were strong. . . . Now, with ‘Striving for Achievement,’ we are indicating to neighboring countries that we are strong and you are weak. This is a change at a very fundamental level.

The Global Financial Crisis. The shock of the Global Financial Crisis led China to see the United States as weakening and emboldened it to shift to a building strategy. The Party sought to lay the foundations for order—coercive capacity, consensual bargains, and legitimacy—under the auspices of the revised guidance "actively accomplish something" issued by Chinese leader Hu Jintao.

Building Regional Order. This strategy, like blunting before it, was implemented across multiple instruments of statecraft—military, political, and economic. China now sought the capability to hold distant islands, safeguard sea lines, intervene in neighboring countries, and provide public security goods.

Shifting Priorities. China now sought the capability to hold distant islands, safeguard sea lines, intervene in neighboring countries, and provide public security goods. For these objectives, China needed a different force structure, one that it had previously postponed for fear that it would be vulnerable to the United States and unsettle China’s neighbors.

9. Military Building: From Sea Denial to Sea Control

Make more offensive moves.

Shift to Sea Control. The Global Financial Crisis accelerated a shift in Chinese military strategy away from a singular focus on blunting American power through sea denial to a new focus on building order through sea control.

Investing in Power Projection. China promptly stepped up investments in aircraft carriers, capable surface vessels, amphibious warfare, marines, and overseas bases.

Regional Ambitions. China now sought the capability to hold distant islands, safeguard sea lines, intervene in neighboring countries, and provide public security goods. For these objectives, China needed a different force structure, one that it had previously postponed for fear that it would be vulnerable to the United States and unsettle China’s neighbors.

10. Political Building: Launching New Regional Institutions

Establish regional architecture.

Launching New Institutions. The Global Financial Crisis caused China to depart from a blunting strategy focused on joining and stalling regional organizations to a building strategy that involved launching its own institutions.

AIIB and CICA. China spearheaded the launch of the AIIB and the elevation and institutionalization of the previously obscure CICA. It then used these institutions, with mixed success, as instruments to shape regional order in the economic and security domains in directions it preferred.

Building a Sphere of Influence. China’s building strategy sought to lay the foundations for order—coercive capacity, consensual bargains, and legitimacy. China sought to lay the foundations for order—coercive capacity, consensual bargains, and legitimacy—under the auspices of the revised guidance “actively accomplish something” issued by Chinese leader Hu Jintao.

11. Economic Building: The Belt and Road Initiative and Economic Statecraft

Aboard our development train.

Offensive Economic Statecraft. The Global Financial Crisis helped Beijing depart from a defensive blunting strategy that targeted American economic leverage to an offensive building strategy designed to build China's own coercive and consensual economic capacities.

The Belt and Road Initiative. At the core of this effort were China's Belt and Road Initiative, its robust use of economic statecraft against its neighbors, and its attempts to gain greater financial influence.

Asymmetric Interdependence. China’s Belt and Road Initiative, its robust use of economic statecraft against its neighbors, and its attempts to gain greater financial influence.

12. "Great Changes": China's Global Expansion Strategy

Toward the world’s center stage.

A New Trifecta. China is launching a third strategy of displacement, one that expands its blunting and building efforts worldwide to displace the United States as the global leader. This strategy emerged following another trifecta, this time consisting of Brexit, the election of Donald Trump, and the West’s poor initial response to the coronavirus pandemic.

Global Ambitions. In this period, the Chinese Communist Party reached a paradoxical consensus: it concluded that the United States was in retreat globally but at the same time was waking up to the China challenge bilaterally.

Displacing the United States. In Beijing’s mind, “great changes unseen in a century” were underway, and they provided an opportunity to displace the United States as the leading global state by 2049, with the next decade deemed the most critical to this objective.

Last updated: March 16, 2025