Surrender or Starve

1. Famine in the Horn was primarily a political weapon, not just drought.

Famine in the Horn is both a tool and an aspect of ethnic conflict, with the Ethiopian Amharas of the central highlands pitted against the Eritreans and Tigreans of the north.

Beyond natural disaster. While drought played a role, the devastating famine of the mid-1980s in Ethiopia was fundamentally a consequence of deliberate government policy and ethnic conflict. The ruling Amhara elite, fortified by Marxist ideology, actively used food denial and agricultural disruption as a means to pressure rebellious regions into submission. This was not merely an act of God, but a calculated strategy akin to historical instances of politically engineered starvation.

Targeting ethnic groups. The famine disproportionately affected the northern provinces of Tigre and Eritrea, strongholds of resistance against the central government. The regime's actions, such as burning crops, bombing markets, and restricting aid access to rebel-held areas, exacerbated the natural food shortages. This demonstrated a clear intent to weaken the insurgency by starving its civilian support base, making the famine a direct extension of the ongoing civil wars.

Historical precedent. The use of famine as a political tool had historical roots in the region, but the Marxist regime intensified it with modern, totalitarian efficiency. The deliberate orchestration of starvation against specific ethnic groups mirrored tactics seen in other communist states, such as Stalin's forced collectivization and famine in Ukraine in the 1930s. This highlighted that the Ethiopian tragedy was not just an African problem, but a chilling example of ideological brutality.

2. Ethiopia's Marxist regime used modern totalitarian methods to brutalize its people.

Supported by the Soviet Union and the rest of the Eastern bloc to a degree unprecedented in Africa, the present leaders in Addis Ababa—Christian Amharas all—have invigorated Ethiopia's age-old despotism with modern, totalitarian techniques.

Despotism modernized. The Dergue, led by Mengistu Haile Mariam, transformed Ethiopia's traditional, feudal despotism into a sophisticated police state. Unlike the emperor's rule, which was anchored in tradition and less efficient in control, the new regime, backed by Soviet and East German security services, implemented systematic repression, surveillance, and control over the population. This included mass arrests, torture, and the elimination of political rivals.

Ideology as justification. Marxist-Leninist ideology provided the framework and justification for the regime's brutal policies. Concepts like class struggle and the need to eliminate "kulaks" were applied to prosperous farmers, particularly the Oromos, leading to forced collectivization. This ideological veneer allowed the regime to rationalize widespread human rights abuses as necessary steps towards building a socialist society, making its cruelty chillingly thorough and precise.

Faceless brutality. Mengistu, unlike the charismatic Emperor Haile Selassie, was a faceless bureaucrat of terror. His lack of personal corruption and austere demeanor made his evil more remote and less relatable to a Western audience, contributing to the lack of sustained media focus on his regime's crimes. This efficient, impersonal brutality, supported by Eastern bloc expertise, made the Dergue one of the cruelest governments in the world, operating with a chilling, modern thoroughness.

3. Eritrean and Tigrean guerrillas were highly effective, self-reliant forces fighting Amhara imperialism.

Facing off against the world's best guerrilla fighters are upward of one hundred fifty thousand Ethiopian government soldiers—half of the total troop strength of black Africa's largest and best-trained standing army.

Formidable resistance. The Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) and the Tigre People's Liberation Front (TPLF) were among the most capable unconventional armies of the 20th century. Despite being heavily outnumbered and receiving minimal external support compared to the government, they inflicted significant casualties on the Ethiopian army and controlled large swathes of territory. Their military prowess was demonstrated in set-piece battles involving tanks and artillery, and daring raids like the attack on the Asmara airbase.

Self-reliance and innovation. Cut off from international recognition and consistent external aid, the guerrillas developed an extraordinary culture of self-reliance. They repaired captured equipment, converted military hardware for civilian use, and established sophisticated underground infrastructure, including hospitals and workshops. This ingenuity and resourcefulness, born of isolation and necessity, made them unique among Third World insurgencies and highly effective in sustaining their long wars of liberation.

Popular support and social change. Unlike many African rebel groups, the EPLF and TPLF enjoyed widespread popular support among their respective ethnic populations. They implemented social reforms in areas under their control, including land reform, women's rights, and basic healthcare and education. This focus on improving the lives of the peasantry, even amidst war and famine, contrasted sharply with the government's exploitative policies and solidified their base of support, enabling them to feed and shelter their people.

4. Western media focused on the visual drama of starvation, missing the political reality.

For all their horror, the images did not reveal to the U.S. public the intrigues and bloody conquests that were behind this suffering.

