The Political Thought of Xi Jinping

1. Xi Jinping Thought is China's new proto-ideology, aiming for global preeminence.

As it stands in 2022, Xi Thought is, in substance, at most a proto-ideology rather than an ideology.

Guiding China. Xi Jinping Thought (XJT) is the official doctrine guiding China's politics, economy, society, and foreign policy, intended to steer the nation towards the "China Dream" of national rejuvenation by midcentury. While not yet formally declared the state ideology, it functions as a proto-ideology, aiming for a status comparable to, or even surpassing, Mao Zedong Thought. Its influence is pervasive, shaping policy design, implementation, and evaluation across all sectors.

Beyond Pragmatism. Unlike the pragmatic approach of the post-Mao era where policy often preceded ideology, XJT subordinates technocratic expertise to ideological correctness. It articulates Xi's vision for China, defining problems, their causes (often blaming the West and aspects of reform/opening up), and solutions, aiming to reshape China's trajectory and its place in the world. The goal is to make XJT the self-updating navigational chart for China's ship of state.

A Work in Progress. XJT is still evolving, rooted in Xi's worldview and beliefs, but its core tenets are established and unlikely to fundamentally change. Its sustainability is tied to Xi's longevity and ability to deliver on its promises, but its influence is already reshaping China and its global interactions, setting a clear direction of travel for the coming decades.

2. Xi prioritizes regime security and Party supremacy above all else.

The primary mission of Xi’s tianxia system is to enhance and perpetuate China’s interests, though Xi sees it as good for humanity as a whole.

Foremost Concern. Regime security and Party supremacy are the absolute top priorities in Xi Jinping Thought, considered prerequisites for achieving the China Dream. Xi views the Party's survival as inseparable from his own right to rule, drawing lessons from the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Overriding Factor. This prioritization makes regime security the overriding factor guiding Chinese foreign policy, domestic governance, and economic management. Unlike his predecessors who balanced regime security with other goals like economic growth or international integration, Xi elevates it to an unprecedented level, willing to sacrifice other objectives if they are perceived to threaten the Party's hold on power or his leadership.

Party-State-Nation Trinity. Xi conflates the interests of the Party, the state, and the nation, making loyalty to him and the Party synonymous with patriotism and defending China. This trinity underpins the entire framework of XJT, justifying centralized control, suppression of dissent, and an assertive stance on the global stage, all in the name of securing the regime's future.

3. Xi is transforming China's political system into Sino-centric consultative Leninism.

Our research shows that the political system of Sino-centric consultative Leninism under Xi Thought is an amalgamation of a Leninist party-state with personalist rule.

Upgrading the System. Xi inherited a consultative Leninist system characterized by Party supremacy, governance reform, monitoring public opinion, economic growth focus, and party-centric nationalism. He is not abandoning this system but substantially modifying it, or "upgrading" the software while keeping the hardware largely intact.

Key Modifications:

• Reinvigorated Leninism: Bolstering Party discipline, hierarchy, and control under a strongman leader.
• Sino-centrism: Embedding China's interests and national unity as primary justifications for Party actions.
• Personalist Rule: Replacing collective leadership with Xi's dominance, making him the "core" leader.

Beyond Collective Leadership. Xi has systematically undermined the norms of collective leadership established after Mao, such as term limits for the top leader and shared decision-making power. This shift towards personalist rule, while framed as "institutionalization" to strengthen the Party, effectively centralizes power in Xi's hands.

4. Rectification and anti-corruption are tools to consolidate Xi's power and discipline the Party.

By taking matters into their own hands to demand accountability from the Party, the activists and Peng betrayed their impatience at, if not disbelief in, the Party’s ability to spot and correct mistakes.

Dual Purpose. Xi's relentless rectification-cum-anticorruption drive serves two main goals: purging rivals and disciplining the Party as a Leninist instrument. It's a synthesis of Liu Shaoqi's focus on party organization and Mao's ambition for strongman rule, where loyalty to Xi is conflated with loyalty to the Party.

Punishing Disloyalty. The campaign targets "tigers" (high-ranking officials) and "flies" (lower-level cadres), often disproportionately affecting those from rival factions while sparing Xi's allies. This selective enforcement, though denied by the Party, is legitimized under XJT as necessary to eliminate threats to the Party's "core" leadership.

Disciplining the Ranks. Beyond punishment, the drive involves incessant ideological indoctrination, requiring cadres to study XJT and engage in practices like "criticisms and self-criticisms." It also centralizes the disciplinary regime under the National Supervision Commission, extending Party control over all public sector employees and reinforcing vertical accountability.

5. The Party must lead everything, requiring deep penetration into state and society.

"The Party, the state, the military, the civilians, and the education sector; east, west, south, north, and center—the Party leads everything," Xi proclaimed as he prepared to start his second term as the CCP General Secretary at the 19th Party Congress in 2017, the convention that inscribed Xi Thought into the Party Constitution.

Vanguard Role. Xi Thought mandates the CCP to proactively act as the vanguard, not just monopolizing power but actively transforming society. This reverses the limited separation of Party and state attempted in earlier reform eras.

Organizational Control. Xi implements this through:

• Increasing the prominence and number of Party-led central leading small groups/commissions, often chaired by himself.
• Merging Party departments and subsuming state organs under Party control (e.g., National Supervision Commission, Civil Servants Bureau under Organization Department).
• Strengthening Party-building within non-Party organizations like SOEs, private firms, and social groups, ensuring Party cells exert influence.

Ideological Control. This organizational push is coupled with a crackdown on "false ideological trends" (like Western democracy, universal values, civil society) and the promotion of a Sino-centric Marxism-Leninism, aiming for ideological uniformity across the nation. The goal is to ensure the Party's authority is unchallenged and its directives are followed seamlessly.

