Freedom of the Will

1. The Will is Always Determined by the Strongest Apparent Motive.

The Will (without any metaphysical refining) is, That by which the mind chooses any thing.

Defining the Will. The Will is simply the mind's faculty of choosing. Every act of the Will, whether choosing, refusing, liking, or disliking, is fundamentally an act of choice. This choice is never made in a state of perfect indifference; rather, it always reflects a preference or a prevailing inclination of the soul towards one thing over another.

Motive's influence. The Will is invariably determined by the strongest motive presented to the mind. A motive encompasses anything that moves, excites, or invites the mind to volition, whether a single factor or a combination of many. This motive must be perceived by the understanding, as an unperceived element cannot influence the mind.

Apparent good. Whatever acts as a motive is viewed as "good" or "agreeable" by the mind. The strength of a motive is its previous tendency to excite choice, derived from:

• The object's apparent nature and circumstances (beauty, pleasure/trouble, proximity).
• The manner of viewing (certainty, vividness of idea).
• The mind's state (temper, habits, occasion).
  Thus, the Will always aligns with what appears most agreeable, all things considered, at that moment.

2. Arminian Self-Determining Will is a Logical Contradiction.

If the Will determines all its own free acts, then every free act of choice is determined by a preceding act of choice, choosing that act.

Infinite regress. The Arminian notion of the Will possessing a "self-determining power" implies that a free act of choice is determined by a prior act of choice. If this prior act is also free, it must, in turn, be determined by an even earlier free act of choice, leading to an infinite regress. This means there could never be a first free act, which is a logical impossibility.

Contradictory nature. If the first act in this chain is not determined by a preceding act of the Will, then it is not "self-determined" and therefore, by Arminian definition, not free. If the initial act is not free, then none of the subsequent acts, which depend on it, can be free either. This renders the entire concept of self-determination self-defeating, as it either requires an endless series of prior choices or a first choice that is not free.

Action vs. determination. The Will determines things by an act of choice. If the Will determines its own acts, it must do so by choosing those acts. This means choice determines choice, and acts of choice are subject to other acts of choice. This framework forces the conclusion that an act of choice must exist before it exists to determine itself, which is a direct contradiction.

3. Every Event, Including Volition, Requires a Cause.

Nothing ever comes to pass without a Cause.

Universal causation. The fundamental principle that everything which begins to exist must have a cause is a primary dictate of common sense and the bedrock of all human reasoning. This applies equally to substances and to the modes or circumstances of things, such as a body beginning to move or changing its form.

Consequences of denial. To deny this principle—that things not necessary in themselves can begin to exist without a cause—would dismantle all arguments from effects to causes. This would eliminate our ability to prove the existence of anything beyond immediate intuition, including the being of God, whose existence is inferred from the created world.

Volition as an effect. Volitions, or acts of the Will, are events that begin to be, and therefore must have a cause. If volitions could arise without a cause, it would imply that they are not dependent on anything, including the agent's own choice or design. This would make the Will a passive subject of accidental occurrences, rather than an active determiner.

4. God's Infallible Foreknowledge Proves the Necessity of All Events.

To say, the Foreknowledge is certain and infallible, and yet the connexion of the event with that Foreknowledge is dissoluble and fallible, is very absurd.

Prophetic evidence. God's absolute and certain foreknowledge of future events, including the voluntary actions of moral agents, is extensively demonstrated throughout Scripture. Numerous prophecies detail the moral conduct of individuals (Pharaoh, Josiah, Peter, Judas), nations (Israel, Babylon), and the entire course of human history, including the coming of the Messiah and the establishment of his kingdom.

Infallible connection. If God infallibly foreknows an event, then there is an indissoluble connection between that foreknowledge and the event's future existence. To assert otherwise—that God can certainly know something will happen, yet it might possibly not happen—is a contradiction. Certain knowledge implies the certainty of the thing known.

Necessity inferred. God's foreknowledge, being an existing reality, makes the foreknown event necessary in the sense of an infallible connection. This necessity is not caused by God's foreknowledge, but rather demonstrated by it. Just as after-knowledge proves the past existence of an event, foreknowledge proves the necessary future existence of an event. This means that if God knows it, it cannot fail to come to pass.

5. Moral Necessity is Distinct from Natural Necessity and Does Not Excuse Sin.

Moral Inability consists not in any of these things; but either in the want of inclination; or the strength of a contrary inclination; or the want of sufficient motives in view, to induce and excite the act of the Will, or the strength of apparent motives to the contrary.

