Before Forgiveness

1. Modern Interpersonal Forgiveness is a Recent Historical Construct

For all its vast importance today in religion, law, politics, and psychotherapy, interpersonal forgiveness is a creation of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, when the Christian concept of divine forgiveness was finally secularized.

A modern invention. The book argues that the concept of interpersonal forgiveness, as understood today, is not an ancient idea but a relatively recent development. This "full sense" of forgiveness, encompassing apology, remorse, and a change of heart in the wrongdoer, emerged only in the 18th and 19th centuries. It represents a secularization of earlier Christian notions of divine forgiveness.

A complex constellation. Modern forgiveness is not a simple idea but part of a constellation of ethical and emotional concepts. These include:

• Acknowledgment of responsibility
• Expression of regret and remorse
• Commitment to future good conduct
• A change of heart in both the forgiver and the forgiven
  This intricate set of conditions makes it a unique moral phenomenon, distinguishing it from mere pardon or excusing.

Beyond ancient ethics. The absence of this specific concept in ancient cultures is not just a matter of terminology but reflects a fundamental difference in ethical outlook. This divergence extends to how ancient and modern societies conceived of the self and moral identity, suggesting that the modern emphasis on forgiveness is deeply intertwined with a particular historical and philosophical trajectory.

2. Classical Greek and Roman Societies Lacked the Concept of Modern Forgiveness

I argue that the modern concept of forgiveness, in the full or rich sense of the term, did not exist in classical antiquity, that is, in ancient Greece and Rome, or at all events that it played no role whatever in the ethical thinking of those societies.

Misleading translations. Terms like Greek sungnômê and Latin ignoscere, often translated as "forgive," did not carry the modern meaning. Instead, they typically signified "excuse," "understand," "make allowance," or "pardon" for actions that were involuntary or excusable due to circumstances. This distinction is crucial for understanding ancient ethical systems.

Aristotle's perspective. Aristotle, in his Nicomachean Ethics, links sungnômê to involuntary acts, those done by force or through excusable ignorance. He explicitly states that truly involuntary acts do not count as wrongdoing, and thus, there is nothing to "forgive" in the modern sense. This aligns sungnômê with exculpation or understanding, not the pardoning of a deliberate offense.

Rhetorical strategies. Ancient rhetorical manuals further illustrate this. Sungnômê was a defense strategy where the accused conceded the deed but denied responsibility, attributing it to external forces (like a storm) or internal states (like drunkenness or passion) that diminished culpability. This aimed for exoneration, not forgiveness based on remorse.

3. Ancient Reconciliation Focused on Status, Compensation, and Exoneration

Aristotle’s analysis of the appeasement of anger is, as we see, focused entirely on relations of status and power, which is in accord with his conception of anger as a consequence exclusively of a slight or diminishment.

Status and power dynamics. In classical societies, appeasing anger and achieving reconciliation often revolved around restoring the injured party's dignity or acknowledging their superior status. This was achieved through various means, none of which required the modern concept of forgiveness.

Methods of appeasement:

• Compensation: Offering gifts or payment for damages, as Agamemnon did to Achilles.
• Self-abasement: The offender humbling themselves, demonstrating fear or inferiority, which Aristotle noted could calm anger.
• Excuses: Attributing the offense to involuntary factors like divine influence (atê), drunkenness, passion, youth, or necessity, thereby denying full responsibility.
• Transference (metastasis): Shifting blame to another party or circumstance.

Absence of remorse. Characters in ancient literature, like Agamemnon in the Iliad or Lyconides in Plautus's Aulularia, offered excuses rather than expressions of deep remorse or a promise of moral transformation. Their aim was to mitigate blame or placate the offended party, not to undergo a fundamental change of character to earn forgiveness.

4. Biblical Forgiveness is Primarily a Divine Act of Sin Remission

The term employed for forgive here is a form of the root salakh; in the Hebrew Bible, only God is the subject of this verb.

