Anarchy, State, and Utopia

1. Individual Rights are Supreme Side Constraints

個人擁有權利，有些事情是他人或團體不能加諸於個人的，做了就會侵犯他們的權利。
(Individuals have rights; there are things others or groups cannot do to individuals, doing so would violate their rights.)

Rights define boundaries. At the core of political philosophy are individual rights, which act as strict moral side constraints on what others, including the state, can do. These rights are not merely goals to be maximized or balanced against other social goods; they are inviolable boundaries that cannot be crossed, even for the sake of achieving a greater overall good. This perspective contrasts sharply with utilitarian views that might permit sacrificing one person's rights for the benefit of a larger number.

Individuals are ends. This emphasis on rights reflects a fundamental Kantian principle: individuals are ends in themselves, not merely means to be used for the benefit of others. Using a person in certain ways, even if it leads to a better outcome for society as a whole, is morally impermissible because it fails to respect their inherent separateness and dignity. The inviolability of individuals is expressed by the command: "Do not use people in certain specified ways."

Limits on action. The existence of these strong, extensive individual rights immediately raises the central question: what, if anything, can a state legitimately do? The scope of state action is severely limited by these rights. Any state action that violates these side constraints, unless it is in response to a prior rights violation, is morally illegitimate.

2. The Minimal State Arises Naturally and Justifiably

諾齊克此一國家形成之說明，使其將國家角色，定位在個人權利之保障。
(Nozick's explanation of the formation of the state positions the state's role as the protection of individual rights.)

From nature to state. Starting from a Lockean state of nature where individuals possess rights but lack a reliable enforcement mechanism, protective associations would naturally emerge. Individuals, seeking more secure protection of their rights against violence, theft, and fraud, would contract with agencies offering such services. Competition among these agencies, driven by market pressures and economies of scale, would likely lead to a dominant protective association in a given geographical area.

Invisible hand process. This emergence of a dominant protective association is explained as an "invisible hand" process. It is not the result of a deliberate collective agreement or social contract aimed at creating a state, but rather the unintended consequence of individuals pursuing their self-interest in obtaining protection. This process, if it occurs without violating anyone's rights, provides a moral justification for the resulting entity.

De facto monopoly. The dominant protective association, by prohibiting others from using unreliable or unfair enforcement procedures against its clients (a right individuals already possess), effectively gains a de facto monopoly on the use of force within its territory. This monopoly, arising from the aggregation and enforcement of individual rights, is a key characteristic of a state.

3. Only the Minimal State is Morally Legitimate

他的最低限度國家，基本上沿循古典自由主義「守夜人國家」（nightwatchman state）的基線，將國家功能定位在防止暴力、偷竊、詐欺，以及保障契約之履行等等。
(His minimal state essentially follows the baseline of the classical liberal "nightwatchman state," positioning the state's functions in preventing violence, theft, fraud, and ensuring contract enforcement, etc.)

Limited functions. The minimal state, also known as the nightwatchman state, is the most extensive state that can be morally justified. Its functions are strictly limited to protecting individuals against force, theft, and fraud, and enforcing contracts. This state arises from the aggregation and enforcement of individual rights in the state of nature.

Justification through process. The legitimacy of the minimal state stems from the just process of its formation. It emerges from the state of nature through morally permissible steps, primarily the voluntary actions of individuals seeking protection and the subsequent development of a dominant protective association that enforces individual rights without violating them.

Against anarchy. This justified minimal state provides a response to the individualist anarchist who argues that any state is inherently immoral because it violates individual rights. By showing how a state with limited functions can arise without such violations, the argument for the minimal state's legitimacy is established.

4. More Extensive States Violate Individual Rights

不過，任何逾越此一最低限度功能之國家（ultraminimal state），則將不可避免地造成對個人權利侵犯之後果。
(However, any state exceeding this minimal function (ultraminimal state) will inevitably result in the consequence of violating individual rights.)

Beyond protection. Any state that takes on functions beyond the minimal ones of protection and contract enforcement is morally unjustified. This includes states that engage in redistribution of wealth, provide welfare services, or enforce patterned principles of justice. Such actions necessarily involve violating individual rights, particularly property rights and the right not to be forced to contribute to others' well-being.

Forced contributions. A state that taxes some citizens to provide benefits or services to others, even if those benefits are desirable (like healthcare or education), is forcing some individuals to serve as means for the ends of others. This violates the principle of individual inviolability and treats individuals as resources for the collective good, which is impermissible according to the rights-based framework.