Images over context. Television coverage of the famine, while powerful in eliciting public sympathy and aid, prioritized dramatic visuals of starving people over the complex political and historical context. The focus on drought as the primary cause and aid as the solution simplified a multifaceted crisis driven by war, ethnic conflict, and ideological brutality. This emphasis on visual spectacle meant that the underlying causes and the nature of the Ethiopian regime were largely ignored or misunderstood.

Limited access, limited story. Media access was heavily controlled by the Ethiopian government, particularly to war zones and forced collectivization sites. Journalists based in Addis Ababa often relied on official sources and were restricted to government-approved areas, limiting their ability to report on the conflict and human rights abuses occurring in rebel-held territories. This lack of access to the "other side" contributed to a skewed narrative that downplayed the role of war and government policy in causing the famine.

Aid politics over Ethiopian politics. Much of the media coverage became a "U.S. story" about the logistics and politics of aid delivery, rather than an in-depth exploration of Ethiopian politics. Debates centered on the efficiency of aid agencies and the Reagan administration's response, diverting attention from the actions of the Ethiopian regime and the dynamics of the civil war. This focus on the external response, rather than the internal reality, left the public with a superficial understanding of the crisis.

5. Massive Western aid, though life-saving, was often manipulated by the regime.

The famine was good business for the Dergue.

Aid as revenue. The influx of massive international aid, primarily food, provided the Ethiopian government with significant financial and logistical benefits. Port fees charged on donated grain became a major source of hard currency, surpassing traditional exports like coffee. The government also utilized aid-funded infrastructure, such as trucks and airfields, for military purposes, effectively subsidizing its war effort against the rebels.

Strategic distribution. The regime manipulated aid distribution for strategic advantage. Food was sometimes withheld from rebellious areas or used to lure peasants to government-controlled feeding centers, where they could be subjected to forced resettlement or conscription. While aid agencies worked to save lives, the government prioritized its military and political objectives, demonstrating that humanitarian assistance could be co-opted in a conflict zone.

Lack of leverage. Despite providing the vast majority of famine relief, Western donors, particularly the United States, gained little political leverage over the Ethiopian regime. The government remained hostile to the West, deepened its ties with the Soviet bloc, and continued its brutal policies, including forced collectivization. This highlighted the limitations of using humanitarian aid alone to influence a totalitarian government primarily concerned with maintaining power through force.

6. Forced collectivization programs caused immense suffering and death.

In the final analysis, the accounts given by the refugees made little impact.

Systematic displacement. The Ethiopian government implemented large-scale forced collectivization programs, primarily "Resettlement" and "Villagization," displacing millions of peasants. Resettlement moved people from the rebellious north to the southwest, often under brutal conditions leading to high death rates due to disease, starvation, and mistreatment. Villagization consolidated scattered villages into centralized locations to facilitate government control and ideological indoctrination.

Human rights abuses. Eyewitness accounts from refugees detailed horrific abuses during these programs, including forced separation of families, confiscation of property, destruction of villages, religious persecution, sexual violence, and forced labor. Peasants were often rounded up at gunpoint or lured with false promises of food, then transported in overcrowded, unsanitary conditions. These programs were politically motivated, targeting populations perceived as hostile or strategically located.

Ignored atrocities. Despite compelling evidence from refugees and human rights organizations, the full extent of the suffering caused by forced collectivization received limited international attention and condemnation. Access restrictions, the regime's denials, and the aid community's reluctance to jeopardize their operations contributed to this silence. The scale of these abuses, potentially resulting in hundreds of thousands of deaths, remained largely obscured from the global public consciousness.

7. The Cold War proxy conflict shaped the region's tragedy, with the USSR gaining influence.

Less proximate than Nicaragua, less crucial than Iran (although just as populous), Ethiopia still remains one of the few big pieces that the USSR has managed to knock off the U.S. side of the board.

Strategic prize. The Horn of Africa, particularly Ethiopia with its Red Sea coastline, was a strategically vital region during the Cold War. Its location at the entrance to the Red Sea, a crucial oil transit route, made it a target for superpower influence. The Soviet Union, after being expelled from Somalia, successfully shifted its support to Ethiopia, leveraging the internal chaos and the Dergue's need for military aid to establish a strong foothold.

Soviet commitment. The USSR provided massive military assistance to the Ethiopian regime, including tanks, fighter jets, and military advisers, enabling the government to prosecute its wars against internal rebellions and repel the Somali invasion. This level of commitment, unprecedented for the Soviets in black Africa, allowed them to implant their system and security apparatus, transforming Ethiopia into a Soviet satellite state.

