Always with Honor

1. The Russian Army's collapse stemmed from political turmoil and loss of discipline.

But in the present circumstances, with the disappearance of the Czar the very idea of authority and all the age-old obligations vanished, and nothing could take the place of either in the minds of the Russian people.

Army's decline. By late 1916, the Russian Army, though still large, was weakened by heavy losses, hastily trained officers, and reluctant reserves. Nepotism and rigid seniority hindered effective leadership adaptation to modern warfare needs. The bond between officers and men, once strong, began to fray.

Political contagion. Political turmoil in Petersburg, including ministerial changes and conflicts between the government and Duma, created deep anxiety among patriotic officers. The Czar's abdication in March 1917 delivered a staggering blow, dissolving the central symbol of authority and loyalty for soldiers raised on monarchist principles. This vacuum paved the way for disintegration.

Disorder spreads. The Provisional Government's initial measures proved too weak to contain the growing anarchy. The rise of Soviets, particularly the Soviet of Deputies of Workmen and Soldiers, further undermined traditional military authority. Officers faced disrespect and violence, discipline eroded rapidly, and units became susceptible to political agitation, accelerating the army's collapse from within.

2. The Provisional Government proved weak, ceding power to the Soviets.

The Provisional Government's first measures showed that the disorder in the interior had gone too far to be suppressed, and that these incompetent men, strangers to the Army, could do nothing to prevent things from going to ruin.

Incompetent leadership. The Provisional Government, formed after the Czar's abdication, was composed largely of politicians with little military understanding. Despite some members like Goutchkov having experience with army needs, the government as a whole lacked the firmness and resolution required to control the escalating chaos. They were quickly overwhelmed by events.

Soviet's rise. The Soviet of Deputies of Workmen and Soldiers rapidly gained influence, effectively becoming a parallel power structure. The government's attempts at compromise and its fear of using force allowed the Soviets to dictate terms, issue orders contradicting military command, and promote ideas that further eroded discipline, such as questioning officer authority.

Loss of control. The government's inability to suppress disorder, protect loyal officers, or maintain basic functions like railway transport demonstrated its impotence. Key figures like Kerensky, while initially seen as potentially controlling the populace, ultimately failed to stem the tide of anarchy. This weakness facilitated the Bolshevik seizure of power in October 1917.

3. Early White Army efforts faced severe challenges but achieved initial victories.

The flag was certainly in good hands, but there was neither ammunition, arms, nor money.

Forming the core. Following the Bolshevik takeover and the collapse of the old army, scattered groups of anti-communist forces began to coalesce, notably the Volunteer Army on the Don and in Caucasia under Generals Alexeiev and Kornilov. These initial forces were small, primarily composed of officers who had escaped Red terror.

Overcoming scarcity. The nascent White armies faced extreme shortages of everything needed for warfare:

• Ammunition and arms (often captured from the enemy)
• Supplies and transport (relying on local requisitions)
• Financial resources (dependent on limited donations and foreign promises)
  Despite these limitations, the high morale and dedication of the officer core provided a fighting spirit.

Initial successes. Despite being outnumbered and out-equipped, these determined units achieved significant early victories, particularly in Northern Caucasia. By leveraging tactical skill and the enemy's disorganization, they liberated territory, captured supplies, and began to attract new recruits, demonstrating the potential for effective resistance against the Red forces.

4. Strategic disagreements and disorganization plagued the White High Command under Denikin.

General Denikin's Army continued its rapid march towards Moscow... But it had been clear to me for a long time... that we were building on sand, we had bitten off far more than we could chew.

Conflicting visions. Under General Denikin's command, the White movement expanded significantly, but strategic direction became a major point of contention. Wrangel advocated concentrating forces on key objectives like Tsaritsin to link with Kolchak's Siberian army and secure a strong base, arguing against overextension.

Denikin's plan. Denikin, however, pursued a broad, multi-pronged offensive towards Moscow, dividing his forces across an immense front stretching from the Volga to Ukraine. This "March on Moscow" strategy, while initially successful in capturing territory like Kharkov and Kiev, dangerously thinned the White lines and left the rear vulnerable.

Ignoring warnings. Wrangel repeatedly warned Denikin and his staff, particularly Romanovsky, that this strategy was unsustainable and would lead to disaster. He highlighted the lack of reserves, the disorganized rear, and the enemy's ability to concentrate forces against weakened points. These warnings were largely dismissed, often attributed to personal ambition rather than strategic foresight.

5. Corruption and lack of order behind the lines undermined the war effort.

The war is becoming to some a means of growing rich, re-equipment has degenerated into pillage and peculation.

Breakdown of discipline. As the White Army advanced and occupied vast territories, the breakdown of order behind the lines became a critical weakness. The lack of centralized control and inadequate administrative structures allowed widespread corruption to flourish.