God's exclusive domain. In the Hebrew Bible, the verb salakh, meaning "to forgive," is almost exclusively used with God as the subject. This highlights that forgiveness, in the sense of remitting or canceling sin, is a divine prerogative, not a human one.

Repentance and return. Forgiveness from God is often contingent on repentance (shoov, meaning "turn about" or "go back") and a return to God's path. This involves acknowledging one's sinfulness and seeking to re-establish the covenantal relationship. The focus is on a religious attitude and commitment, rather than purely interpersonal ethics.

Interpersonal "forgiveness" differs. When human characters in the Hebrew Bible "forgive" each other (e.g., Joseph forgiving his brothers), the term used is nasa ("lift up" or "bear"), not salakh. These instances often involve fear, self-interested pleas, or a pragmatic resolution, rather than a deep, mutual moral transformation.

5. Divine Forgiveness Differs Fundamentally from Human Interpersonal Forgiveness

But although moral forgiveness, unlike the remission of a debt and unlike exoneration, is granted only in the case of an inexcusable wrong, the vocabulary of debts and the cancelling of debts – opheilêmata and aphiêmi – employed in the Sermon on the Mount points to an important discrepancy between human forgiveness, in the sense defined in Chapter 1, and Jesus’s actions as recorded in the Gospels of Matthew and Luke.

Debt vs. moral wrong. The New Testament often uses the metaphor of "debts" (opheilêmata) and "remitting" (aphiêmi) them for forgiveness. While this can apply to financial debts, in the context of sin, it signifies God's power to eradicate a fault entirely, as if it never happened. This "wiping the slate clean" is a divine act.

God's unique power. Jesus's ability to "forgive sins" (e.g., the paralytic) is presented as evidence of his divine authority, a power that ordinary humans do not possess. Unlike human forgiveness, which acknowledges the wrong while overcoming resentment, divine forgiveness can abolish the sin itself, leaving nothing to remember or hold against the sinner.

Unconditional vs. conditional. While some interpretations suggest unconditional divine forgiveness, the New Testament often links it to repentance (metanoia) and faith (pistis). However, even when conditional, God's forgiveness is a unilateral act of grace, distinct from the complex, bilateral process of interpersonal forgiveness that requires a change of heart in both parties.

6. Early Christian Repentance Emphasized a State of Sinfulness and Conversion to God

With it there is created a new category, as it were: a person is now qualified as an evildoer, not just one who has done wrong. It is the difference between having committed a crime and being a criminal: it touches on one’s very nature, as being in a state of sin.

The concept of "sinner." Early Christian writers, like Tertullian and John Chrysostom, introduced and heavily emphasized the concept of hamartôlos (sinner), a term largely absent in classical Greek. This shifted the focus from specific wrongdoings to a pervasive state of sinfulness inherent in human nature, requiring constant vigilance and inner struggle.

Profound conversion. Repentance (metanoia) became a profound spiritual conversion, a "turning" or "return" to God's path. This involved deep self-reproach, shame, and contrition, often manifested through weeping, fasting, and mortification of the flesh. The goal was to cleanse the heart and purge the sinful state, not just individual actions.

Humility before God. Christian humility (tapeinophrosunê) was a virtue of self-doubt and acknowledgment of one's nothingness before God, distinct from the classical sense of deference to a superior. This humility was a precondition for seeking God's grace and remission (aphesis) from sin, a process fundamentally different from seeking sungnômê (excuse) in the classical world.

7. The Philosophical Paradox of Forgiving a "New Self" for a Past Wrong

If I repent, and in so doing, become a new man, asking for forgiveness seems to be a matter of asking for a response aimed at a person who no longer exists. But if this is really so, then there can be no point in asking for forgiveness, and the person who is asked for forgiveness can only aim his response at a metaphysical shadow.

The "new man" dilemma. The modern concept of forgiveness often implies a radical transformation of the offender, becoming a "new man" or a different person. This creates a philosophical paradox: if the person who committed the wrong no longer exists in a moral sense, who is being forgiven? The object of forgiveness becomes elusive.

