A Great Place To Have A War

1. The CIA's Transformation: From Spies to Warriors in Laos

The CIA now has become such a central part of war fighting that even the other large US government agencies, which during the early era of the Cold War tried tenaciously to block the CIA from gaining more influence in Washington, have largely accepted the CIA’s massively expanded war-making duties—the duties it took on first in Laos.

A new mission. Before the Laos operation, the CIA primarily focused on intelligence gathering and political actions like coups. The Korean War's unpopularity and the desire to avoid committing large numbers of US ground troops pushed presidents to seek alternative ways to fight communism. Laos presented a unique opportunity for the CIA to step into a military role, managing a large-scale proxy war.

Paramilitary expansion. The Laos war, known as Operation Momentum, was the CIA's first significant paramilitary undertaking. It involved training, arming, and directing tens of thousands of local fighters, calling in air strikes, and managing battle strategy. This marked a dramatic shift, proving the agency could function as a military force, a capability it would increasingly embrace in future conflicts.

Permanent shift. The success (from the CIA's perspective) in managing a war "on the cheap" and without direct congressional approval solidified paramilitary operations as an essential part of the agency's mission. Laos veterans would go on to lead similar operations globally, culminating in the post-9/11 era where the CIA became deeply involved in targeted killings and managing proxy armies, a direct legacy of its first major war.

2. Laos: A Cold War Domino and the Genesis of US Covert War

Even after the French loss in Indochina, the Eisenhower administration had made clear the importance of Indochina to US security; a paper issued by the National Security Council in December 1954 stated that it was the United States’ objective to “defeat Communist subversion and influence” in Indochina.

Strategic importance. US interest in Laos stemmed from the "domino theory," the fear that if one country fell to communism, its neighbors would follow. Positioned between communist North Vietnam and China, and US allies like Thailand, Laos was seen as a critical bulwark. President Eisenhower even warned Kennedy that Laos was the most pressing foreign policy issue.

Avoiding open conflict. Despite its perceived importance, the US was reluctant to commit large ground forces after the Korean War. The 1962 Geneva Accords, which nominally declared Laos neutral, provided a convenient cover for a covert war. Washington could maintain the fiction of neutrality while secretly supporting anti-communist forces, making a secret, CIA-run war politically palatable.

A vacuum filled. France's withdrawal left a power vacuum in Laos, which the US quickly moved to fill. By the late 1950s, the CIA's presence in Vientiane already dwarfed the State Department's. A weak central government, internal divisions, and the Pathet Lao's ties to North Vietnam created fertile ground for external intervention, which the CIA was uniquely positioned to exploit.

3. Forging a Proxy Army: The CIA and the Hmong Under Vang Pao

Operation Momentum was a plan to arm and train the Hmong under Vang Pao to fight in the growing civil war in Laos, which pitted communist insurgents called the Pathet Lao, backed by North Vietnam, against Laos’s government and its non-communist allies such as Vang Pao and his men.

Ideal fighters. The Hmong, a hill tribe with a history of resisting outside control and known for their toughness and knowledge of the mountainous terrain, were identified as ideal proxy fighters. Many, led by figures like Vang Pao, feared communist rule would centralize power and strip them of their freedoms.

Vang Pao's rise. Vang Pao, a charismatic and fierce military officer from a modest background, emerged as the key Hmong leader. His willingness to fight, his personal animus towards the Vietnamese, and his ability to unite (initially) disparate Hmong clans made him the CIA's chosen partner. Bill Lair, the initial CIA operative, saw in Vang Pao the potential for a potent guerrilla force.

A partnership of necessity. The Hmong needed weapons and support to defend themselves against the Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese incursions. The US needed a local force willing to fight on the ground without requiring American troops. This mutual need forged a partnership, initiated with traditional Hmong ceremonies, though the long-term implications and US commitment were viewed differently by the two sides.