Defining necessity. Edwards distinguishes between natural and moral necessity. Natural necessity refers to physical constraints (e.g., inability to fly). Moral necessity, however, arises from the strength of inclinations or motives, making it impossible for the Will to choose otherwise. This is not a physical inability but a certainty of the Will's determination based on its prevailing disposition.

Moral inability. Moral inability is the want of inclination or the strength of a contrary inclination. For example, a virtuous person may be morally unable to commit a vile act, or a malicious person morally unable to show benevolence. This inability is not a lack of power to act if one wills to, but rather a lack of the will itself.

No excuse for sin. Unlike natural inability, moral inability does not excuse blameworthiness. If a person's Will is opposite to a command, that opposition is the moral inability, and it is precisely what constitutes the fault. To argue that strong evil inclinations excuse sin would mean that the more wicked a heart, the less blameworthy the person, which is contrary to all moral intuition.

6. God's and Christ's Necessary Holiness is Supremely Virtuous and Praiseworthy.

The infinitely holy God — who always used to be esteemed by God’s people not only virtuous, but a Being in whom is all possible virtue, in the most absolute purity and perfection, brightness and amiableness; the most perfect pattern of virtue, and from whom all the virtue of others is but as beams from the sun; and who has been supposed to be, (being thus every where represented in Scripture,) on the account of his virtue and holiness, infinitely more worthy to be esteemed, loved, honoured, admired, commended, extolled, and praised, than any creature — this Being, according to this notion of Dr. Whitby, and other Arminians, has no virtue at all; virtue, when ascribed to him, is but an empty name; and he is deserving of no commendation or praise; because he is under necessity, he cannot avoid being holy and good as he is; therefore no thanks to him for it.

Divine virtue. Arminians argue that necessity precludes virtue and praise. However, they acknowledge God is necessarily holy. This leads to the absurd conclusion that God, the epitome of all virtue, possesses no actual virtue and deserves no praise because His goodness is unavoidable. This contradicts Scripture and universal human understanding of God's character.

Christ's perfect obedience. Similarly, Christ's human soul was necessarily holy, upheld by God's promises and eternal decrees. His perfect obedience, even unto death, was impossible to fail. Yet, Scripture abundantly portrays Christ's actions as supremely virtuous, praiseworthy, and meritorious, earning Him glorious rewards and the highest honor from God and angels.

Glory in necessity. The necessity of God's and Christ's holiness does not diminish their virtue; rather, it enhances it. Their unwavering commitment to good, stemming from their perfect nature, is the very essence of their supreme glory and worthiness of praise. To suggest otherwise would imply that a being is more virtuous if they are less inclined to good, which is illogical.

7. Arminian Liberty Undermines All Virtue, Vice, and Moral Influence.

If Liberty of Indifference be essential to moral Agency, then there can be no Virtue in any habitual inclinations of the heart; which are contrary to Indifference, and imply in their nature the very destruction and exclusion of it.

Inconsistent with habits. If Arminian liberty, defined by indifference and self-determination, is essential to virtue and vice, then no habitual disposition (e.g., humility, malice) can be virtuous or vicious. Habits, by their nature, imply a fixed bias, which destroys indifference and thus, by Arminian logic, eliminates liberty and moral quality.

Motive's dilemma. The influence of motives also becomes problematic. If motives excite the Will, they destroy indifference and introduce a bias, thereby eliminating Arminian freedom. If volitions are caused by motives, they are necessary effects, and thus not free or morally qualified. This renders all moral persuasion, exhortations, and divine means to promote virtue utterly useless.

Virtue's demise. This scheme leads to the conclusion that virtue and vice cannot exist. If an action is determined by a preceding choice, it's not free (not from indifference). If it's not determined by a preceding choice, it's not self-determined (not from the Will). Either way, no action can be virtuous or vicious. Furthermore, a choice without motive or end is without intention, and thus without moral quality.

8. The Moral Quality of Actions Resides in Their Nature, Not Their Cause.

If the essence of virtuousness or commendableness, and of viciousness or fault, does not lie in the nature of the dispositions or acts of mind, which are said to be our virtue or our fault, but in their cause, then it is certain it lies no where at all.

Infinite regress of fault. Arminians often argue that the moral quality of an act lies not in its nature, but in its cause. If a vicious act is only vicious because its cause is vicious, then the viciousness of that cause must, in turn, lie in its cause, and so on. This leads to an infinite regress, ultimately banishing all faultiness from existence, as no "first cause" could be inherently vicious without a prior cause.