Identity and responsibility. This paradox challenges the coherence of forgiveness, as it requires simultaneously acknowledging the past wrong and the perpetrator's continuing responsibility, while also accepting a fundamentally changed individual. If identity is episodic, then true change makes forgiveness redundant; if identity is persistent, then radical change is impossible.

Beyond literal re-creation. While the "new man" is often understood metaphorically, the underlying assumption of a profound moral shift remains. This shift, when made the basis for forgiveness, demands that the forgiver overcome resentment for an act committed by someone who, in a crucial sense, is no longer the same, making the act of forgiveness inherently enigmatic.

8. Kant's Moral Philosophy Paved the Way for Secular Self-Transformation and Forgiveness

Kant’s insistence on the moral autonomy of human beings, combined with his belief in the practical incompleteness of our virtue, may be seen as paving the way for an understanding of conversion or moral transformation as the precondition for earning forgiveness and for the capacity to forgive in interpersonal relations.

Secularizing grace. Immanuel Kant, despite not extensively discussing human forgiveness, inadvertently laid crucial groundwork for its modern understanding. His emphasis on human moral autonomy and the idea of radical self-transformation, previously a religious concept tied to divine grace, became secularized within his ethical framework.

Duty to be forgiving. Kant posited a duty to be forgiving (Versöhnlichkeit), rooted in the idea that humans, being imperfect, are always in need of pardon themselves. While he didn't fully elaborate on its content, this duty implied a shift towards human responsibility in the process of reconciliation, moving away from purely divine intervention.

Moral archetype. For Kant, God served as a moral archetype, embodying the law-giver and judge. This perspective allowed for the idea that God's grace, and the profound moral transformation it entails, could serve as a model for humanly possible, albeit imperfect, transformative and restorative relations, thus legitimizing the pursuit of such change in interpersonal contexts.

9. The "New Man" Concept Creates an Enigmatic Basis for Interpersonal Forgiveness

The premise of identity in renewal is intrinsic to forgiveness, and it is an enigmatic basis for a moral relation.

Sincerity and trust. The modern concept of forgiveness, relying on the offender's sincere remorse and moral transformation, introduces a precarious element: judging the authenticity of another's inner change. This difficulty in distinguishing genuine remorse from mere regret or feigned contrition makes reconciliation fragile.

Ongoing process. Forgiveness is often conceived not as a single, completed act ("having forgiven") but as an ongoing process ("forgiving"). This implies that the forgiver must continually commit to overcoming resentment, even as the memory of the wrong persists, locking both parties in a complex, reciprocal dependency.

Beyond forgetting. Unlike divine forgiveness, which can "obliterate" sin, human forgiveness cannot erase the past. It requires acknowledging that real harm was done while simultaneously choosing to transcend the bitterness and restore a moral relationship. This inherent tension between remembering the wrong and letting go of resentment forms the enigmatic core of modern forgiveness.

10. Ancient Character Formation Emphasized Continuity, Not Radical Self-Transformation

In general this is how the ancients understood the process of character formation – marked not by ruptures but by continuity, in which traits visible in childhood persist or become accentuated over time.

Consistent character. Classical Greek and Roman thought generally viewed character as continuous and stable, developing from innate dispositions through education and habituation. Figures like Achilles or Themistocles were imagined as possessing their adult traits even in childhood, with no expectation of sudden, radical shifts in their fundamental nature.

Education vs. conversion. While education could modify or improve character, it was seen as a process of shaping existing tendencies, not a profound, discontinuous transformation. This contrasts sharply with the Christian concept of conversion, which implies a complete turning away from a former self.

No "new man" in antiquity. The idea of an adult becoming an entirely "new man" due to remorse over wrongdoing was foreign to ancient psychology and biography. Even philosophical "conversions" were typically about adopting a new way of life or intellectual perspective, rather than a fundamental alteration of one's moral identity in response to a specific transgression.