Big Boys' Rules

1. The transition to Police Primacy militarized the RUC and fueled intelligence rivalries.

Under Chief Constable Kenneth Newman, and the new policy of ‘Police Primacy’, the RUC begins to take overall responsibility for security in Northern Ireland.

Militarizing the police. The 1976 policy of Police Primacy shifted security control from the British Army to the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC). To handle this responsibility, Chief Constable Kenneth Newman expanded and militarized specialized police units like the Special Patrol Group. This transition aimed to normalize security by presenting a police-led front, but it fundamentally altered the RUC's character.

Fierce institutional rivalries. The shift sparked intense friction between the Army and the RUC over who controlled intelligence. Both organizations ran separate, uncoordinated informer networks, leading to catastrophic operational errors. Key issues included:

• Accidental arrests of each other's secret informers.
• Compulsive secretiveness that blocked vital bomb warnings.
• Rivalries between MI5, MI6, and RUC Special Branch.

The power of knowledge. Intelligence became a currency of power, with agencies actively withholding information to protect their bureaucratic standing. This toxic environment of non-cooperation meant that the fight against the IRA was frequently sidelined by internal turf wars. It required the intervention of security coordinators to force a semblance of unity.

2. The IRA restructured into tight cells to survive the "long war."

By reorganizing on cellular lines PIRA has become less dependent on public support than in the past and is less vulnerable to penetration by informers.

The long war doctrine. Following the collapse of the 1975 ceasefire, the Provisional IRA realized that a quick victory was impossible. Leaders like Gerry Adams and Ivor Bell pioneered a transition to a protracted guerrilla campaign. This strategic shift required a leaner, more secure organization capable of wearing down the British state over decades.

Adopting the cell system. The IRA abandoned its vulnerable, large military-style company structures in favor of small, isolated Active Service Units (ASUs). These tight cells consisted of only three or four volunteers who knew nothing of other units. This structural overhaul drastically reduced the damage that a single informer could inflict:

• Volunteers only had contact with their immediate cell commander.
• Logistical tasks like hijacking and bombing were strictly segregated.
• The overall active membership shrank to a highly disciplined core.

Enhanced operational security. By streamlining their ranks, the IRA eliminated unreliable, loose-lipped volunteers who were prone to breaking under interrogation. The remaining core possessed superior forensic awareness, using gloves, boiler suits, and rigorous cleaning rituals to avoid leaving evidence. This made conventional policing methods virtually obsolete against them.

3. Elite undercover units operated in a legal gray area under "big boys' rules."

Many SAS soldiers sum up their attitude to the use of lethal force in situations like Ulster saying: ‘Big boys’ games, big boys’ rules.’

Elite covert forces. The deployment of the SAS and the creation of 14 Intelligence Company marked a massive shift toward clandestine warfare. These highly trained soldiers operated in plain clothes, driving unmarked cars and living in concealed observation posts for days. Their primary mission was to watch, track, and, when ordered, eliminate active terrorists.

The legal tightrope. Undercover soldiers operated under the same civil laws as ordinary citizens, theoretically bound by the principle of minimum force. However, the reality of close-quarters combat in hostile republican estates made adherence to the official "Yellow Card" guidelines highly impractical. Soldiers relied on an unwritten understanding:

• The state would protect them from prosecution if operations went wrong.
• Lethal force was deployed instantly if a suspect appeared to reach for a weapon.
• Written statements were meticulously prepared with Army lawyers to ensure legal compliance.

A culture of violence. The intense physical and psychological pressure of undercover work fostered a ruthless, insular culture. Soldiers viewed the conflict as a war, dismissing legal niceties as unrealistic constraints imposed by distant politicians. This mindset frequently resulted in a shoot-first mentality when confronting suspected terrorists.

4. The informer war turned the republican movement against itself.

During 1979 to 1981 the IRA killed eight people for informing, seven of them members of its own units.

The ultimate weapon. Human intelligence, or "touts," was the most valuable asset available to RUC Special Branch and MI5. The security forces used blackmail, financial rewards, and threats of prosecution to turn vulnerable republicans into informants. A single well-placed source could compromise entire operations and save dozens of lives.

Paranoia and internal purges. The pervasive threat of penetration forced the IRA to turn its violence inward. The organization established a ruthless internal Security Department tasked with hunting down and executing suspected traitors. This created a climate of intense suspicion and fear within republican communities:

• Suspected informers were abducted, tortured, and forced to confess on tape.
• Bodies were dumped on roadsides with blindfolds and single headshots.
• The IRA killed more of its own members than the security forces did during certain periods.

The moral compromise. Running high-level informants forced handlers to make agonizing ethical decisions. To protect a valuable source, handlers sometimes had to allow lesser crimes to proceed, or withhold information that could have prevented attacks. The state essentially became complicit in some paramilitary activities to preserve its intelligence network.

5. "Jarking" weapon caches allowed the state to track and neutralize the IRA.

The idea was that the devices would be activated when the weapon was picked up and that the terrorists’ movements could be monitored as they went towards their target.

Technical surveillance triumphs. When the security forces discovered hidden IRA arms dumps, they increasingly chose not to seize them immediately. Instead, specialized Weapons Intelligence Unit experts secretly dismantled the weapons to insert miniature tracking and listening devices. This highly classified practice, known as "jarking," revolutionized counter-terrorism.

Tracking the cells. Jarked weapons allowed intelligence officers to monitor the movements of active service units in real-time. Handlers could listen to the conversations of terrorists as they prepared for an attack, providing invaluable tactical foresight. This technology offered several distinct advantages:

• It identified the exact members of a cell when they retrieved the weapons.
• It allowed the security forces to intercept attacks before they occurred.
• It protected informers by making finds appear accidental or technical.