Inherent quality. Moral evil is hateful and deserves punishment because of its inherent deformity, not because of some prior hateful cause. Similarly, virtue is lovely and praiseworthy due to its amiable nature. The wickedness of an effect does not lie in the wickedness of its cause, but in its own evil nature.

Misapplication of logic. This error likely stems from applying the logic of external actions to internal volitions. For external actions (e.g., moving a hand), their moral quality indeed lies in the internal volition that causes them. However, for volitions themselves, their moral quality must reside in their own nature, as they are the most direct expressions of the soul's disposition.

9. Common Sense Affirms Moral Necessity is Consistent with Blame.

The idea which the common people, through all ages and nations, have of faultiness, I suppose to be plainly this; a person’s being or doing wrong, with his own will and pleasure; containing these two things: 1. His doing wrong when he does as he pleases: 2. His pleasures being wrong.

Vulgar notion of fault. Common sense defines faultiness as a person doing wrong willingly, or having a wrong heart and acting from it. This understanding does not rely on complex metaphysical distinctions about the Will's self-determining power or indifference. Children, as soon as they can reason, grasp the concept of desert based on actions done by choice.

Distinguishing necessities. Natural necessity (e.g., inability to walk due to lost legs) is universally understood to excuse blame. However, moral necessity (e.g., a proud man's inability to humble himself due to his fixed disposition) is not seen as an excuse. In fact, a strong evil inclination is often considered an aggravation of wicked acts, not an extenuation.

The "grand illusion." The Arminian argument that necessity is inconsistent with blame relies on a "grand illusion"—an insensible shift in the meaning of terms like "necessary" and "unable." These terms, originally signifying natural constraint (against one's will), are then applied to moral certainty (a fixed inclination of the will), leading to a false association of blamelessness with moral necessity.

10. The Doctrine of Necessity Does Not Render Means and Endeavors Vain.

For endeavours to be in vain, is for them not to be successful; that is to say, for them not eventually to be the means of the thing aimed at, which cannot be but in one of these two ways; either, first, That although the means are used, yet the event aimed at does not follow; or, secondly, If the event does follow, it is not because of the means, or from any connection or dependence of the event on the means: the event would have come to pass as well without the means as with them.

Means are connected. The objection that necessity makes means and endeavors vain is self-contradictory. Means are "foregoing things" and effects are "following things." If there were no fixed connection between antecedents and consequents, then all means would be utterly vain, as there would be no reliable link between effort and outcome.

Necessity enables efficacy. The doctrine of necessary connection, far from rendering means useless, is precisely what gives them efficacy. Our endeavors are part of the chain of events, and their connection with desired outcomes is what makes them successful. To argue that a fixed connection hinders means is to argue that connection hinders connection.

Arminian paradox. Conversely, the Arminian doctrine of contingence (events without fixed connection to antecedents) would logically render all means and endeavors truly vain. If virtue and vice arise from pure self-determination, uninfluenced by anything prior, then no instruction, persuasion, or effort could have any predictable effect on moral outcomes.

11. God's Will is Necessarily Determined by His Perfect Wisdom and is His Highest Glory.

It is the glory and greatness of the Divine Sovereign, that God’s will is determined by his own infinite, all-sufficient wisdom in every thing; and in nothing at all is either directed by any inferior wisdom, or by no wisdom; whereby it would become senseless arbitrariness, determining and acting without reason, design, or end.

Divine sovereignty. The idea that God's will is necessarily determined by what is wisest and best is not a limitation but the very essence of His glory and absolute sovereignty. This necessity stems from the infinite perfection of His nature, not from external constraint. It implies no disadvantage, meanness, or subjection.

Components of sovereignty. God's sovereignty includes:

• Supreme, infinite power to do what He pleases without control.
• Absolute authority and right to act, without derivation or limitation.
• A will that is supreme, underived, and independent, determined by His own wisdom.
• Wisdom that is supreme, perfect, and self-sufficient.
  This perfect determination by wisdom prevents His will from being "senseless arbitrariness" or "blind contingence."

Glory in necessity. It is no more dishonorable for God to be necessarily wise and holy than for His existence to be necessary. In fact, His necessary perfection in these attributes is what makes Him supremely praiseworthy. To suggest that His freedom would be enhanced by the possibility of acting unwisely or unholily is a profound misunderstanding of true dignity and excellence.