4. Clash of Styles: Lair, Vang Pao, Poe, and Sullivan Shape the Conflict

In the early 1960s, most of the CIA leadership was “all for a war in Laos,” recalled Robert Amory Jr., who served as the agency’s deputy director. “They thought that [Laos] was a great place to have a war.”

Diverse personalities. The Laos war was shaped by a cast of distinct characters:

• Bill Lair: The quiet, culturally attuned Texan CIA operative who initiated the Hmong program, favoring a light footprint and guerrilla tactics.
• Vang Pao: The fierce, ambitious Hmong general, a natural fighter who became the face of the anti-communist effort, increasingly demanding more resources.
• Tony Poe: The brutal, hard-drinking paramilitary operative known for extreme tactics and training hill tribes, embodying the "warrior class."
• Bill Sullivan: The patrician diplomat turned "Field Marshal," who took control of the war from Vientiane, prioritizing US strategic goals over local dynamics.

Conflicting visions. Lair envisioned a Hmong-led guerrilla war with minimal US involvement, focused on defending Hmong territory. Sullivan and later CIA leadership, particularly Ted Shackley, pushed for an expanded, more conventional war aimed at bleeding North Vietnamese forces to aid the war in Vietnam. Poe represented the raw, often uncontrolled, paramilitary capability the agency was developing.

Power struggles. As the war grew, control shifted from field operatives like Lair to the ambassador and agency headquarters. Sullivan centralized authority, sidelining military advisors and even Lair, who disagreed with the escalation and the shift towards conventional battles, foreshadowing the agency's increasing top-down, militarized approach.

5. Escalation to Total War: The Devastating Air Campaign

Over the course of the war, US bombing of Laos would become so intense that it averaged one attack every eight minutes for nearly a decade.

Unprecedented scale. What began as limited air support escalated into the most intense bombing campaign per capita in history. Driven by the desire to interdict the Ho Chi Minh Trail and pressure North Vietnam, US planes dropped more ordnance on Laos than on Germany and Japan combined during World War II.

Indiscriminate destruction. The bombing, often conducted without clear targets or in poor visibility, devastated the Laotian countryside and civilian population. Villages, infrastructure, and arable land were destroyed. Antipersonnel bombs and mines left a deadly legacy of unexploded ordnance that continues to kill and maim decades later.

Disconnected from reality. The air war became increasingly disconnected from the ground reality and local needs. Bombing runs were sometimes flown simply to avoid landing with ordnance or for pilot practice during cease-fires in Vietnam. Despite the immense destruction, the bombing failed to stop North Vietnamese infiltration or win the war, primarily harming the very population the US was ostensibly helping.

6. The Human Toll: War's Impact on the Hmong and Laos

Overall, by the end of the war in 1975, some two hundred thousand Laotians, both civilians and military, had perished, including at least thirty thousand Hmong.

Devastating casualties. The war inflicted immense suffering on Laos. Approximately one-tenth of the population died, hundreds of thousands were wounded, and over a quarter became refugees. The Hmong, fighting disproportionately for the anti-communist side, suffered particularly heavy losses.

Societal breakdown. The conflict shattered traditional Laotian and Hmong society. Constant displacement, reliance on external aid, and the cultural disruption of military bases like Long Cheng eroded traditional ways of life. Prostitution, crime, and drug trafficking flourished in war zones, further destabilizing communities.

A scarred landscape. Beyond the human cost, the war left Laos physically devastated. Infrastructure was destroyed, and vast areas were rendered uninhabitable by bombing and unexploded ordnance. The country, already one of the poorest, faced immense challenges rebuilding after decades of conflict and destruction.

7. The "Secret" War Revealed: Public Scrutiny and Congressional Lies

“We are fighting a big war in Laos, even if we do not have [American] ground troops there,” said Symington. “Yet we are still trying to hide it not only from the [American] people but also from the Congress.”

Thin veil of secrecy. Despite being a covert operation, the scale of the Laos war made complete secrecy impossible. Foreign reporters, aid workers, and eventually the sheer number of people involved led to information leaks. The refugee crisis, in particular, brought the war's impact into public view.