No right to services. While individuals have rights that prohibit others from harming them (negative rights), they do not have rights that obligate others to provide them with goods, services, or opportunities (positive rights), unless those obligations arise from voluntary agreements or rectification of past injustices. A state that enforces positive rights by compelling contributions from some to benefit others is acting unjustly.

5. Taxation for Redistribution is Forced Labor

由於認為財富重分配不啻強制某些人為其他人勞動，乃是對個人權利的侵犯，因而加以拒斥。
(Because they believe wealth redistribution is tantamount to forcing some people to labor for others, it is rejected as a violation of individual rights.)

Taking earnings. Taking the earnings of labor through taxation for the purpose of redistribution is morally equivalent to forced labor. If the state can claim a portion of what you earn, it is essentially claiming a portion of your time and effort. This treats you as if you are partially owned by others, who have a claim on the fruits of your labor.

Partial ownership. Just as forcing someone to work for free for a certain number of hours is forced labor, taxing their income is forcing them to work for the state (and those who benefit from the taxes) for the portion of time it took to earn that taxed income. This implies a form of partial ownership of individuals by the collective or the state, which is incompatible with the idea of self-ownership.

Violation of rights. This perspective argues that individuals have a right to the fruits of their labor, derived from their ownership of themselves and their abilities. Taxation for redistribution violates this right by seizing justly acquired property. While voluntary charity is permissible and even encouraged, compulsory contributions enforced by the state are not.

6. Justice in Holdings Follows Entitlement Principles

諾齊克這本書的第二部分，主要在揭示他的「賦予權利理論」（entitlement theory），據以批判超越最低限度國家的各種觀點。
(The second part of Nozick's book primarily reveals his "entitlement theory," based on which it critiques various views that go beyond the minimal state.)

Three principles. The entitlement theory of justice in holdings consists of three main principles:

• Principle of Acquisition: How unowned things can be justly acquired (e.g., through labor mixed with the unowned thing, subject to the Lockean proviso).
• Principle of Transfer: How holdings can be justly transferred from one person to another (e.g., through voluntary exchange, gift, etc.).
• Principle of Rectification: How past injustices in acquisition or transfer should be corrected.

Historical justice. A distribution of holdings is just if and only if it arose from a just initial acquisition through just transfers, or is a result of rectifying past injustices. Justice in holdings is historical; it depends on the actual process by which the distribution came about, not on whether the resulting distribution conforms to a particular pattern or end-state principle.

Against patterned principles. The entitlement theory stands in contrast to patterned principles of justice (like those based on need, merit, or equality) which judge a distribution based on its structure at a given time, regardless of how it was achieved. The entitlement theory argues that no patterned principle can be continuously maintained without constant interference with individual liberty.

7. Patterned Justice Conflicts with Liberty

諾齊克批評分配正義是一種模式的正義觀（a patterned conception of justice），而其賦予權利理論則是一種歷史的正義觀（a historical conception of justice）。
(Nozick critiques distributive justice as a patterned conception of justice, while his entitlement theory is a historical conception of justice.)

Liberty upsets patterns. If a society achieves a distribution that conforms to a specific pattern (e.g., equal distribution), allowing individuals the liberty to engage in voluntary transactions (buying, selling, gifting) will inevitably disrupt that pattern. People will use their justly acquired holdings in ways that lead to unequal distributions.

Wilt Chamberlain example. A famous illustration involves a patterned distribution (D1) where everyone has equal wealth. If a basketball star like Wilt Chamberlain is popular, and people voluntarily pay him 25 cents from their ticket price to watch him play, his wealth will accumulate significantly (D2). If D1 was just, and the transfers were voluntary, then D2 must also be just, even though it is highly unequal and deviates from the initial pattern.

Constant interference. Maintaining any specific pattern of distribution would require continuous interference with individual liberty. The state would have to constantly monitor transactions, prohibit certain exchanges, or seize justly acquired holdings to redistribute them back into the desired pattern. This level of state intervention is incompatible with a society that respects individual rights and freedom of association and exchange.

8. Natural Differences Don't Justify Forced Redistribution

羅爾斯則為了體現在政治界域中對多元價值的尊重，在代表後期思想之《政治的自由主義》（Political Liberalism）一書中，以「交疊的共識」（overlapping consensus）概念為核心，對其正義理論進行重構。
(Rawls, in order to embody respect for plural values in the political sphere, reconstructed his theory of justice in "Political Liberalism," a work representing his later thought, centering on the concept of "overlapping consensus.")