6. Xi offers an upgraded social contract: better life for loyalty and defense of the regime.

By taking matters into their own hands to demand accountability from the Party, the activists and Peng betrayed their impatience at, if not disbelief in, the Party’s ability to spot and correct mistakes.

Beyond Materialism. China's post-Tiananmen social contract relied heavily on economic growth for legitimacy. Xi upgrades this, recognizing rising public expectations and social tensions. The new contract promises enhanced government effectiveness in meeting demands (like poverty alleviation, pollution control) and delivering social justice.

Terms of the Deal. In return for a better life and the fulfillment of the China Dream, the people are required to:

• Actively defend regime security, accepting more intrusive state surveillance and control.
• Embrace the Party's leadership and express overt loyalty, guided by the reinvigorated mass line.
• Subordinate individual interests to national goals defined by the Party.

Targeted Delivery. The antipoverty campaign exemplifies this, using massive state resources and cadre mobilization to achieve specific targets, framed as a historic Party achievement. However, it also highlights the top-down, often coercive nature of delivery, particularly for ethnic minorities like the Uyghurs, where "leveling up" material conditions is inseparable from forceful Sinicization.

7. Economic strength through innovation is Xi's top economic goal, guided by state steerage.

At the top of the list is to secure economic strength.

Beyond Size. Xi views China's economy as "large but not strong," lacking the innovation capacity and international rule-making authority commensurate with a top-tier power. His primary economic goal is to achieve "economic strength" by developing world-leading "independent innovation ability."

Strategic Focus. This involves an asymmetrical strategy targeting "key domains" (like IT, robotics, biotech) and "choke-neck technologies" (like semiconductors) to reduce reliance on the West and develop "asymmetrical assassin's maces." Policies include massive state investment through government guidance funds, national laboratories, and a "bounty system" for research.

State-Centric Model. This pursuit reinforces a state-centric economic model, prioritizing SOEs and direct state control. While aiming for innovation, the approach is top-down and often struggles to effectively integrate private capital and leverage existing research structures, leading to slower-than-hoped progress and costly failures.

8. Xi seeks economic order and security via deleveraging, regulation, and selective decoupling.

To complement his efforts to discipline the domestic market actors, recalibrated as and when the economy faces headwinds, Xi introduced the “dual circulation strategy” to insulate the domestic economy from external risks.

Disciplining the Market. Xi's second economic goal is to enhance order and security. Domestically, this means imposing market discipline through a deleveraging drive targeting SOEs, local governments, financial institutions, and property developers, and intense regulatory enforcement, particularly over large private tech conglomerates.

Balancing Growth. While committed to order, Xi pragmatically adjusts the intensity of these measures based on economic performance, pulling back when growth slows to protect regime stability. This reveals a tension between his Leninist preference for control and the need to maintain economic vitality.

Insulating the Economy. Externally, economic security is pursued through the "dual circulation strategy," emphasizing domestic circulation while selectively engaging internationally. This aims to insulate China from external vulnerabilities and reduce dependence on the West for critical supply chains, effectively pursuing a form of "home-based globalization" on China's terms.

9. Common prosperity is a lower-priority goal focused on managed wealth redistribution.

The relatively low priority Xi attaches to common prosperity is predetermined by his Leninist mentality, which favors supply-side reform over demand-side reform, as much as his pragmatism, which implies that he will not do anything that he thinks will seriously disturb economic growth.

Socialist Requirement. Common prosperity, defined as achieving an "olive-shaped distributive structure" with a large middle class and reduced wealth gaps, is framed as an "essential requirement of socialism" and a political issue affecting the Party's legitimacy. However, it is ranked below economic strength and security.

Three-Tier Distribution. Xi's blueprint involves:

• First Distribution: Increasing personal income, especially for low-income groups (e.g., raising minimum wage, vocational training).
• Second Distribution: Protecting government revenue, optimizing expenditure, and strengthening the social safety net (e.g., punishing illegal income, potentially property/consumption taxes).
• Third Distribution: Encouraging corporate philanthropy and donations from high-income groups.

Limited Redistribution. Despite the rhetoric, the program is not classic socialism aiming for egalitarianism. It seeks to prevent excessive polarization but avoids "welfarism." Implementation is often voluntary for businesses, and the focus remains on supply-side reforms, reflecting Xi's prioritization of growth and stability over radical redistribution.

10. Xi aims to forge one patriotic Chinese people loyal to the Party and himself.

To Xi, a willingness to sacrifice oneself for the nation is a good starting point for a patriot, but it is not enough.

New-Era People. Xi seeks to create a single, united, patriotic people out of China's diverse population, extending this ambition to the Chinese diaspora. This involves a perpetual campaign of indoctrination to cultivate "new-era people" who "love the nation, love the Party, and love socialism."

Defining Patriotism. Patriotism under Xi Thought requires:

• Embracing the "China Dream" and aligning personal ambitions with national goals.
• Professing absolute loyalty to Xi and the Xi-led Party, seeing them as inseparable from the nation.
• Believing in Xi Thought as the correct path for China.
• Adopting a xenophobic attitude, mistrusting foreign influences and celebrating China's self-reliance.

Methods of Indoctrination. This is achieved through:

• Systematic patriotic education from kindergarten to university, standardizing curriculum and vetting materials.
• Promoting a "hero culture" celebrating self-sacrifice for the nation.
• Controlling historical narratives to emphasize the Party's indispensable role and portray China as a victim of the West.
• Rectifying entertainment, media, and work culture to align with "core socialist values."

11. Xi's foreign policy is driven by a Sino-centric tianxia vision for global leadership.

In Xi Thought, “
[ERROR: Incomplete response]

Last updated: May 4, 2025