Official deception. US officials, including Ambassador Bill Sullivan, consistently downplayed or denied the extent of American involvement, particularly the bombing campaign and the CIA's role. They insisted the US was merely providing limited aid and advice, even when faced with mounting evidence to the contrary during congressional hearings.

Limited public impact. Despite revelations in the press and congressional inquiries, the Laos war never generated the widespread public outcry seen with Vietnam or Cambodia. Factors included the lack of large numbers of US ground troops dying, the obscurity of the country, and effective government efforts to obscure the full truth, allowing the war to continue largely unnoticed by most Americans.

8. Turning Point and Retreat: Defeat on the Ground, Abandonment by the US

“We were desperate [after Skyline Ridge],” Vang Pao admitted much later. “There were no more men to [get to fight] . . . We could only use up what [men] we had.”

Costly victories. Despite tactical successes like briefly taking the Plain of Jars and holding Skyline Ridge, the anti-communist forces suffered unsustainable casualties in large, conventional battles. Vang Pao's army, disproportionately bearing the losses, was decimated, forcing him to recruit child soldiers and resort to coercive tactics.

Shifting US priorities. As the war in Vietnam wound down, US interest in Laos waned. President Nixon and Henry Kissinger prioritized normalizing relations with China and achieving a peace deal in Vietnam, viewing Laos as secondary. The immense cost and limited strategic gains in Laos made it expendable in the larger geopolitical game.

Abandonment. The 1973 Paris Peace Accords, negotiated without significant input from Laotian leaders, effectively sealed the fate of the anti-communist side. Despite promises of continued support, US aid and bombing ceased, leaving Vang Pao and his forces vulnerable. The US withdrawal was swift, leaving the Hmong and other allies to face brutal retribution from the victorious communist forces.

9. The CIA's Enduring Legacy: Laos as a Blueprint for Paramilitary Power

In the opinion of many officers in the CIA Clandestine Service, the paramilitary programs that the agency operated in Laos . . . were the most successful ever mounted.

A model for covert action. Despite the ultimate defeat of its allies, the CIA viewed the Laos operation as a success for the agency itself. It demonstrated the CIA's capability to manage large-scale covert military operations, bleed enemies, and operate without the constraints faced by the uniformed military.

Paramilitary ascendance. Laos veterans rose to prominent positions within the CIA, bringing with them the experience and mindset of paramilitary warfare. This contributed to the institutionalization of covert military action within the agency, shifting its focus from traditional espionage.

Template for future wars. The Laos model—using proxy forces, relying on airpower, operating in secrecy, and bypassing traditional military and congressional oversight—was replicated in subsequent conflicts, notably in Afghanistan and Central America during the Cold War, and extensively in the post-9/11 global war on terror.

10. Aftermath: Scars on Laos, Struggle for the Hmong, and Forgotten Promises

The US government was not highly supportive about the idea of settling thousands of Hmong in the United States—the Gerald Ford and Jimmy Carter administrations passed legislation allowing in some Indochinese refugees, but most of the first people resettled were from South Vietnam and had more connections in the United States than the Hmong did.

Post-war repression. Following the communist takeover in 1975, Laos faced political repression, economic hardship, and continued violence, particularly against the Hmong who had fought alongside the US. Tens of thousands were sent to brutal reeducation camps or summarily executed.

Hmong diaspora. Facing persecution, tens of thousands of Hmong fled Laos, primarily to Thailand, hoping for resettlement in the US. Despite promises perceived by the Hmong, the US response was initially slow and inadequate, leaving many in squalid refugee camps.

Struggle and legacy. Hmong refugees eventually resettled in the US faced immense challenges adapting to a vastly different society, often struggling with poverty, cultural loss, and intergenerational trauma. The legacy of the secret war continues to affect the Hmong community, marked by the unfulfilled promises and the high price paid for a war largely forgotten by their former ally.

Last updated: June 8, 2025