Pillage and profiteering. Re-equipment efforts, instead of being managed systematically, often devolved into units seizing whatever they needed or desired from the local population. This led to:

• Arbitrary requisitioning and looting
• Soldiers and officers engaging in trade and profiteering
• Large numbers of personnel remaining in the rear with excessive transport trains
  This behavior demoralized the troops and alienated the populace.

Weak administration. The civil administration was often ineffective, staffed by incompetent or dishonest individuals. Police and counter-espionage services were disorganized and often corrupt, failing to suppress crime or counter Bolshevik agitation. This created an environment of lawlessness and abuse that severely hampered the war effort and eroded public trust.

6. The disastrous retreat from Kharkov to Crimea marked a turning point.

The disaster that I had foreseen for so long seemed to be upon us at last.

Overextension's cost. Denikin's overextended front, combined with the disorganization in the rear, finally caught up with the White Army in late 1919. The Red Army, concentrating its forces, launched successful counter-offensives, particularly against the junction of the Volunteer Army and the Army of the Don.

Rapid collapse. The White lines buckled, leading to a rapid and chaotic retreat across southern Russia. Cities like Orel and Kursk were abandoned, and the front collapsed towards the Black Sea. The retreat was marked by immense suffering, loss of equipment, and further demoralization of the troops.

Loss of territory and morale. The vast territories gained during the March on Moscow were lost, along with crucial resources and manpower. The retreat culminated in the chaotic evacuation from Novorossiisk in March 1920, where tens of thousands of soldiers and refugees were left behind due to insufficient transport and planning, marking the nadir of the White cause.

7. Wrangel assumed command of a shattered force facing overwhelming odds.

I have come here because I cannot refuse to share with the Army what are, perhaps, its last hours, and if fate calls me to the leadership of the Army, I will accept the ordeal.

A desperate situation. Following the Novorossiisk disaster and Denikin's resignation, Wrangel was elected Commander-in-Chief by a military council in Crimea in March 1920. He inherited a force on the brink of collapse, demoralized, disorganized, and confined to a small, resource-poor peninsula.

Overwhelming challenges. The new command faced a multitude of dire problems:

• Army and Navy in disarray, lacking discipline, equipment, and fuel
• Civil administration non-existent or incompetent
• Financial system in ruins, hyperinflation rampant
• Population suffering from food shortages and epidemics (typhus)
• Bolshevik agents active behind the lines

Foreign abandonment. Compounding the internal crisis, Wrangel immediately received an English ultimatum demanding surrender negotiations and threatening withdrawal of all support if the fight continued. Despite recognizing the near-hopelessness, Wrangel accepted command, determined to uphold the honor of the Russian flag and protect those who had sought refuge.

8. Reorganization and vital reforms aimed to rebuild the Army and gain popular support.

The Prikaze concerning the Land, therefore, rejected the idea of making a general reallotment of the land, or of making a free gift of it.

Restoring order. Wrangel immediately implemented drastic measures to restore discipline and order in the Army and behind the lines. This included ruthless punishment for corruption and lawlessness, reorganization of military units, and efforts to improve the dire living conditions of soldiers and refugees.

Agrarian reform. Recognizing the critical importance of the peasant question, Wrangel enacted a radical agrarian law. This law legalized peasant seizure of land, granting them private ownership through redemption payments to the state (which would compensate former owners). This aimed to:

• Gain peasant support and counter Bolshevik propaganda
• Create a class of small landowners invested in stability
• Provide a legal basis for land ownership

Local government. Alongside land reform, Wrangel established a system of district Zemstvos elected on a democratic basis. This decentralized local administration, giving peasants a significant role in local governance and economic management, further aiming to build trust and stability from the ground up.

9. Foreign policy shifted, with French support replacing English pressure for surrender.

The French Government has consented to a de facto recognition of the South Russian Government.

English pressure. Following the Novorossiisk evacuation, England intensified pressure on Wrangel to negotiate a surrender with the Bolsheviks, threatening to cut off all aid. This policy, driven by a desire to end the Civil War and resume trade, put Wrangel in a difficult position.

French support. In contrast, France, concerned by Bolshevik advances against Poland and recognizing the strategic value of Wrangel's resistance, began to offer support. Through diplomatic efforts, particularly by P.B. Struve, Wrangel's government secured de facto recognition from France in August 1920.

Seeking alliances. Wrangel actively pursued alliances, particularly with Poland and Ukrainian anti-Bolshevik forces. He proposed coordinated military operations and the formation of a Russian army on Polish territory, seeking to leverage Polish successes and secure much-needed resources and manpower from Bolshevik prisoners and internees.

10. Despite initial successes, strategic failures and enemy strength led to defeat in Northern Taurida.

The Trans-Dnieper operation was over. It had been thought out carefully, prepared cleverly, and developed strictly according to plan, and yet it had ended in failure.

Offensive necessity. Confined to Crimea and facing severe economic hardship and limited resources, Wrangel recognized the necessity of breaking out into Northern Taurida to secure food and expand his base. He launched an offensive in May
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Last updated: May 10, 2025