Arbitrary factors. Rawls argues that natural talents and social circumstances are "arbitrary from a moral point of view" because individuals do not earn or deserve them. He suggests that a just society should mitigate the effects of these arbitrary factors on the distribution of wealth and opportunity, treating natural talents as a "common asset."

Nozick's counter. Nozick agrees that individuals do not "deserve" their natural talents in a moral sense. However, he argues that this does not mean they are not entitled to them or the benefits that arise from their use. The fact that something is unearned does not automatically give others a claim over it or its products.

Self-ownership. Individuals own themselves, including their talents and abilities. They are entitled to use these talents as they see fit and to keep the results of their efforts (subject to the rights of others). Treating talents as a "common asset" implies a form of collective ownership of individuals, which violates the principle of self-ownership. The moral arbitrariness of talents does not justify forced redistribution of the benefits derived from them.

9. Critiques of Alternative State Justifications

在本章，我們將考慮那種認為一個功能更多的國家，能因為其為達到分配正義所必需的手段（或是最好的工具）而得到證明的觀點；在下一章我們將討論其他不同的觀點。
(In this chapter, we will consider the view that a more extensive state can be justified because it is a necessary means (or the best tool) for achieving distributive justice; in the next chapter, we will discuss other different views.)

Beyond distributive justice. The book examines and refutes various other arguments for a state more extensive than the minimal state, beyond those based on patterned distributive justice. These include arguments based on:

• Equality: Arguments for equality of opportunity or outcome are shown to conflict with individual liberty and property rights.
• Self-Esteem/Envy: The idea that inequality harms self-esteem or fuels envy is not a sufficient basis for forced redistribution or state intervention.
• Meaningful Work/Worker Control: While desirable, meaningful work and worker self-management should arise from voluntary arrangements and market processes, not state coercion.
• Marxist Exploitation: The Marxist theory of exploitation, based on the labor theory of value, is critiqued as theoretically flawed. Even if valid, it would only justify eliminating forced labor (including taxation), not necessarily supporting a more extensive state.
• Right to a Say: The argument that people have a right to a say in decisions that significantly affect their lives is shown to lead to absurd conclusions when applied universally (e.g., a rejected suitor having a say in who a woman marries).

Voluntary solutions. Many desirable social goals, such as poverty reduction, provision of social services, or fostering meaningful work, can and should be pursued through voluntary means, such as charity, mutual aid societies, and diverse voluntary associations, rather than through state coercion.

10. Utopia is a Framework for Diverse Communities

諾齊克這本書的第三部分，則在提出一個烏托邦的架構。
(The third part of Nozick's book proposes a framework for utopia.)

Not a single blueprint. Utopia is not a single, perfect society that is ideal for everyone. Given the vast diversity of human beings, their values, goals, and conceptions of the good life, no single community or way of life could possibly satisfy everyone. Attempting to force everyone into one mold would be oppressive.

A meta-utopia. Instead, utopia should be understood as a "meta-utopia" or a framework for utopias. It is an environment in which diverse individuals and groups can freely and voluntarily form and live in communities of their choosing, each pursuing their own vision of the good life. This framework allows for a multitude of different communities, each with its own rules, structures, and values.

Voluntary association. The framework emphasizes voluntary association and the right to exit. People are free to join or leave communities as they see fit, ensuring that communities must attract and retain members through their desirability rather than coercion. This allows for experimentation and evolution of different social forms.

11. The Minimal State is the Utopian Framework

諾齊克認為在最低限度國家之中，我們是以不容侵犯的個人被看待。
(Nozick believes that within the minimal state, we are regarded as inviolable individuals.)

The framework is the state. The minimal state, limited to protecting individual rights and enforcing contracts, is precisely the framework required for this meta-utopia. Its non-coercive nature, its respect for individual autonomy and rights, and its neutrality regarding different conceptions of the good life make it the ideal environment for diverse voluntary communities to flourish.

Protecting diversity. By prohibiting force and fraud, the minimal state protects individuals' ability to form and maintain their chosen communities without interference from outsiders or other communities. It acts as an umpire between communities, resolving disputes without imposing a single way of life.

Moral ideal. The minimal state, far from being a dry or uninspiring concept, is presented as a morally inspiring ideal. It is the state that fully respects individuals as inviolable beings with rights and dignity, allowing them the freedom to pursue their own paths and create their own associations. It is the only state compatible with the full respect for individual liberty that is necessary for a true utopia.

Last updated: May 13, 2025