A deadly game of wits. The IRA eventually realized their weapons were being bugged, leading to a sophisticated counter-surveillance effort. Volunteers began meticulously inspecting their arsenals for electronic anomalies, turning the technology into a double-edged sword. If the IRA discovered a bugged weapon, the informant who had access to that cache was instantly marked for death.

6. The supergrass system offered a shortcut to justice that ultimately collapsed.

In the years which followed a series of appeals by people who had been convicted on the word of informers was to lead to the end of the supergrass system.

Mass trials and quick wins. In the early 1980s, the RUC pioneered the "supergrass" system, using turned terrorists to secure mass convictions. Informers like Christopher Black and Raymond Gilmour agreed to testify against dozens of their former comrades in exchange for immunity and new identities. This system bypassed the need for forensic evidence or confessions.

A legal assembly line. The trials took place in juryless Diplock courts, where judges routinely accepted the uncorroborated word of self-confessed criminals. For a brief period, this strategy successfully decimated the leadership of both republican and loyalist paramilitary groups. However, the system relied on highly questionable legal foundations:

• Over 200 people were arrested and held on the word of single informants.
• Supergrasses were paid massive sums and granted immunity for heinous crimes.
• The trials created immense resentment and protests within nationalist communities.

The system's collapse. The supergrass system ultimately disintegrated under the weight of its own legal and moral contradictions. Appellate courts began systematically overturning the convictions, ruling that the uncorroborated testimony of paid perjurers was inherently unreliable. By the mid-1980s, the strategy was abandoned, forcing the state to return to more conventional intelligence methods.

7. The "shoot-to-kill" controversy exposed systemic state cover-ups.

I have never experienced, nor had any of my team, such an influence over an entire police force by one small section.

The Armagh shootings. In late 1982, specialized RUC firearms units shot dead six unarmed individuals in County Armagh over a five-week period. These incidents sparked widespread allegations of a deliberate "shoot-to-kill" policy authorized at the highest levels of the state. The victims, mostly republican suspects, were killed in a hail of gunfire without any attempt at arrest.

Concocting the cover stories. To protect sensitive intelligence sources and the involvement of MI5, Special Branch officers instructed the shooters to lie to CID investigators. They fabricated elaborate stories of high-speed chases and broken roadblocks to justify the immediate use of lethal force. This systematic obstruction of justice was designed to keep the courts in the dark:

• Shooters were sequestered and debriefed by Special Branch before CID access.
• Crucial forensic evidence, including clothing and audio tapes, was destroyed or withheld.
• The state invoked "national security" to block independent investigations.

The Stalker affair. When Manchester Deputy Chief Constable John Stalker was appointed to investigate the killings, he met with fierce resistance from RUC Chief Constable Jack Hermon. Stalker's relentless pursuit of the truth, including his demand for secret MI5 audio tapes, led to his sudden and controversial removal from the inquiry. The affair exposed the lengths to which the state would go to protect its covert apparatus.

8. The state preferred the "clean kill" to avoid creating political martyrs.

If we don’t get them and destroy them totally or get them with the cleanest of cuts, then it is always assumed that it was not done properly.

The strategy of the clean kill. Security chiefs recognized that killing unarmed suspects or bystanders carried a devastating political and propaganda cost. It validated the republican narrative of British state murder and drove recruitment for the IRA. Consequently, the state developed the doctrine of the "clean kill"—intercepting terrorists when they were armed and actively executing an attack.

Exploiting the rules of engagement. By waiting for terrorists to retrieve weapons and initiate an operation, the SAS could claim they had no choice but to use lethal force. This allowed the state to operate within the letter of the law while achieving its real objective: the physical elimination of active cells. The tactical calculations behind this strategy included:

• Using precise informer intelligence to predict the exact time and place of an attack.
• Deploying overwhelming firepower to ensure no terrorists survived to testify.
• Presenting the incident to the media as a sudden, unavoidable gunbattle.

The illusion of legality. The "clean kill" maintained the crucial illusion that the state was adhering to the rule of law. It allowed politicians to defend the actions of the security forces in Parliament and before international observers. However, the reality was a highly calculated, pre-emptive execution strategy disguised as self-defense.

9. Loughgall was the devastating climax of the state's pre-emptive ambush strategy.

Loughgall was the most spectacular manifestation of this contest.

The ultimate trap. On 8 May 1987, an eight-man IRA unit launched a heavily armed assault on the RUC station in the quiet village of Loughgall. What they did not know was that the security forces had been fully briefed on their plans by a high-level informer. A massive force of SAS soldiers was lying in wait, positioned in and around the station.

Overwhelming lethality. As the IRA unit drove a bomb-laden digger into the station and opened fire, the SAS unleashed a devastating torrent of automatic gunfire. All eight terrorists, including key commanders Jim Lynagh and Paddy Kelly, were killed in a matter of minutes. The ambush was executed with ruthless, military precision:

• The SAS fired hundreds of rounds from assault rifles and machine guns.
• The bomb detonated, destroying the station but failing to save the terrorists.
• An innocent civilian bystander, Anthony Hughes, was accidentally shot dead by the SAS.

A decisive blow. The Loughgall ambush was the most successful single operation against the IRA since the start of the Troubles. It wiped out the core of the formidable East Tyrone Brigade and sent shockwaves of paranoia through the republican movement. While the state celebrated a massive victory, the incident stood as a stark monument to the lethal efficiency of the secret war.