US disengagement. In contrast, the United States, particularly under the Carter administration, disengaged from Ethiopia due to human rights concerns and a belief that the Soviets would eventually be expelled. This idealistic approach, lacking a realistic assessment of the regime's brutality and the Soviets' determination, created a vacuum that Moscow readily filled. The US failure to counter Soviet influence effectively resulted in a strategic loss and contributed to the prolonged suffering of the Ethiopian people under a totalitarian regime.

8. Sudan's internal chaos and external manipulation hindered aid efforts.

Sudan, like Ethiopia, although for different reasons, never has been a nation in the modern sense.

Political instability. Sudan's chronic political instability, marked by coups, civil war, and ineffective governance, severely hampered famine relief efforts. The overthrow of Nimeiri, while initially hailed as a move towards democracy, led to a period of chaos, strikes, and bureaucratic paralysis that disrupted aid logistics, particularly the crucial railway system needed to transport food to the west.

External interference. Sudan became a battleground for external influence, with Libya and Ethiopia supporting the southern SPLA rebels against the Khartoum government. Libya also actively sought to destabilize the north, using aid convoys to smuggle weapons and cultivating ties with Sudanese politicians. This external manipulation exacerbated the internal conflicts and further complicated the operating environment for humanitarian organizations.

Government indifference. The Sudanese government, dominated by northern Arab elites, showed limited interest in the plight of the famine-stricken peasants in the west and south. Their focus remained on political maneuvering in the capital and the civil war. This indifference, coupled with corruption and inefficiency, meant that even when aid arrived in the country, its distribution was often hindered, leaving millions vulnerable despite international generosity.

9. The US failed to leverage its aid for political influence or support effective opposition.

Although the Reagan administration was more realistic about Ethiopia than was the Carter administration, the former did precious little with its realism.

Aid without leverage. Despite providing hundreds of millions of dollars in famine relief to Ethiopia, the United States gained virtually no political influence over the Marxist regime. The government remained hostile, refused to moderate its policies, and deepened its ties with the Soviet Union. The US strategy of using aid as a potential bribe or goodwill gesture proved ineffective against a regime prioritizing ideological control and military power.

Ignoring viable opposition. The Reagan administration, while supporting anti-communist insurgencies elsewhere (e.g., Nicaragua, Afghanistan), largely ignored or dismissed the Eritrean and Tigrean guerrillas in Ethiopia. Despite their military effectiveness, popular support, and anti-Soviet stance (despite some Marxist leanings), they were often labeled simply as "Marxist secessionists." This ideological rigidity prevented the US from exploring opportunities to support forces actively challenging the Soviet-backed regime.

Missed strategic opportunity. The US missed a strategic opportunity to destabilize a key Soviet satellite in Africa. Supporting the EPLF or TPLF, even with limited defensive aid, could have increased pressure on the Dergue and potentially forced a policy shift or even a change in regime, which would have had significant humanitarian benefits by ending the war and forced collectivization. Instead, US policy remained largely reactive and ineffective in challenging Soviet influence.

10. The Horn of Africa highlighted the limitations of idealistic foreign policy in a brutal reality.

In a world of imperfect choices, where the United States often finds itself supporting regimes and resistance movements of limited caliber, the Eritrean guerrillas would appear to be useful proxies in a “low intensity war” to make Mengistu cry “uncle.”

Idealism vs. Reality. The US approach to the Horn, particularly under the Carter administration, was often guided by idealistic principles like human rights and non-intervention, which proved ineffective against the brutal, pragmatic actions of the Soviet Union and the Ethiopian regime. While the US preached morality and diplomacy, the Soviets used force and proxy armies to achieve their objectives, demonstrating that in a world of power politics, idealism alone is insufficient to protect interests or promote humanitarian outcomes.

Consequences of inaction. The US failure to effectively counter Soviet influence and the Ethiopian regime's brutality had devastating consequences for the people of the region, leading to prolonged war, famine, and human rights abuses on a massive scale. The belief that the Soviets would eventually fail or that Africans should solve their own problems ignored the reality that external powers, particularly the Soviets, were actively shaping the conflict and enabling the regime's worst excesses.

The need for realism. The tragedy in the Horn underscored the need for a more realistic and pragmatic foreign policy approach. This would involve recognizing the true nature of totalitarian regimes, understanding the strategic importance of regions, and being willing to use a range of tools, including potentially supporting imperfect allies or employing limited force, to counter hostile influence and protect humanitarian interests. The experience demonstrated that sometimes, the most humanitarian action is a strategic one.

Last updated: June 9, 2025